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Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS EEU-96-094
Tuesday
14 May 1996

Daily Report
East Europe

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NOTICE: This volume contains a representative selection of material previously disseminated in softcopy format.

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Balkans: FRY, Bosnia, Croatia Sign Agreement on Refugees

LD1305113196 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1009 GMT 13 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Geneva, 13 May (TANJUG)—Ljubisa Vladusic, minister of the Serb Republic, Nugdin Recica, minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Ante Alic, minister of the Muslim-Croat federation, today signed a joint statement at the Palais des Nations in Geneva upholding 10 UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] principles on visits by refugees and displaced persons to municipalities and places of their origin in Bosnia. [passage omitted]

Ljubisa Vladusic, the Serb Republic minister for refugees and displaced persons, told TANJUG immediately after the signing ceremony that the acceptance of the UNHCR principles would ensure that the visits are carried out in an organized manner and under complete control.

"In any event, we expect this statement to thwart attempts at political manipulation and to create conditions for complete freedom of movement throughout Bosnian territory," Vladusic said.

"We also expect this joint statement to speed up the process of rebuilding trust among people and make possible the exercise of the right to ownership of real property, or the right to receive compensation or exchange this property," he added. [passage omitted]

Bulgaria: Zhelev, Pavlov Agree on Military Inspectorate

AU1405092596 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 14 May 96 p 12

[Article by Sasha Dimitrov: "Dr. Zhelev and Pavlov Agreed on Inspectorate Issue"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Bulgarian Army General Staff announced on 13 May that President Zhelyu Zhelev and Defense Minister Dimitur Pavlov have agreed on the composition of the Army Inspectorate.

The special bill that was adopted recently invests the Inspectorate with control functions within the armed forces. Such an organ used to exist until 1992, when it was closed. Now, in addition to control over combat training, the Inspectorate will also deal with cases of corruption and other violations in the armed forces.

Dr. Zhelev has accepted in principle the proposals of the Ministry of Defense (which have already been approved by the Council of Ministers), and it is expected that, by the end of the week, he will issue a presidential decree on the appointment of general-inspectors in the Bulgarian Army.

Colonel General Petko Prokopiev, first deputy to the chief of the General Staff, is expected to head the Inspectorate. Lieutenant General Angel Katsarov, Military Intelligence chief, has been proposed as his deputy.

Some 45 payroll and temporary employees will work in the Inspectorate. The officers will be appointed by Minister Pavlov, while the generals will be appointed by the president. Among them there will be representatives of all the branches of the Army and the more important military services. Sources at the Ministry of Defense said that the number of inspectors has been reduced to a minimum.

Bulgaria: Zhelev, Pavlov Seen Compromising on Inspectorate

AU1405095696 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 14 May 96 p 4

[Commentary by Sasho Dimitrov: "Profit From the Loss"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A few days after President Zhelev signed the decree on appointing new ambassadors abroad, he and the defense minister made a discrete agreement on the composition of the Armed Forces Inspectorate. It seems that the contradictions between the Presidency, the government, and the General Staff, which until yesterday seemed to be insurmountable, are history.

It is true that in a long and quiet dispute, the president succeeded in prevailing regarding the Inspectorate's new structure and did not allow governmental control over the military intelligence. On the other hand, he agreed to restore an institution that was closed down four years ago.

Dr. Zhelev did not give in. He only took a step backwards on the road leading toward the strategic battle—winning a new mandate at the presidential elections with military votes.

The specific "text" of the Zhelev-Pavlov agreement became obvious with the St. George's Day promotions, as well as the promotions that did not materialize, as it became clear which generals the president and the defense minister support.

Now that the discussion regarding the Inspectorate's composition is complete, the only thing left is to see what it will do in practice. Too many things in the Army evoke concern in the soldiers, their parents, and our society.

Everyone involved in the battle for the Inspectorate gained something and lost something. Now it remains to be seen whether the Army will gain.

Bulgaria: Defense Ministry Denies Rumors of Funding Cuts

AU1305170196 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 13 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] According to an announcement by the Defense Ministry Press Center, cited by BTA, the Defense Ministry has today denied rumors that have appeared concerning a 25-percent cut in the funding for combat training.

Bulgaria: Zhelev Views Videnov Government, Primaries

AU0905152996 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 9 May 96 pp 9-10

[Interview with Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev by Nikola Kitsevski; place and date not given: "This Cabinet Has Completely Failed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Kitsevski] Dr. Zhelev, you are the head of state, but it seems to me that, in recent weeks, you have been acting merely as one of the presidential candidates. Do you not think that this is not only due to pressure from the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] and SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] headquarters, but also is to some extent your own fault?

[Zhelev] All those who know me are aware that my behavior is not determined by external pressure, wherever it may come from. I determine how I behave according to the specific situation, which in this case is the following: My position is more complex than that of the other candidates for the simple fact that I am the incumbent president. Because I am president, I fulfill the duties prescribed by the Constitution; I receive people from home and abroad, make various decisions, and issue decrees. I also do a few other things that the government cannot forgive me for; I send back the laws that encroach upon our new democratic gains. I do all this, and I am duty bound to do it as a head of state who is responsible to the Bulgarian citizens. Accordingly, I cannot go and say: Vote for me, we have primary elections, and so on, as the other candidates may do.

[Kitsevski] You agreed to take part in the opposition's presidential primaries. However, these can easily be manipulated. Is it not a mistake to take part?

[Zhelev] My decision to participate in the primaries is a gesture toward the democratic development of a united and pluralist opposition in Bulgaria. To win the actual presidential elections, the democratic opposition has to have a single candidate. We were convinced that, in the second round of the elections, either no transfer of votes will take place at all or it will happen to a very small extent. This creates much greater risks of the presidential institution passing into the hands of another political force, with all the ensuing consequences. This made me agree to participate in the primaries. There is another reason as well: I am taking part with the goal of winning.

[Kitsevski] Does this presuppose that, in the event of any manipulation of the primaries being proved, it is possible that you will still run as a candidate?

[Zhelev] We signed a political agreement, in which the conditions are clearly and precisely stated. In the event of a total manipulation, if the election results are totally distorted, I am sure that they will be challenged by the political forces. I am sure, however, that sound common sense will prevail. What we are all thinking of is that if we lose the presidential elections, Bulgaria will lose the chance to enter the 21st century as a European and democratic country.

[Kitsevski] In his May Day speech, Videnov leveled the accusation against you that, in your capacity as president, you stand side by side with the old Bulgarian feudal landowner, with all his despicable features, now reincarnated in the form of a contemporary plutocrat; that you are sabotaging the executive's efforts; that you are a specialist in efforts to overthrow Bulgarian governments; that you use your trips abroad to calumniate your own country; and that you are fomenting a war between the institutions. Does war exist between you and Videnov?

[Zhelev] This is mere phraseology, and perhaps also the view of a man with typical communist or fascist convictions. The term "plutocracy" comes from the arsenal of Hitler's propaganda. It is a fact of history that it was the Nazis that accused all the Western democracies of "plutocracy." I find it very curious that the prime minister—a young man—has slipped into the rut of just this type of propaganda.

Regarding "calumniating my country," this is also a well-known feature of communist ideology, and especially its practice: Let us keep quiet, conceal things, then no one will know anything. To tell the truth about the government and its policies is not to calumniate one's country. Some 10 years ago, both Bulgarian and other statesmen remained silent about Chernobyl to avoid putting their parties and governments in a bad light. They did not discredit them, and people suffered because of this. Do not ask me to say abroad that Zhan Videnov categorically rejected Yeltsin's invitation to join USSR-2, because he did not do so. I think that Bulgaria can best be served by telling the truth.

War between the institutions does not exist. There is no war between the government and the president. The government is waging a war against Bulgarian society, but no government can ever win such a war.

Governments come and go, and this one will go too....

[Kitsevski] You say: "...and this government will go." When will it go and why?

[Zhelev] I do not know precisely when it will go, and I do not want to speak like an oracle. Seeing how things are going now, however, one thing is clear to me, and I stated it in my assessment of the government's performance in its first year: This government is simply incapable of ruling democratically. It has failed in practically all fields, despite the stories and despite the propaganda that it constantly tries to disseminate. The government has failed in all fields: in the fight against crime, in the economic field, in the purely financial field, and in agriculture. Let us merely cite as examples the grain and animal-feed crisis, on the one hand, and the banking crisis on the other. At present, we are witnessing these leaps in the dollar rate and the interest rate. All these things clearly and unambiguously demonstrate the failure of these policies and this government.

[Kitsevski] Do you draw a distinction between the cabinet's policies and those of the BSP?

[Zhelev] I have always wanted a distinction to exist, let us say, between the BSP, as a former communist party that has already evolved, and this government, which is practically neocommunist. Unfortunately, I do not discern this difference, and I doubt whether anyone can see it. Perhaps within the BSP there are individual groups, tendencies, and people who see the way things are going, who see that this is not the road for Bulgaria, but they do not hold dominant positions, they do not determine the government's policy, and they do not provide the image for the BSP's rule.

I will cite Kwasniewski as an example. When we talked together, we had practically no differences on any fundamental issues. On NATO, we held absolutely identical views, and the same was true of USSR-2; we also agreed regarding privatization, which they have almost completed in Poland. The same was the case when I talked with Brazauskas. In a word, the reformed communist parties are producing reformer leaders, while the unreformed parties are producing neocommunists.

[Kitsevski] You are in fact directly responsible for one type of government, namely a caretaker government, because you appointed it. Do you think that it was more successful?

[Zhelev] The caretaker cabinet was perhaps the most successful one, or at least one of the most successful. It accomplished much more than the Constitution obliged it to. It started the fight against crime, and took it up precisely at the right point, but it simply did not have enough time. Chervenkov, who was a competent interior minister, Prime Minister Reneta Indzhova, and other members of that government showed that they really meant to fight crime. It is precisely the experience of the caretaker government that gives me grounds to think that Bulgaria has a chance, that Bulgaria does have competent professionals to govern it. I will tell you that if, God forbid, some of General Chervenkov's police officers had been murdered, you would not have found him where Nachev was found. The difference between the caretaker government and Videnov's government is the difference between Chervenkov and Nachev.

[Kitsevski] You supported the thesis that the transition from totalitarianism to democracy most often passes through dictatorship. Now, seven years after the start of the changes, we have still not come to this. Do you fear a dictatorship?

[Zhelev] In our country, dictatorship is impossible because dictatorships are generally installed with the help of the army. Our army will not take part in such wild ventures. Throughout the whole of this period, the Bulgarian Army has shown a high degree of maturity by standing apart from all the political battles, not intervening, but staying on guard and preserving its status as an all-national institution, the chief internal guarantor of our national security and Bulgaria's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Strong feelings, of course, can always appear, and they very often do in Bulgaria as a result of the chaos, lawlessness, and raging crime. This naturally arouses an instinctive desire in the ordinary man for a strong hand, for more dictatorial methods of action. We simply have to seek ways to emerge from the crisis as soon as possible so as not to provide food for feelings of this kind in people.

[Kitsevski] What about the risk of dictatorship imported from abroad—in the event of a "strong hand" following the elections in Russia?

[Zhelev] I do not consider that this can have such an effect on Bulgaria. Today, Bulgaria is much more closely linked with Europe than with Russia, through the European structures in which it participates. This connection with the continental democratic structures is a guarantee for the continuation of the democratic processes in our country. As for me, I do not want the strong hand in Russia that you mention.

[Kitsevski] Simeon II is soon to return to Bulgaria. Are you worried by this, do you thing that there may be some political reversal in Bulgaria?

[Zhelev] No, I do not think so. Naturally, this will be a great event, perhaps even a sensation, for broad sections of the public. However, it is important to give him an opportunity to meet with his relatives and family friends, and with his supporters and personal admirers. Thus, things will go quite normally. Tension might be aroused if somebody tries to impose any restrictions. For this reason, I think that there should be no restrictions. Simeon Coburg-Gotha will be able to go anywhere he wants, meet the people whom he wants to see, and familiarize himself with the situation in the country. Let him help in any way he can.

[Kitsevski] Mr. President, one last question. What do you expect on the day of the primary elections?

[Zhelev] On the day of the primaries, I expect everyone to cast their votes who realize that, in 1996, what is being decided is not questions of power, but questions regarding Bulgaria's future. I further expect to meet with you to give you my first interview as the one and only candidate of the united opposition.

Bulgaria: National Bank Reduces Dollar Rate to 106 Leva

AU1305173596 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 13 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Today Mileti Mladenov, deputy governor of the Bulgarian National Bank [BNB], announced that the BNB is reducing the dollar fixing price for tomorrow to 106.48 leva. This measure is accompanied by an increase in the amounts of foreign currencies bought and sold on the interbank market today to 25 and 15 million dollars respectively, amounts that in the view of the BNB deputy governor are almost normal.

The BNB's measures are already producing results, Mladenov said, adding, however, that it is still too early to say that the market's negative expectations have been defeated.

Bulgaria: Videnov, Trenchev Discuss Enterprise Liquidation

AU1405101596 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 14 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Zhan Videnov and Dr. Konstantin Trenchev, president of the Podkrepa Labor Confederation, met today to discuss the liquidation of enterprises.

Following the talks, Dr. Trenchev said that he was surprised by the invitation, but accepted it because dialogue is always his trade union's first priority.

The trade union leader presented Podkrepa's position on the issue and stressed that he insists on clarity, not only regarding the names of specific plants that will be closed down, but also on the relevant social program and financial guarantees for the workers who will find themselves without jobs.

Dr. Trenchev also posed the issue of preventing the economic leaders from carrying out the enterprises' liquidation, because this will allow them to conceal their crimes. According to him, the collectives must participate in the process, during which the provisions of the collective labor contracts must be observed.

The Podkrepa leader proposed to the prime minister to cooperate in forming a commission that will investigate the consequences of replacing plant managers during Videnov's tenure.

Bulgaria: Budget, Finance Commission Examines Bank Act

AU1305171296 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 13 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Today the National Assembly's Budget and Finance Commission held a special session to discuss the bill on amendments and additions to the Banking and Credit Act. What is important now is to examine the passages relating to bank insolvency risks, the measures for rehabilitating the credit institutions, the procedures for declaring banks insolvent, and the actions ensuing therefrom, declared Kiril Zhelev, the commission's chairman.

The members of the commission also intend to discuss the amendments that the cabinet proposes to the list of companies for mass privatization.

Bulgaria: Purvanov Sees No Chance of Videnov's Overthrow

AU1305122796 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 11 May 96 p 8

[Interview with Georgi Purvanov, deputy chairman of the BSP Supreme Council, by Neda Popova on 11 May; place not given: "The Rumors About a National Salvation Cabinet Are Exaggerated"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Popova] Mr. Purvanov, you have been out of Bulgaria during the last few days. During this period, a rumor was put into circulation about a coup being prepared within the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP]. The coup was supposed to take place today, at the Sofia BSP organization's conference, and transferred on the following day to the session of the left-wing parties held to discuss the government's economic policy. What is your comment on these claims?

[Purvanov] There are certain seekers of strong sensations who plan such scenarios every day, but in my opinion it would be impossible to speak of such trends within the BSP. Quite the reverse, all the debates that are going on are aimed at strengthening and stabilizing the executive and the whole administration of the Democratic Left.

[Popova] Your name (together with a few others) is linked to a possible successor to Aleksandur Marinov [leader of the Sofia BSP organization], naturally with the proviso that you retain your post as deputy chairman of the BSP Supreme Council, because there is a tradition in the BSP that the leader of the party should at least for a time lead the Sofia BSP organization....

[Purvanov] I am familiar with the Socialist Party's history, but do not consider that such a tradition exists. Moreover, I do not regard it as appropriate at present for one person to hold the two posts you mention. With regard to my own candidacy (I only heard about this rumor a few hours ago), I do not consider that it is appropriate. If such a proposal should be made, I will probably decline, because my proper role is elsewhere, and I would not want to take on the burden of leading the Sofia party organization. There are other more suitable and better prepared candidates for this job.

[Popova] Am I to understand that you approve of the work carried out by Aleksandur Marinov, the incumbent leader of the Sofia BSP Council?

[Purvanov] I do have quite a number of criticisms concerning his activities. These are linked with the need for the leadership of the Sofia BSP organization to work more intensively. Sasho Marinov is a strong and mature politician, but he does not pay sufficient attention to the organization at 10 Lege Boulevard [headquarters of the Sofia BSP organization]. Some of the weaknesses in the Bulgarian Socialists' largest municipal organization stem from this. However, I will expound my views at today's conference. It is most important to seek to make an overall assessment, without getting bogged down in details, and not only to negatively assess the work of one leader or other. I say this regarding both the BSP Sofia organization and the work of the Council of Ministers.

[Popova] There is a prevailing view that the old guard in the BSP can no longer tolerate Aleksandur Marinov. If we add to their views the resolutions adopted by a number of municipal organizations, it emerges that there will be great tension at the conference....

[Purvanov] I have not made any head count, but it seems to me that Marinov is able to hang onto his job as leader of the Sofia organization. However, at the same time I hope that the discussion will be conducted frankly and in depth, and that Marinov and his team, which may be substantially renewed, will draw the necessary conclusions so as to ensure the stabilization of the Sofia organization.

[Popova] Will the criticisms of the government that are expected to be made at the Left's meeting tomorrow finally bring about perceptible changes in the cabinet's policies?

[Purvanov] I expect a frank discussion of economic policy. Following an old tradition, some of the comments will most likely be aimed at the government's activities, the parliamentary group's work, and the overall policies followed by the BSP during its 18 months in office. However, I would not want you to think that I am drawing any parallel between the atmosphere at each of the two forums. Tomorrow's meeting has a specific task, and personally I think that we are not prepared to hold a general political discussion. The problems relating to economic policy are too severe and urgent for us to permit ourselves to engage in a diffuse debate without adopting any concrete resolution.

[Popova] Will at least two more ministers have to leave the cabinet?

[Purvanov] At its plenum on 10 March, the Left recommended changes in the executive's system. My own personal view is that they should be implemented in a timely way. Of course, they could only be made as the prime minister himself sees fit, because our primary task is to strengthen the Democratic Left's government; this is connected not so much with the prospects for our own administration as with the overall development of the reform and the further evolution of the transition.

[Popova] Could the government fall tomorrow?

[Purvanov] I do not believe that the cabinet is threatened. It seems to me that all the rumors about a forthcoming global change and about seeking some national salvation cabinet are greatly exaggerated. The Democratic Left can and must govern as the electors who voted for it in the fall of 1994 ordained.

[Popova] When can we expect the BSP to name its presidential candidate?

[Purvanov] The answer to this question will become clear no later than in the first half of June. The BSP Supreme Council will decide who our candidate will be. Its decision will take into account the numerous factors of which the media have already informed the public.

[Popova] How do your regard the alternative of a cabinet headed by Georgi Pirinski?

[Purvanov] We are now entering the realm of political fantasy and soothsaying. At this stage, one cannot expect any restructuring of the political scene (an idea that lies at the bottom of the so-called national salvation cabinet proposal), nor any overthrow of the prime minister, who still enjoys the support of the Democratic Left.

[Popova] However, the voting on the resignation of the head of Bulgarian National Television showed that the prime minister can no longer count on the support of the Democratic Left Parliamentary Group for all his decisions!

[Purvanov] In the Granitski affair, the distrust was not so much in Videnov as in those who tried to replace the director of national television. In this case, the prime minister stood apart from the debate.

Bulgaria: Konakchiev Supports Videnov, Economic Team

AU1405123296 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 14 May 96 p 9

[Interview with Doncho Konakchiev, deputy prime minister and member of the BSP Executive Bureau, by Sevda Dinovska in Sofia on 13 May: "Time for Changes in Cabinet's Economic Team Has Not Come"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Dinovska] Mr. Konakchiev, one hears the reproach that in the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] "plotters and sycophants" are increasingly prospering. Such statements come from your colleagues in the BSP Executive Bureau. Are they justified?

[Konakchiev] Naturally, I cannot accept such assessments. In addition, I assume that those who express them know in their hearts that they are wrong. Of course, mistakes are made, but only those who do not do anything make no mistakes. I do not want to idealize our work, but I categorically declare that we have assumed a great responsibility in the government and parliament, and objectively, we cannot engages in any intrigues.

[Dinovska] All that you will admit is that you are too busy. So isn't the proposal that you relinquish a part of your posts not a prudent one?

[Konakchiev] What do you mean by posts? I am a minister precisely because I am a representative of the Democratic Left in the executive power. In other words, I am a minister because I am a person engaged in party work. I would even add that we were given our posts with the idea that this would guarantee that the cabinet will work for the implementation of the BSP program. [passage omitted]

[Dinovska] Do you agree with the calls for changes in the cabinet's economic team?

[Konakchiev] I respect all colleagues and comrades who make such proposals because they are concerned. I have long experience in economic matters, therefore, let us discuss these things on the basis of familiarity with the real economy. There is no ideal team. Our team is not ideal. Furthermore, there does not exist a permanent team in any sphere, let alone in the economy. However, when we really are carrying out a large-scale restructuring of our economy, adopting real measures for improving the banking system, and are about to begin real privatization, it is not the time to change the cabinet's economic team. On 10 March (date of the BSP plenum that marked the party's first year in power), we entrusted the prime minister with our political confidence, and he will make the changes when they become necessary.

[Dinovska] You said "we entrusted him with political confidence." According to some BSP Executive Bureau members Videnov is "twisting your arm" and imposing his own decisions.

[Konakchiev] No one has twisted my arm. If I accept or reject something at the Executive Bureau I do it because I am convinced that it is the right thing to do. [passage omitted]

[Dinovska] Is it justified to ask Videnov to resign?

[Konakchiev] A party that rallies 2 million voters around itself contains various streams of thought. However, how do you express opinions? By voting. I would not identify everything we are doing with Videnov alone, but there has been no case when the position that he maintains has produced a split in the leadership. Therefore there is no justification in drawing such conclusions. [passage omitted]

Bulgaria: 'Crisis' in BSP Over Enterprise Liquidation

AU1405095196 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 14 May 96 p 3

[Commentary by Reni Neshkova: "Real War of Interests in the BSP Yet To Come"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] faces its gravest crisis in the last six years as a result of the necessity to liquidate enterprises rapidly. The BSP plenum concealed the internal tension in the party because electoral needs dictated this, but the accumulation of tension will continue with increasing force. What is meant here is the difference in interests among the higher leadership regarding the economy. Andrey Lukanov stated that he categorically supports Videnov's report. He understood how harmful it is to oppose the victor precisely at the moment of his victory. He also understood that if the government does not try now at least to simulate a structural reform, then it will not receive any money from the IMF, which would mean a fiasco not only for the state, but also for the BSP (on the basis of their value system). However, soon he will have to open his eyes, if the Plama oil refinery in Pleven leaves his sphere of influence. The "Great White Father," as the citizens of Pleven call Lukanov, holds every other day meetings with managers of the city enterprises, sources in the refinery told us. It is an incredible fact that not an enterprise that produces toothpicks, but an oil refinery, have become unfit to exist. This is unprecedented in the world economy. However, strong interests have demanded the liquidation of the refinery.

The example of the Zebra rubber factory in Novi Iskur, which has a credit line in the World Bank and is the only such enterprise in the country, but nevertheless figures in the list of plants to be closed down, is also absurd. This information regarding the enterprises that will be closed down, which is kept secret at present, was disclosed by Aleksandur Marinov, the former head of the BSP Sofia City Organization, one day after he was toppled. Unlike Lukanov, he could not control his nerves and did not even congratulate his successor. Nevertheless, regardless of how much they differ in style, they are united in their attitude toward the cabinet.

However, the infighting within the BSP will be nothing in comparison to the discontent that will spread among the interest clubs, precisely because of the violation of their interests. Nikola Koychev [the new head of the BSP Sofia City Organization], has already been visited by a dozen plant managers. The line is becoming ever longer and the tacit discontent ever stronger and clearer.

Indeed, what will be left of the BSP after the fiasco of its demagogy and if the local *nomenklatura* becomes dissatisfied with its protectors? And on the other hand, what will happen if the leadership does not implement its promises to the IMF and again pumps budgetary blood into enterprises that are more dead than alive?

It is very likely that, after the presidential elections, the BSP's feebleness will produce a new government of "national consensus," for which George Ganchev [Bulgarian Business Bloc leader] is actively pushing, combining this with his presidential elections campaign.

Bulgaria: Possible Erosion of Workers' Support for BSP

AU1405101296 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 14 May 96 p 7

[Commentary by Vasil Popov: "Painful Issues Shake the BSP"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At present, the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] is being shaken by many painful issues. The transition period until now asserted many changes in the party as a whole, and they require a serious study and analysis. The BSP accountability elections conferences are continuing, and the most characteristic changes in the party are emerging at them.

The BSP has changed and continues to change. This is not related only to the new quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the membership. The BSP coordinates in society and the political spectrum have changed, especially after winning the parliamentary majority and forming the cabinet.

However, it is not general party and political issues that prevail at the conferences, although such issues are not being ignored, but rather specific issues that are being clearly formulated and require clear answers. Some of them are related to the interest clubs. Why is the BSP not strong enough among the railroad workers, who were one of the cradles of the socialist idea? Why are there no Socialists in Sofia's meat processing plant when there used to be 55? Were BSP members fired there and in other places?

The current situation in the country [illegible] the upcoming unpopular measures of the executi[illegible]sed new dilemmas to many citizens. Those 40,000 who will lose their jobs—what are they if not the proletariat? Where will they stand tomorrow? If a wave of strikes emerges—and the trade unions are warning of that—on whose side will the still-working Socialists be? Will they defend their interests as an impoverished class or the interests of the government formed by their parliamentary party?

After the initial stress created by the political hatred of aggressive opponents, which shook the Socialists from top to bottom, the party units of the party structure—the basic party organizations—now appear to be the most stable element in the entire party hierarchy. The reason is hardly in the mechanical consolidation against the external pressure. The rank-and-file Socialists are carefully observing the processes at the top, and every tremor produces a painful echo, especially when there is not enough information and when there are no answers to pragmatic questions.

Bulgaria: SDS Said To Miss Chance To Attack Cabinet

AU1305174996 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 13 May 96

[Report by Radio Plovdiv correspondent Sonya Karlova]

[FBIS Translated Text] The proper moment for seeking a no-confidence vote in Zhan Videnov's cabinet has slipped by, and now the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] is drawing dividends, especially following yesterday's plenum and the adoption of the resolution on structural reform. This assertion was made in Plovdiv today by SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] Deputy Vasil Doykov. He described the omission as a political mistake on the part of the SDS. He added that the opposition should be more resolute and belligerent at such a moment, saying that the opposition's reaction to the situation was inadequate.

Bulgaria: Dogan's Strategy on SDS Primaries Analyzed

AU1305131996 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 13 May 96 p 10

[Article by Mina Atanasova: "Dogan Betrayed the President"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On Saturday, the impoverished and depleted constituency of the Rights and Freedoms Movement [DPS] was called upon by its leaders to vote in accordance with their conscience in the opposition's presidential primaries.

Thus, Ahmed Dogan did what long was expected from him—to not show, or rather not dare to show preference for either Zhelyu Zhelev or Petur Stoyanov. Some time ago, the Falcon [Dogan's nickname] addressed another appeal to his people, namely, to join the mass privatization and spend 500 leva each. They did not listen to him. According to the most recent calculations, Kurdzhali, for example, is among the regions with the fewest owners of voucher books.

Dogan's appeals do not reach his voters as clearly and rapidly as in the past. It is not only the Turkish television and radio programs—widely watched and listened to in the Deliorman and Kurdzhali regions—that are responsible for this.

The Falcon's steps are also unintelligible to the political leaders who, from time to time, feel compelled to drink a glass of brandy with him. The inconclusive decision of the DPS Central Council will irritate Ivan Kostov [Union of Democratic Forces—SDS leader]. The blue [SDS] leader made it clearly understood that another betrayal on the part of the Falcon will prove very costly for the DPS. The SDS was enraged by the DPS's unclear policy during the municipal elections and reminded the DPS that Musa would not be Kurdzhali's mayor today had the SDS supporters not voted for him.

It appears that the Falcon's voters will simply not participate in the presidential primaries. This means that Zhelev will most likely not win against Petur Stoyanov.

Those involved in the president's campaign relied most of all on the votes of the ethnic Turks. They thought that Dogan would give the sign without any preconditions and qualifications that and his people would run as one to the polling stations. Even if Dogan had issued a clear instruction, however, there is no guarantee that the DPS voters would have run to the polling stations. This is so because the semi-illiterate and poor Bulgarian Turks in the villages have absolutely no idea what the "primaries" are, what the difference is between them and the real elections, and what they have to do with all this. Even at the municipal elections, which were so important for them, they succeeded only in the second round in understanding what they had to do and what ballot they should select. One cannot expect them to understand the unclear primaries.

With its Saturday decision, the DPS Central Council actually demonstrated that it has turned its back on Zhelev. Without the DPS votes, he will not see a second mandate. The SDS activists will recruit all their supporters in the main cities, while the People's Union has a weak apparatus. The Falcon selected the slyest variant—to not commit himself to any of the candidates and then support the winner at the real elections. If he had indicated support of one of the two candidates, he would have inevitably evoked the hatred of one of his present allies. Now he can have his cake and eat it, and still appear absolutely clean.

Czech Republic: Havel, Holan Praise IFOR Troops

AU1305124096 Prague PRAVO in Czech 13 May 96 p 6

[Article by Vaclav Pergl: "Holan Has Honored the Czech IFOR Troops"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Defense Minister Vilem Holan presented 20 Czech IFOR [Implementation Force] troops with commemorative medals on Saturday [11 May]. During his visit to the battalion, which is deployed near the Bosnian community of Donja Ljubija, he also gave them gifts—wristwatches.

He was rewarding their intervention of 19 April, when the Czech troops prevented a bloody clash between 300 Muslims and Serbs. [passage omitted]

The calm and composure of the Czech troops was also praised by the president of the Republic, whose order was read out. Vaclav Havel writes to the troops that, "by performing your duty and by means of your discipline and capability for action, you are helping to increase our state's trustworthiness in creating a new European security arrangement." The Czech troops are also taking part in mine clearance in the area where they are deployed. So far, they have cleared roughly 1,500 mines.

Czech Republic: IFOR Replacements Begin Training

AU1305135296 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 13 May 96 p 2

[Article by Jan Gazdik: "New Soldiers Are To Replace Some of the Bosnian Veterans in June"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Three hundred and fifty Czech troops will depart for Bosnia next month, where they will replace their colleagues in the IFOR [Implementation Force] battalion operating under the command of the North Atlantic Alliance.

So, roughly one-third of the 1,000-member unit will be replaced, while mainly soldiers who have already been serving in Bosnia for a number of months will be coming home. Among those to leave Bosnia will be the unit's current commander, Lieutenant Colonel Jiri Sedivy. He will be replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Josef Proks from the rapid deployment brigade. The training of the replacement forces will begin in the Sumava mountains this week.

Deputy Defense Minister Petr Necas said that, first and foremost, soldiers who have been in the Balkans for almost two years—with brief breaks—will return home. "They served first in the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] mission, which, following last year's offensive by the Croats, was transformed into the UNCRO [UN Confidence Restoration Operation] operation. Following its completion at the end of last year, these veterans again signed up unselfishly for the IFOR battalion, which is commanded by NATO," said Necas. The battalion's commander, Sedlak, is one of these men. "It is not good for the soldiers to serve in crisis regions for longer than a year—they may then make mistakes out of tiredness and monotony," thinks Necas.

Jiri Klose, head of the medical-psychological department of the Central Military Hospital, considers the selection of the new people for the IFOR mission to be unusually tough. The correctness of this criterion has been confirmed, according to the psychologist, by the fact that, so far, none of the Czech troops in Bosnia has broken down while carrying out the military tasks, despite being in situations of extraordinary conflict. Nevertheless, 17 persons have left the battalion prematurely. "I sent some of them home for repeated misbehavior, others left voluntarily—the mission was too much for them," said Sedlak.

Czech Republic: CR Seeks Full Membership in NATO

96CH0091A Prague PRAGUE POST in English 26 Mar 96 p 1

[Article by Siegfried Mortkowitz: "Czechs Want Nothing Short of 'Full and Equal' NATO Status"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] As the Czech Republic prepared to host foreign ministers from the United States and 12 Central and Eastern European countries on Wednesday, March 20, officials here said they will not accept any half-measures when it comes to being members of NATO.

In a series of recent public statements, Russian officials and diplomats have softened their resistance to NATO expansion into the countries of the former Soviet bloc. But these concessions stop well short of satisfying the Czech demand to be admitted into the alliance as, in the words of one highly placed Foreign Ministry official, "a full and equal partner."

According to Petr Kolar, recently named advisor for the coordination of foreign policy to Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec, full and equal NATO membership includes the obligation "to have nuclear weapons on our territory and perhaps also foreign troops."

This is a matter of political principle, Kolar said. "We want to take responsibility for our security."

Kolar went on to express his satisfaction with what he termed the "apparent Russian acceptance of reality."

"Several years ago, they did not accept any NATO enlargement; now they are prepared to make compromises. This is an important turning point."

At a March 14 news conference, however, the Russian Ambassador to the Czech Republic, Alexandr Lebedev, indicated that Russia would not accept the positioning of NATO military structures on the territory of the Czech Republic and other post-communists countries. He admitted, however, that "Russia does not have the right to veto the entry of the Czech Republic into NATO."

"But every state should be prepared for a worst-case scenario," he added, "not in the form of aggression, but in the form of pressure based on military superiority." And NATO already has a quite significant military superiority over Russia.

"It might be sufficient (for the former Soviet-bloc countries) to enter the political organization of NATO without entering the military structure, without the expansion of the military infrastructure of NATO" to the Russian border, he said.

But this is unacceptable to both the Czech Republic and NATO itself. "There is no such thing as being a half-member of NATO," a NATO source told THE PRAGUE POST. "This is totally unacceptable to the alliance."

According to Jiri Sedivy, a lecturer at the Charles University Institute of Political Science and a specialist in security matters at the Institute of International Relations, the recent Russian softening of its previous hard-line position is intended to avoid humiliation when NATO expansion becomes a reality. "The Russians have very little leverage, given their present economic situation and the deplorable state of their army."

Czech Republic: Verdict Casts Doubt on Telecom Privatization

AU1305165396 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 11 May 96 p 1

[Article by "(rez)": "The Court's Verdict Has Cast Doubt on the Sale of Some of Telecom's Shares"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The biggest privatization project in the country to date, the sale of 27 percent of Telecom's shares to the TelSource foreign consortium for more than 34 billion korunas, may turn into an international scandal. This is because the Regional Court in Prague has annulled the Telecom company's general assembly of February last year, at which the shareholders made their decision on the entry of a strategic partner.

"This virtually means that the entry of the foreign partner is invalid," said Martin Mosinger, the leader of the Association of SPT Telecom Shareholders, who caused the judicial dispute.

The February general assembly abolished the shareholders' right of first refusal. "If there were no such condition in the company's articles—and this has now happened—the entry of a strategic partner could not take place," explained Mosinger.

SPT Telecom, however, does not consider the court's decision to be final and intends to appeal. "We consider the complaint to be unwarranted, and, in any case, we will appeal," declared Telecom's spokesman, Evzen Stanek.

It follows from yesterday's court decision that the architect of the whole project, Economy Minister Karel Dyba, is to a certain extent responsible for the annulment of the general assembly and, thus, also for the grave doubts cast on the largest foreign investment in the Czech Republic so far. That is, Mosinger's complaint was based on the fact that, at the time of the general assembly, his commission from the National Property Fund was invalid.

The Economy Ministry, however, like Telecom, does not consider the verdict to be correct and maintains that the court's decision will in no way influence the agreements concluded with the TelSource company. "In any case, we support Telecom's stance," added Michaela Kucharova, the ministry's spokeswoman.

Nevertheless, according to Mosinger, the Economy Ministry made a few more blunders in Telecom's privatization. "It begins with a bad letter of invitation to another general assembly and ends with fraud in the entry in the company register," he said. If the Supreme Court rejects Telecom's appeal, the Association of Shareholders, which took part in last year's selection procedure, will, according to Mosinger, purchase the shares now owned by TelSource.

Czech Republic: Controversy Over Accepting Communist Party

96CH0091B Prague PRAGUE POST in English 26 Mar 96 p 2

[Article by Maggie Ledford Lawson: "Klaus at Odds With Ruml on Banning SCK"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus has cast himself as the good cop in a controversy over whether the Party of Czechoslovak Communists (SCK) should be allowed to exist.

Klaus, taking a stand in keeping with the thinking of many European democracies, says the government shouldn't be deciding such matters. The bad cop, Interior Minister Jan Ruml—like Klaus, a member of the ruling Civil Democratic Party (ODS)—want to outlaw the party.

The drastically different views being expressed on the issue, plus the timing on the eve of the nation's elections, have prompted speculation that political motives are behind it—an attempt to play to voters on both sides of the ideological spectrum.

Ruml kicked off the controversy earlier this month with the announcement of a proposal he was preparing to outlaw the party, on grounds that it is a clone of the communist organization that held power for 40 years. It is a "threat to democracy," the announcement said.

The SCK is led by Miroslav Stepan, who was jailed for two years for having ordered police to wield truncheons against students during the 1989 revolution.

Klaus took the political high road in a March 12 response, telling Czech Radio that only the courts should decide whether the SCK should be allowed to continue. "The idea of a formal ban is alien to me," Klaus said, adding that the most telling moment for the communists will come at the polls.

Vasil Hudak, director of the European Studies Center, a think tank focusing on political and economic policy in Central and Eastern Europe, said he thinks it is "not by chance" that the communist issue has surfaced shortly before the elections. "I would be very surprised" if the effort by Klaus and Ruml were not coordinated, Hudak said.

Ruml's role was to stir up emotion among constituents who have strong anti-communist leanings, he speculated. Klaus could then respond by appearing to be above politics, coming across as "a father of the nation, along with Havel," Hudak said.

Although Ruml's proposal played to the anti-communists, the ODS can't afford to go too far in that direction, because a number of allies in the government coalition, including Minister of Industry and Trade Vladimir Dlouhy, have affiliations with the former regime, Hudak said.

Czech Republic: Unemployment Figures Released

96CH0079A Prague PRAGUE POST in English 13-19 Mar 96 p 18

[Article by Eva Munk: "Unemployment Remains Low—Perhaps Too Low for Employers"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] According to the latest report issued by the Czech Statistical Office (CSU), the rate of unemployment in the Czech Republic is continuing to drop. But this is not necessarily a good thing.

At the end of January 1996, only 3.13 percent of the labor force, or 164,430 workers, were unemployed. This rate is .27 percentage points lower than it was at the same time in 1995 and .67 points lower than in 1994. Twenty-five percent of the unemployed were newly registered.

Many economists, including Industry and Trade Minister Vladimir Dlouhy, think these figures are too low. At a Feb. 15 meeting with entrepreneurs in Jihlava, he said an overall average of 5-6 percent unemployment would be ideal for employers looking for qualified labor.

The January '96 report showed that 68.4 percent of all unemployed people were manual workers, 19 percent were nonmanual workers, 55.5 percent were women and 12.4 percent were college or advanced school graduates. Forty-four percent, or 72,763 people, were receiving unemployment benefits. At the same time, 73,515 manual and 16,401 nonmanual jobs were available, for an aggregate of 1.8 seekers for every job.

The lowest unemployment rate is in Prague, where it stands at 0.3 percent. The highest rate is still in the north Bohemian towns of Most (7.71 percent), Louny (7.70 percent) and Jesenik (7.20 percent) and in northern Moravia, where the rate hovers between 6.16 and 6.89 percent.

Although these rates remain low, an earlier, more detailed report issued by the CSU shows a moderate increase in the unemployment rate since last fall.

In the autumn of 1995, 174,000 workers or 2.7 percent of the total labor force of 6,301,000 (which includes 504,364 students) were unemployed. If students are subtracted from the labor force, the percentage of unemployed was about 3 percent.

The autumn '95 report also said 45 percent of those unemployed were men and 54.3 percent were women. The largest group (17 percent) of unemployed were between the ages of 15 and 19, 15.5 percent were between 20 and 24, and 14 percent were between 25 and 29. Only 9 percent were between 50 and 59—the age group most often considered to be imperiled in the new economic system. Thirteen percent of those unemployed were handicapped.

Sixty-four percent of those without jobs were formerly employed by another person or by a company, 2.2 percent were entrepreneurs and only 1 percent were former members of production cooperatives.

The main cause of unemployment, cited by 19.4 percent, was personal or family reasons. Thirteen percent said they had been made redundant and another 12.5 percent said their employers had closed down.

Of those polled, 16.8 percent said they had been looking for a job for more than two years, 10.5 had been looking for less than a month, 18.5 had been looking between three and six months, 20.4 percent had been looking for six months to a year, 16.8 percent had been looking between one and two years and 16.9 percent were not identified.

Thirty-two percent of the unemployed were from the manufacturing sphere, another 15.2 percent had worked in trade and repairs and 11.5 had worked in construction. Unemployed agricultural workers made up only 5.5 percent of the total.

Sixty-four percent of those polled were looking for work through local unemployment offices, 0.6 percent were using a private employment exchange, 12.4 percent were reading advertisements and 10.6 percent were using contacts and friends.

Eighty percent were seeking work as employees (as opposed to seeking membership in production cooperatives or wanting to become entrepreneurs). About 13 percent said they would take any job offered. Sixty-six percent said they preferred full-time work, 18.6 preferred part-time employment and the rest expressed no preference.

Slovakia: EU Official Views 'Problems' in Relations With SR

AU1305123696 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 10 May 96 p 6

[Article by Samuel Brecka: "EU Commissioner Van den Broek's Adviser: We Have To Be Very Patient With Slovakia"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Berlin—More than 1,000 political and cultural programs are being held in Germany this week within the framework of the so-called European Week, the aim of which is to bring the idea of European unity closer to broad sections of the population. One of these events was the seminar "European Union in Change," organized by the European Academy in Berlin for journalists from EU associate countries—Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, and the Slovak Republic [SR]. [passage omitted]

The seminar participants were most interested in the speech by and subsequent discussion with Frazer Cameron from the European Commission's Planning Staff, who is the foreign policy adviser of EU Commissioner Van den Broek, the commissioner in charge of relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

In his lecture on EU policy toward the association and integration of Central and Eastern European countries, Frazer Cameron confirmed that eastward expansion was the EU's key task for the period to come. He added that talks on conditions for the entry of these countries could only begin after the conclusion of the EU Intergovernmental Conference in Turin and after introductory talks with Malta and Cyprus, but no later than the beginning of 1998. He estimates that the talks will last four to six years, but the Commission will definitely apply a differentiated approach because it believes concurrent negotiations with a larger number of countries would be technically impossible.

In the discussion, a question was asked about the latest development in the EU's relations toward the SR. Stressing that he was not communicating the Commission's official position but only his personal view, Frazer Cameron literally said: "We must be very patient in relation to the SR. On the other hand, the SR has made international commitments and has signed international treaties, and these must be honored. I believe that some of the more recent laws violate elements to which the SR has subscribed, especially in relation to the Council of Europe. We therefore have certain problems, including the aforementioned legislative measures. We hope, however—and we also have a Slovak Government promise to this effect—that these laws will be changed. We are conducting a permanent dialogue. Problems exist, but, as I have said, the SR has taken on commitments, and these must be fulfilled."

Slovakia: Government Criticizes Kovac Statements to Solana

AU1305130796 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 10 May 96 p 2

[Article by "do": "Government Office Voiced Regret"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The statement by the Press Department of the Office of the President of the Slovak Republic, issued in conjunction with Michal Kovac's talks with NATO Secretary General Mr. Solana, in which Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar was accused of having twisted the president's words to suit his propaganda aims, is not true. This is according to a report issued by Magda Pospisilova, director of the Information Department of the Slovak Government Office. The Information Department expresses regret that it must use the wording of the minutes from the reception of the rare guest, NATO Secretary General Mr. Solana, by Slovak President Michal Kovac. Based on the minutes, the president asked that the citizens of our Republic learn in a timely and accurate manner about whom NATO has critical reservations and why. By quoting a newspaper clipping, an extraordinarily unusual method in diplomacy, the president read to Mr. Solana the view of a foreign guest to the Party of the Democratic Left congress, which has been broadly publicized in our media [reference to the statement by Jean Francois Vallin, secretary general of the Party of European Socialists, that Vladimir Meciar represents the greatest obstacle to Slovakia's EU entry]. In this way, the president chronically involves foreign representatives in the domestic political affairs of the Slovak Republic, the report states.

Slovakia: Meciar Accuses Kovac of Dividing Society

AU1305144096 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 10 May 96 p 2

[Article by Robert Zitnansky: "According to Vladimir Meciar, the President Is Dividing Society"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Supporters of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) met with Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar and the members of the Slovak cabinet at a regular rally in Bratislava.

The statement by Slovak President Michal Kovac that citizens must learn why and against whom NATO makes exceptions is, according to Vladimir Meciar "...

an expressed challenge: Against whom? After all, it is a state rather than a person, a party, or a government that is admitted into NATO," Vladimir Meciar stated in his introductory address. "It is just an example of a long-running practice of the president appearing on television and lamenting not being able to go to the Bradlo [hill with the tomb of Stefanik], while no one has actually prevented his trip. There was so much of this that I made some of it public. It must be seen that there is a certain duality. On the one hand, there is the idea of peace and tranquillity and, on the other, the constant incitement of emotions and the division of society against the HZDS, the government, the prime minister, or anyone who holds different views," Meciar added.

"... the Christian Democrats in particular are spreading the idea throughout Europe that the law has ceased to apply here and force has taken over.... I propose, therefore, that the full rigors of the law be brought to bear against them...," Vladimir Meciar said.

Slovak Interior Minister Ludovit Hudek assured those present that the possibility had definitely been ruled out in the case of R. Remias that the explosion had been caused by explosives. The autopsy cited trauma caused by burns as the immediate cause of death. Nevertheless, L. Hudek admitted that a metal fragment had been found in the skull of the dead man, but, according to expert analysis, it came from the floor of the vehicle under the back seat.

Slovakia: Hungarian Minority Reacts to Loyalty Pledge Request

LD1305165096 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1000 GMT 13 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] An American-Slovak roundtable on ethnic relations was held in Casta-Papiernicka at the end of last week. It was organized by a U.S. foundation and the National Council of the Slovak Republic.

As usual, Slovak-Hungarian relations, that is the issue of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, were at the top of the agenda. The Hungarian side presented six demands. The government coalition admitted that four of the demands are at least partially justified. They are the demands to set up a transparent system of cultural financing; to return to the principles of self-administration in education; scrapping the decision to abolish the Young Hearts, the only semiprofessional song, dance, and music ensemble; and setting up a private business academy in Dolne Vestenice. The government parties refused the demands to adopt a law on the use of ethnic minority languages and a constitutional law on the position of ethnic minorities. For its part, the government coalition asked the Hungarian minority representatives to adopt a declaration saying that they support the constitution, the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, and the Slovak-Hungarian treaty with the addendum; to express their loyalty to the Slovak Republic; and to reject ethnic separatism.

We asked representatives of the Hungarian coalition to give us their response to the proposed declaration. [passage omitted]

Deputy Pal Csaky [Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement] said that the conditions are unnecessarily formal. He literally said that, as deputies, we signed in 1993 and then in 1994, after the parliamentary elections, a declaration saying that we are loyal to the Slovak Republic. We acknowledge the validity of the Constitution, including the inviolability of the borders.

The position of the Hungarian Civic Party is now presented by its chairman, Laszlo Nagy.

[Begin Nagy recording] Ever since the establishment of the Slovak Republic, representatives of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia have continued to express their loyalty. The top representatives of the Hungarian coalition have signed a declaration and the deputies' oath upon joining parliament. I could also mention our everyday work, as well as the fact that Hungarians in Slovakia observe the law by their work and by paying taxes. They support this country, and no one among the Hungarian citizens is engaged in any activity that might threaten the Slovak Republic and its internal organization, its integrity, and its state borders. On the contrary, ordinary citizens, including those Hungarian citizens who engage in politics, are doing their best to ensure that life in Slovakia is as good as possible, that there are legal certainties in Slovakia, and that the Slovaks and the Hungarians in Slovakia cooperate.

I will not go on talking about loyalty. It is the current government coalition that keeps talking about it. It is only natural for political parties to criticize the government.

What is happening at present? If we are currently criticizing the ethnic policy of the Slovak Republic, we always criticize the ethnic policy of this government.

In my view, there are other problems in Slovakia that need to be resolved. It is more important to do that than to repeatedly express loyalty in a formal way. First, it is necessary to create mechanisms for tackling conflicts and for the implementation of human and ethnic rights in Slovakia. It is also necessary to continue dialogue rather than turning our backs on it, as some representatives of the government coalition did at this round table in Casta-Papiernicka.

However, if a formal declaration is needed, then it would first be necessary for the government to declare that it will implement the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, the Slovak-Hungarian treaty, and to adopt a law on the use of minority languages in Slovakia. [end recording]

Jozsef Kvarda, deputy chairman of the Coexistence Movement, replied to our question in the following statement issued through the movement's press department: Loyalty cannot be enforced, it is the result of a process. If the state pursues policies that are acceptable to the people, the issue of loyalty does not even arise and supporting the state becomes a natural thing. The demand that the parties of the Hungarian coalition should publicly declare their loyalty to the Republic is not standard in international life, nor is it justified. [passage omitted]

We consider the demand that we should support the introduction of bilingual education to be cynical, because the so-called alternative education would result in the loss of our identity. [passage omitted]

We were also interested to learn the position held by the nonparliamentary Hungarian People's Movement for Reconciliation and Prosperity [MLHZP]. MLHZP Chairman Gyorgy Gyimesi is on the phone:

[Begin recording] [Gyimesi] The MLHZP program clearly states its loyalty to the Slovak Republic. Therefore, we do not need to voice our stance on the issue. However, if it is necessary I can only confirm that our movement unequivocally supports Slovak statehood, the integrity of Slovakia's borders, and the full sovereignty of the Slovak Republic.

We consider ourselves to be equal citizens of this republic, to which we have our duty. Of course, this republic has a duty to us. All this is anchored in the Constitution, and that is why our movement unequivocally supports the Constitution of the Slovak Republic.

We have welcomed the basic Slovak-Hungarian treaty from the very beginning. We are resolved and prepared to implement the conclusions of the treaty.

With regard to the integration efforts of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, the position of the MLHZP is quite clear: We reject territorial autonomy. I personally am appalled by such irresponsible efforts as expressed by Miklos Duray from the Coexistence movement, when he said that the Hungarian minority is preparing to declare unilateral autonomy. No one has the right to speak on behalf of the whole minority. This would be fuel to the nationalist fire, and I cannot imagine the consequences of such a step. I am therefore calling on all sensible Hungarians, the intelligentsia, and politicians, to distance themselves from such a step.

[Announcer] Mr. Gyimesi, it is obvious from your statement that in your heart you basically agree with the demands put forward by the government. Would you be prepared to declare this openly?

[Gyimesi] Of course, we would be willing to declare it, the only exception being the addendum. Our movement has not yet received the addendum to the basic Slovak-Hungarian treaty, so with the exception of the addendum we unequivocally support all the other demands: loyalty, support for the Constitution, and, naturally, support for the basic Slovak-Hungarian treaty. Our movement rejects territorial autonomy for ethnic minorities on principle because, under Slovak conditions, we do not consider this form to be acceptable, much less useful. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Slovakia: President's Office Responds to STV Accusations

AU1305135596 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 10 May 96 p 2

[Report by "do": "Office of the President on STV Statement"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Press Department of the Office of the President of the Slovak Republic yesterday made available to our editorial office a statement on the STV [Slovak Television] statement broadcast on 8 May at 1930, which reads, in part: "The STV management has the right to reject a statement by the spokesman for the president of the Slovak Republic, with which, however, it failed to familiarize its viewers. It does not, however, have the right to tell the Office of the President of the Slovak Republic whether the president may or may not ask to deliver a speech on STV and whether the president may or may not inform the public that the STV, as a public corporation, refused to broadcast the president's short speech on the occasion of the 51st anniversary of the end of World War II and the victory over fascism.

"It is startling that STV management defines the president's request as a violation of his constitutional powers and, what's more, even characterizes it as an 'expression of inadmissible political pressure' that 'belongs to the past.' It is typicl that, even this time, the STV management mixed fire with water. It abused its statement for criticizing the president, claiming that he, without authorization, had invited representatives of the STV Council to a meeting. This is a typical example of camouflage. This invitation, and the meeting itself, took place at the initiative of Mr. Jarjabek, chairman of the STV Council. Since STV management reckons that the television viewer cannot know about this, even such a lie comes in handy in order to raise accusations against the president. Likewise, the STV management failed to react to the lie spread by the STV to the effect that 'STV requested a statesmanlike speech without domestic political invectives' and that '...this request was not met.' There was no STV request, no plea, and no agreement. All this, and many other things, require no further comment."

[Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 10 May on page 2 also publishes a 200-word TASR report on a statement issued by the STV Council on 9 May in response to the STV statement of 8 May. It states that the STV management "has no right to comment on or assess the activity and work of the Council, which is elected by the National Council of the Slovak Republic as a parliamentary body with the power to supervise the fulfillment of the STV's mission as a public corporation." The STV Council statement points out that its members' meeting with President Kovac on 6 May was an "informative meeting initiated by the Council" and that STV Council members used this occasion "to convey to the president their view on some of his critical statements regarding the composition and activity of the STV Council."]

Slovakia: Daily Rejects Criticism of Meciar on Media Freedom

AU1305163696 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 11 May 96 pp 1-2

[Commentary by "vur": "According to U.S. Visionary, Journalists Will Be Jailed in Slovakia"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bratislava—The latest letter from the workshop of the New York-based Committee for the Protection of Journalists (CPJ), addressed to Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar and President Michal Kovac, is a typical example of the expedient use of unverified information. In the letter, CPJ Executive Committee Chairman William Orme reacts to the statement issued by the Information Department of the Slovak Government in response to Vladimir Meciar's inclusion among the world's 10 worst enemies of the press. Displaying true "knowledge" of the situation in Slovakia, William Orme includes among the alarming measures of the government after November 1994, among other things, changes in the directors of Slovak Television [STV] and TASR and the installment of Erika Vincourekova (a former editor of our newspaper) as head of Slovak Radio's Radio Journal program, although she never took up this post. There are several remarkable arguments in Orme's letter. He even finds unacceptable a provision of the press law that gives an individual the right to publish reactions to materials published about him. According to this logic, when a journalist criticizes someone, the one criticized should not be given a chance to defend himself. The CPJ chairman also resents the fact that journalists should be obliged to publish the sources of their information. As is known, President Michal Kovac recently called on STV moderator Igor Kubis to reveal the source of his information on the Technopol case. As for the so-called independent daily SME, only one thing needs to be added: A private printing house refused to print it only because it had not paid its debts. [passage omitted]

Slovakia: Meciar Ridicules Inclusion on List of Enemies of Press

AU1405114696 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 8 May 96 p 2

[Article by Chief Editor Jan Smolec under the "Column in Italics From the Government" rubric: "The Prime Minister Does Not Want To Be 10th"]

[FBIS Translated Text] What is highly interesting about Slovak Government sessions, apart from the discussions themselves—yesterday's concerned, for example, the question of whether to abolish fines for language law violations or whether to bring to equal levels the 6 percent value-added tax for mineral water and the 23 percent tax for other nonalcoholic beverages—are the discussions in the lobbies. Yesterday's discussions were, among other things, about how the coalition and the opposition inform important visitors.

While coalition representatives show pride in the first successes of the young state, without concealing the problems with which Slovakia is grappling, especially with regard to economic transformation, opposition representatives portray everything as dismal and threatening. According to them, the present government only deals with organizing kidnappings and murders. Most recently, it wants to liquidate ethnic Hungarians with grenades.

A couple of days ago they were joined by a highly placed constitutional informer, who unbosomed himself to a foreign visitor. The domestic political scene is divided, only through the prime minister's fault. According to the highly placed informer, NATO is here to organize a crusade against the present prime minister and it should do him the favor of eliminating him [the prime minister]. "We no longer have the strength," the informer said, and almost made a slip of the tongue: "As for myself, the people of this country no longer believe me." And our official took it out of his guest [dorazil hosta] with a piece of confidential information that he asked be spread into the world: "The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] has ceased being a democratic movement!" The foreign visitor was tactfully silent. After leaving the country, he sent the representatives of Slovakia a message of thanks for the reception and for the information imparted. He somehow forgot to express thanks to the constitutional informer.

Another guest, after going through similar receptions, sincerely confided to us: "The way you are slinging mud at one another, you wont be admitted to the European fisherman's union."

Yesterday's discussions also concerned the premier's ranking as the world's 10th greatest journalist-baiter. Meciar, smiling, announced to the ministers:

"I am going to protest against the 10th place."

The ministers nodded. "Indeed, it is necessary to say what the situation is like. It is not we who bait and persecute journalists, but the journalists are baiting us. And it is our right to object, is it not?," said two ministers, turning to the minister of justice.

The discussion was calmed down by some voice pointing out that Mitterrand used to give information only to personally selected journalists. Those who wrote something about him that was not true had to give a wide berth to Elysee Palace. Not losing his humor, the prime minister reiterated:

"You are right, gentlemen. I am going to protest because it offends me that I am only in 10th place. A politician should strive to be first...."

The ministers laughed. One can only wave one's hand over the stupidity of those who compiled that list.

Slovakia: Ex-Minister Accuses Meciar of Cover-Up in Abduction Case

LD1405115596 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1000 GMT 14 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Yesterday evening, Slovak listeners had an opportunity to hear the recording of a telephone conversation between Slovak Interior Minister Ludovit Hudek and Slovak Intelligence Service [SIS] head Ivan Lexa in a radio broadcast. [passage omitted]

As we said in our morning news bulletin, Minister Hudek did not deny that the telephone conversation had taken place, he merely said it had been a private call.

What is the latest development in the case? Ladislav Pittner, former interior minister and chairman of an independent citizens' [obcanska] investigation commission [and a member of the opposition Christian Democratic Movement] has published important facts at a news conference in Bratislava today. Our Bratislava correspondent Renata Havranova has more details:

[Havranova] Ladislav Pittner today publicly accused Prime Minister Meciar, SIS Director Lexa, Interior Minister Hudek, the management of the Office of the Prosecutor General, and the present investigators [in the case of the abduction of the president's son, Michal Kovac Jr.] of deliberately covering up the truth about the kidnapping of the president's son.

The 29-page document made available to journalists lists in chronological order all the facts, indicating not only the participation in this serious crime of the secret service, but also the course of action taken by the prime minister, the interior minister, and the prosecutors, which Pittner described as having gone beyond their legal powers, an interference with, and a deliberate manipulation of the evidence. He also accused the head of the Slovak criminal police of handing over some testimony of Michal Kovac Jr. to the SIS, which in turn invented myths so as to create the impression that the abduction was faked.

The independent commission has the evidence to show that on the day of the abduction, not only were SIS members near Kovac Jr.'s house, but there were also in the area cars with specially numbered plates belonging to the SIS, which facilitated the bugging of the home of the president's son.

The evidence presented by Pittner is allegedly directly linked with the telephone conversation between SIS Director Lexa and Interior Minister Hudek, which was made public yesterday. [passage omitted] The two men talked in a very vulgar way, not only about sacking the investigator, Major Vacok, the second investigator who was later dismissed, but also about a certain three pages that would make Number One, that is, allegedly Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, extremely happy.

Pittner today told journalists that the three pages were a handwritten statement by Brano Chylo-Ptak, who was prosecuted for various crimes and who maintained that Kovac Jr. had planned his own abduction. The media were also today given a statement made by the daughter [Adriana K.] of a high-ranking SIS member, Dezider K., who told the commission that she had been encouraged by her father to give false testimony so the abduction would look as though it were self-arranged. Adriana K. is currently hiding at an unknown place with her friend, former SIS member Oskar F., om fear of her life. The former SIS member has publicly admitted his participation in the abduction and was the first to accuse publicly the SIS of having organized and carried out the abduction. [passage omitted]

Ladislav Pittner today challenged the interior minister and the SIS director to resign immediately from their posts. Pittner will make the results of the investigation available to the citizens of the Slovak Republic at a rally to be held late this afternoon in Bratislava.

Slovakia: Remias Case 'Obfuscated' by Police, Opposition

AU1405102696 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 11 May 96 p 9

[Commentary by Jan Fule: "Overhasty Opposition and Police That Have Time"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] Deputy Chairman Frantisek Miklosko announced on 9 May that his party would submit evidence of Robert Remias's violent death. Journalists were supposed to be presented with this evidence yesterday. What they heard from Jan Carnogursky [KDH chairman] was a report on the autopsy results, which, admittedly, contains some interesting passages but no evidence of violent death. They were also shown a piece of metal that supposedly came from Remias's BMW and that policemen apparently "forgot" at the explosion site. Asked directly whether the KDH considers this to be evidence of Robert Remias's violent death, Jan Carnogursky replied: "We do not claim this, we have no unambiguous materials to prove that."

Following this news conference, which left one somewhat perplexed, Slovak policemen organized a similar extraordinary meeting with journalists. But while Jan Carnogursky's public appearance was unconvincing, the policemen's news conference was mind-boggling.

We learned, this time also from official sources, that the autopsy had been carried out as early as 30 April and, had Jan Carnogursky not read the record from it at his news conference, it would have probably remained a secret to this day. Therein it is written, among other things, that a metal splinter of 2 by 0.9 centimeters was found in Robert Remias's skull, which, however, was not the immediate cause of his death. Interior Minister Ludovit Hudek, at the 9 May Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] rally, and Lieutenant Colonel Anton Manak, vice president of the Police Corps of the Slovak Republic, at yesterday's news conference, both confirmed that it comes from the body of the car, probably from the area behind the backseat. Even 10 days after the autopsy, however, no one is able to answer the question about the origin of the object that, according to the autopsy record, was found on the right side of the deceased man's groin. It is being referred to as a "cartridge of unknown caliber," and police sources speak about a metal object "reminiscent of a small-caliber cartridge." According to the official police version, neither of these two foreign bodies found in the corpse was the direct cause of Robert Remias's death. It has been determined that he was breathing at the time of the explosion because his lungs were damaged by smoke. The experts have also ruled out a defect in the propane-butane system. They are now speaking about a defect in the gasoline fuel system. The traces on the scene of the accident, too, indicate that the gasoline container exploded first, while the car was still in motion. Only then did the car land in the ditch. Robert Remias had a legally held personal weapon, a 6.35-mm CZ, on the front seat of the car. Six cartridges were found in the magazine; the propellant in the cartridges burnt out under the influence of the high temperature. Despite safety regulations, some weapon owners carry a cartridge in the barrel. In this case, no cartridge was found in the barrel, but it is possible that it discharged in the wake of the explosion. The policemen were unable answer to questions about whether they found the weapon in working condition.

Both news conferences yesterday produced more questions than answers. It is not clear why the opposition is in such a hurry to come up with evidence, which, as it admits, is no evidence, in fact. But the policemen, into whose hands the opposition was playing in such an incredible way, are behaving just as amateurishly. They are unable to answer some basic questions. They do not know how they could "forget" a part of the BMW at the place of the accident or how they could overlook the victim's watchband, which was only found by his widow. They are unable to say whether the metal object was found in or on the groin. They know the origin of the object in the dead man's skull, but not the origin of the object in his groin. They are also unable to explain convincingly why Deputy Frantisek Miklosko, who termed Robert Remias's death the first political murder in Slovakia since November 1989, was questioned by the investigator into the kidnapping of Michal Kovac Jr. and not by the investigator into the explosion of Robert Remias's car. And, last but not least, they were unable to explain why no news conference has been held to date on the case of Michal Kovac Jr.'s abduction to Austria. They replied that it is because the investigation into the case has not been completed. Has the investigation into the explosion been completed?

It has not. The case has only been obfuscated. What was said will allow the investigators, also in the future, to produce ever new versions and to point out, feeling injured, how the opposition and journalists complicated their investigation.

Slovakia: Press Reacts to Recent Commentaries by HZDS Deputy

AU1305161996

[FBIS Report] Slovak newspapers on 11 May publish reactions to commentaries by Roman Hofbauer, member of Parliament for the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, HZDS, published recently by the HZDS-owned daily SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA, wondering whether Hofbauer's views represent the views of the HZDS or the government as a whole.

Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 11 May on page 4 publishes a 400-word commentary by Vladimir Jancura entitled "When Euroskeptic Is a Weak Word." The commentary is devoted to Roman Hofbauer's commentary in the 10 May issue of SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA, which warned of the possibility of "the liquidation of the current political representation and the installation of a collaborating puppet government of vassals in Slovakia" as a result of an "international intervention against Slovakia under the auspices of the United Nations, the Council of Europe, NATO, the OSCE, or IFOR [Implementation Force]." Jancura points out that Hofbauer is not "just any commentator, but a parliamentary deputy for the ruling movement," and wonders whether his views ought to be taken seriously. In this context Jancura says: "On 8 May, one foreign colleague asked Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar directly about Mr. Hofbauer's views. The prime minister's reply was very evasive: What Mr. Hofbauer writes is presumably the view of Mr. Hofbauer. One thing is certain, however. Calling Mr. Hofbauer a Euroskeptic is a rather weak word."

Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak on 11 May publishes on page 3 a 300-word reply by Jan Smolec, SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA chief editor and HZDS deputy, to a reader's letter that criticized Roman Hofbauer's commentary in the 4 May issue of Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak. In the reader's opinion, Hofbauer's commentary was "the pinnacle of tactlessness against the representative of a neighboring state."

Responding to the reader's objections to Hofbauer's commentary, Smolec says: "Mr. Vesely! By coincidence, this week Roman Hofbauer and I discussed this article with His Excellency Austrian Ambassador Maximilian Pammer. Tactfully, and with a great dose of diplomacy, he inquired about the intention of the article. Many ambassadors identify our daily's viewpoint with the position of the government. I assured the ambassador that while we defend government policy, we often express the personal views of individuals, editors, and deputies." Smolec goes on to say that although Roman Hofbauer's views are often controversial, in this particular instance he agreed with his "critical view of Mr. Schuessel" because, during his recent visit to Bratislava, the Austrian foreign minister "was too obviously expressing sympathy for a politician who destabilizes the domestic political situation in Slovakia, openly declares that he will overthrow the government of Vladimir Meciar, and that he will teach him to fear him."

In conclusion, Smolec says: "Roman Hofbauer was evaluating one Austrian politician, not the whole government. We might have been more tactful and considerate in the article, but have you noticed how some Austrian journalists write about our ministers, the prime minister, and Slovakia? What they write is mostly outrageous lies. We did, of course, communicate to the Austrian ambassador that, should he consider it necessary to react to the article, we would gladly publish his view."

Hungary: Keleti's NATO Proposal Regarded as 'Unfortunate'

AU1305130596 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 10 May 96 pp 1, 3

[Correspondent's report: "Keleti's Statement Was Hasty And Unfortunate"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In a recent interview with NEPSZABADSAG, Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti came up with the proposal that in order to neutralize some Russian circles' opposition to NATO enlargement, Brussels could declare in advance that NATO does not intend to deploy nuclear weapons in former Warsaw Pact countries. Brussels sources immediately denied this, and stressed that NATO does not usually take such obligations upon itself. Jeno Poda, member of the Defense Committee of the Hungarian Parliament, criticized Gyorgy Keleti's proposal as damaging and apt to lead to mistaken interpretations. Foreign Ministry Spokesman Gabor Szentivanyi told UJ MAGYARORSZAG that the position of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry is unchanged and that Hungary fully accepts the stipulations included in the NATO enlargement document. In connection with NATO membership by the countries in our region, it was repeatedly stated that the countries belonging to the so-called first round, namely the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, have a chance of becoming NATO members. We also asked the opinions of representatives of leading political circles in Prague and Warsaw about Gyorgy Keleti's proposal, and they unanimously called it a hasty and unfortunate statement.

Professor Bohumil Dolezal, the former chief political advisor to Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, said that the countries that want to join NATO will have to fulfill quite a number of requirements. Brussels will draw up the conditions, which are not yet known. Once aware of them, we can decide whether to accept them or not. It would not be fortuitous to come up with our own conditions by making irresponsible declarations, conditions with which we could give ideas to those who oppose NATO's enlargement.

Professor Longin Pastusiak, deputy head of the parliamentary group of the Democratic Leftist Alliance (SLD) in Warsaw and the leading NATO expert of the Polish Government, had a similar opinion about Gyorgy Keleti's proposal, and called it a hasty and premature statement. Pastusiak added the following: "The official document on NATO enlargement makes it clear that NATO will not demand the possibility of deploying nuclear weapons or troops in the territory of newly accepted members, and will not make this a condition for membership. At the same time, our political leadership stresses that in joining NATO, we are ready to accept the obligation to fulfill the desired requirements, but also expect to fully receive every security guarantee from NATO. It is well known that there are NATO countries that did not accept the deployment of nuclear weapons on their territory, like Denmark and Norway, and this does not hinder their full membership at all. However, we will only be able to discuss such details when we can sit at the negotiating table with every member. NATO and Russia can conduct a dialogue on the enlargement issue, but they do not have to do that. We understand Moscow's security concerns, but we do not think Poland must coordinate its intention to join NATO with Moscow. Negotiations between NATO and the country desiring membership can only be bilateral negotiations. It would be harmful to influence these negotiations by suggesting preliminary conditions, especially if the given proposals also refer to the viewpoints of a third side."

The Hungarian Government position is unchanged: we have studied the NATO enlargement document and agree with its content—Gabor Szentivanyi told us. He added that Hungary is striving to become a NATO member with full rights, and that includes participation in the activity of the Nuclear Planning Group. Szentivanyi stressed that this does not mean an "immediate deployment" of nuclear weapons. Consultations with NATO have not yet touched on the issue of deploying nuclear weapons on the territory of any country in the region, Gabor Szentivanyi stressed.

"This issue could also come up in the course of this multilateral dialogue," Gabor Szentivanyi pointed out, but refrained from reacting to Gyorgy Keleti's statement, and said that naturally, Hungary cannot interfere in NATO's dialogue with Russia. Besides, the "Discussion Paper" that serves as a basis for consultations contains several elements of the enlargement document, and the issue of nuclear weapons could also emerge; so far, however, there have been no new developments on this issue, Szentivanyi said.

Hungary: Financial Experts Suggest Postponing Fighter Purchase

AU1305131296 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 10 May 96 p 5

[Article by Peter Matyuc: "Will the Fighter Bid Fly Away? We Do Not Have $1 Billion for the Fighter Planes"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to expert views in the Finance Ministry, solicitation of bids for the Hungarian Army's new fighter planes should be postponed indefinitely, NEPSZABADSAG has learned.

According to our information, it was the Finance Ministry's experts who first came to the conclusion that this deal cannot yet be financed. The purchase amounts to some $1 billion, and our country does not have that kind of money right now, they said, even if the aircraft manufacturers hold out the prospect of barter deals.

Some members of the Army expressed their concern by pointing out that, if no purchase is made, Hungary will only have 28 modern planes—namely the MiG-29 fighter planes in Kecskemet—by the end of the century.

Some Army leaders found this to be an unrealistically low number. According to other security policy experts, this number of modern planes is enough for peacetime patrolling tasks, but only for this....

As is known, the government promised to announce the bid in 1995. The decision on the purchase started from the premise that some of the MiG-21's used by the Hungarian Army would reach the maximum flight time by the turn of the century.

Before the bid, the SAAB aircraft manufacturer indicated its interest, offering its fourth-generation multifunction fighter aircraft JAS 39 Gripen to Hungary, as did the French Dassault Aviation, which would deliver Mirage 2000-5 type planes, and so did Lockheed, the syndicate manufacturing the U.S. F-16 and F-18.

The Wallenberg group, to which SAAB also belongs, held out the prospect of an apparently advantageous repayment deal, which would make it possible for us to pay with Hungarian goods for the Swedish planes. SAAB would also include Hungarian suppliers in the manufacturing of the Gripen—the Duna Aircraft Factory, Inc. is already assembling one of the plane's spare parts. Actually, SAAB has also opened an office in Budapest to coordinate cooperation with the Hungarian companies participating in the barter deal. Prior to the purchase of planes, Sweden focused on Hungary and it will continue to do so if Hungary decides to buy the Gripen, SAAB representative Jan Arlinge earlier told NEPSZABADSAG. The government promised to examine the Swedish offer when the bids are called in.

Little is known about the talks with U.S. firms, although they have come to Hungary a number of times to give presentations on their planes. However, nothing is publicly known about their business offers. It can be assumed that these issues will also be discussed at today's Budapest talks with Paul G. Kaminski, U.S. deputy secretary of defense in charge of acquisitions and technology.

The French Dassault Aviation, which produces the Mirage 2000-5, recently introduced itself in Budapest. They said that their plane is an improved version of the Mirage 2000 and one of the most modern fighters. Not revealing any details about their business or barter deal, they told NEPSZABADSAG that their offer "is no worse than that of the Swedes."

Outside the bid, an Israeli syndicate has offered to do a general overhaul of the MiG-21's for the Army.

Hungary: MSZP Official on Coalition Prospects, Tasks

AU1305135996 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 11 May 96 p 6

[Interview with MSZP Deputy Chairman Bela Katona by Frigyes Varju; place and date not given: "The Parties Should Be on Speaking Terms"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Varju] What is your opinion on the emerging coalition friction in connection with the prime minister's proposal to set up a central investigation committee? While the National Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] supports the idea, the leadership of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] opposes it.

[Katona] Both sides repeatedly declared that this is not a coalition trial between the two parties and within the government, but a professional issue that requires the best solution possible. I am sure we will succeed in finding a solution.

[Varju] As the former minister in charge of secret services, how do you feel about setting up the new investigation office?

[Katona] I think it is definitely necessary to deal with organized crime in a special way. There are several ways to do this. One possibility is to try to strengthen the efficiency of investigation by means of a central investigation office. At the same time, we must precisely determine the authority of this office in order to make sure that we do not come across any legal obstacles.

[Varju] There are few people more aware of the situation of organized crime than you. Do you fear that this organized crime might be able to reach the highest political echelons in the near future?

[Katona] I would not like to answer this question, because any opinion would only be a guess on my part. I think there is always such a danger, and one has to take this into account and hinder this as much as possible before such a contact is made. [passage omitted]

[Varju] Let's talk about the next elections. What are the main tasks facing the MSZP in the period until the elections?

[Katona] I think it is important to say what we want to carry out in the next two years, and we must carry out what we promise now; and the National Committee has a uniform position on this. We must be very consistent in carrying out the tough measures, economic acceleration, and the elements of state administration reform that can be implemented in two years. Trustworthiness will determine the MSZP election success in 1998, as well as our consistency and accountability.

[Varju] Has the party already carried out what it promised two years ago?

[Katona] No, it has not, but our election program is not for two years. We clearly stated in our program that this government and the next will have to carry out a long-term activity for the necessary changes to take place in the country. We successfully carried out some of this activity; privatization is nearing completion and the economy is mostly activated by the private sphere. However, the task of reorganizing the state administration is in a more difficult situation, because these are tough measures that can only be carried out if they are really well prepared. [passage omitted]

[Varju] Will the MSZP again march together with the SZDSZ at the next elections, or can we think of another scenario? The opposition appreciates your political activity, so you could even play the role of a contact between the opposition parties and the MSZP.

[Katona] I think that most natural contact points and most identical opinions can still be found between the SZDSZ and the MSZP. Thus, it is highly probable that we can count on the SZDSZ as a coalition partner for long term too. Honestly speaking, I do not see any firm party among the opposition parties today with which the MSZP could think of possible cooperation in the future. Besides, I am striving to maintain the steady dialogue between the political parties in Hungary. The situation characteristic of a modern democracy will also emerge in Hungary, a situation in which the opposition and the government parties agree on the basic interests of this country. This is extremely important from the viewpoint of political stability.

[Varju] So you are satisfied with the results of the MSZP-SZDSZ coalition?

[Katona] Considering that this is the first attempt to create a real coalition, I do not think the results are bad. Although there has been a lot of unnecessary debate originating from the novelty of the situation, we must get used to the fact that strong debates will emerge in the course of forming a common opinion when two marked parties form a government.

Hungary: Politicians, Journalists View Freedom of Press

AU1305140096 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 13 May 96 p 4

[Article by "bertok-megyeri-pilhal": "General Inquiry Into the Partly Free Hungarian Media—Self-Censorship or Something Else?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As we have already reported, the respectable Freedom House, am organization that examines the human rights situation in the world's countries, listed Hungary in the category of partly free countries. This is a setback, because Hungary was in the group of free countries during the Antall and Boross cabinets. The decline also applies to the press. To be precise, people abroad think that there are problems with freedom of the press in Hungary.

Our questions seek answers to this.

Julia Tardos (Hungarian Socialist Party): This is definitely my private opinion. Today in Hungary the press is as free as it wishes to be. By this I mean that the various brakes are applied by the journalists themselves, rather than by the authorities. Because of some old conditioning, they write committed articles, and the self-control and self-censorship inherited from the late Kadar era is still operating in them. In other words, servile articles are written not because of external pressures but because servility is still in the genes.... That it has changed compared to the previous years? I do not think so. The world sees us differently now.

Gyorgy Csoti (Hungarian Democratic Forum): Politically, Hungary is a free and independent country, but certain human rights do not prevail in perfect fashion. Freedom of the press is one of these. The media are dependent on economic interest groups and, as the links between politics and the economy are close, the picture is clear: Politics interferes with freedom of the press, and tries to limit it. However, this is not a Hungarian phenomenon; it is the same all over the world. It is a different matter that certain barriers are set up everywhere to prevent the formation of press monopolies, but this tends only to function in the developed democracies....

Ferenc Szekely, executive deputy chairman of Hungarian Television: I do not know what criteria and what facts were used in the survey. In my view, the state of freedom of the press has in all probability improved rather than deteriorated in Hungary as compared to past years. I am not claiming that it is perfect; the relationship between politics, the economy, and the press are not quite clear yet. However, the media law can help a lot in this area, because it places the various interest groups further away from the press. I feel that Hungarian society is already getting adequate information on the important events, issues, and processes. It probably does not get an overall view of social processes and the future. Therefore the quality rather than the independence of the press is the problem. Individuals involved in the press should strive to satisfy society's justified expectation that people should understand the processes, not just know about them.

Emil Ludwig (chief editor of MAGYAR FORUM): We have the necessary laws and rules for the freedom of the press to operate in Hungary; the trouble is that there is no financial independence. By this I mean that the media are often forced to make compromises, and occasionally they sell themselves out in order to survive and to be published. They play the music to those who pay the bill. Newspapers, radio, and television provide information according to the tastes of those who finance them. It is as simple as that. As those with political power also have the economy and the money, they also have most of the media. We have seen how this Latin American kind of media structure provides information for the public, which would be its task.

Gyorgy Acs (acting responsible editor of MAGYAR HIRLAP): In my view, Hungary has full freedom of the press; there is no censorship, agitprop department, or chief editors' conferences, as before. Accordingly, self-censorship has also decreased, and everyone can publish their thoughts, but perhaps in a different newspaper. Journalists can today choose between newspapers as they please; they are not defenseless. To be frank, I do not know how true the news is that the Hungarian press is not seen to be free abroad.

Gyorgy Orban (shift-lead editor at Hungarian Radio): I must agree with the Freedom House, although I add that freedom of the press was not complete during the Antall and Boross governments, either. Investigative journalism is completely missing, and has also been missing in the past, from the Hungarian press. Journalists do not take issues to their conclusion. It could be due to fear of the authorities or the mafia, or due to servility, that they do not take the responsibility upon themselves to fully investigate the issues. Actually, the fact that newspapers are not rich enough to keep journalists purely for investigations, or for the journalists to pay for services, might be a more typical reason for all this. A Hungarian journalist would not even dream of being able to pay someone for information at his newspaper's cost. Only the newspaper's richness could mean independence for him.

Laszlo Karcagi (deputy chief editor of NEPSZABADSAG): I do not think that freedom of the press is limited in Hungary. A rather wide range of opinions and thoughts finds its way to the public. We have conservative, liberal, and social-liberal newspapers, and they do not refuse to publish thoughts that do not fit in with the newspaper's basic line. NEPSZABADSAG also explicitly tries to encourage thinkers who are on the other side of the political palette or represent a different ideological system from this newspaper.

Hungary: Nonparliamentary Parties Form Joint Forum

AU1305143696 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 13 May 96 p 5

[Report by MTI: "Nonparliamentary Parties Want To Have More Say"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A new constitution is needed, but as we do not have a constitutional emergency situation, much more than the 45 days that have been provided must be devoted to a broad social discussion of the constitution, also including in this the nonparliamentary parties and civic organizations. This was said at the introductory news conference of the Interest Coordination Forum of Nonparliamentary Parties.

The forum consists of the Compromise Smallholders Party, the Republic Party, the Hungarian People's Party-National Peasant Party, the Hungarian Freedom Party, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, the Social Democratic Party of Hungary [MSZDP], the Election Alliance for Hungary, the Workers' Party, the National Democratic Party, the Pensioners' Party, and the Social Democratic Party.

After the weekend meeting, MSZDP executive Antal Szabadkai said that they propose the abolition or a significant lowering of the threshold for getting into parliament, and that the distribution of money intended for financing the parties should be linked to the proportion of votes received in the past one or two elections. (According to the rules in force, only parties that get at least 5 percent of the vote in the elections get into parliament, and only those parties whose electoral support reaches at least 1 percent get state support.)

According to Republic Party executive Gyorgy Magyar, the political interests of the parliamentary parties determine the concept of the constitution. He emphasized that the Forum gathers together parties with the most varied views, and they have an identity of interest rather than an identity of politics.

B-H: Dayton Accord Considered 'Political Marketing'

AU1305134196 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 13 May 96 p 2

[Commentary by N. Kazazovic: "Failed Expectations"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Five months after Dayton, there is a growing conviction in Bosnia-Herzegovina among the part of its population that is for peace and normal life—and, in Bosnia, everybody knows very well what is meant by normal life—that the great powers will not invest as much in this peace as it appeared they would in the beginning, nor will they essentially do what they committed themselves to do. According to those opinions, Dayton is a sort of political marketing in which the question is raised each time anew regarding the relationship between their own interests and the price that ought to be paid, and, for that reason, new calculations are constantly being made. In other words, everything is a lie, and what is being done is only meant to back up things formally and bring about their implementation. Today, we have a situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in which it is not the peace agreement itself that is being implemented, but rather, to put it precisely, its different interpretations. The forces that caused the war and Bosnia-Herzegovina's disintegration, in political and military terms, are still on the scene, and they are still able to do what they have done so far. The most dangerous thing is that, through different interpretations of the agreement, one aims to create a situation in which all the destruction and catastrophic consequences of the war will be cemented. Consequently, neither the causes nor the consequences of the war have been removed.

The essence of Dayton is that part of the job must be done by the international community, while the other part must be done by the internal forces. Only incentives, aid, and partial guidelines that will come from abroad, which will enable the forces to complete the job under favorable circumstances. This is a congruence that is very important. Incentives may come late, fail to come, or be wrong. The same applies to reactions on the part of the internal forces. Peace, even if it were to come from outside, must appear as though it were created internally. This is not a peace of the international factors, but rather of internal factors. None of the foreign architects of the agreement fostered illusions that all the stages and priorities would be dealt with without difficulties. Means and mechanisms for overcoming problems have been anticipated, but they are not almighty or limitless.

B-H: Izetbegovic, Christopher Discuss Joint Muslim-Croat Army

LD1305213196 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 13 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, spoke on the phone this afternoon with U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher.

President Izetbegovic informed the secretary about his stands regarding the agenda for tomorrow's session of the Federation, which will examine the law on the defense of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the elections in Mostar.

President Izetbegovic confirmed his stand that two military components currently existing in the Federation—the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croatian Defense Council—ought to be integrated into a single army force within three years at most.

With regard to the Mostar elections, which are scheduled for 31 May, President Izetbegovic confirmed the stand that Mostar refugees have the right to vote by mail or in diplomatic missions in their countries of temporary residence. This right should not differ from the right of other voters, President Izetbegovic told Christopher on the phone.

B-H: Federal Army Deemed 'Essential' for U.S., NATO Policy

AU1405074996 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 7 May 96 p 2

[Article by Suad Arnautovic: "An Army for Dissuasion"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It seems that the political confrontations over passing the principal federal law on defense have begun to disentangle. Solutions that are about to be reached could result in the establishment of a modern federal army whose geometrical progression would instigate the establishment of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation in all fields. The process was started by two parties: By President Izetbegovic, who agreed to form a united federal army that could—according to the Dayton agreement—also comprise the Serb armed forces after the elections, and by the main sponsor of the Federation, the United States, which ventured to send its senior military officers to persuade the federal partners to do what is best for them. Only one factor, a critical one, has not agreed so far: Tudjman, or the Republic of Croatia. Does the visit of Minister Granic [Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic] mean that they agree?

What the Americans Want

According to the political choice of the U.S. Administration, first the political and then the military foundations for the formation of the united army of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation were laid. The United States and NATO want to make two armed forces out of the existing three in Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to stop one potential aggressor and to defeat the other when it is identified by its repeated intentions.

The present diplomatic, political, and military pressures on the Republic of Croatia (the peaceful method is obviously preferred) and on the legal authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina are aimed at creating united armed forces on Bosnian territory. The armed forces should be organized according to NATO's modern military structures, and their structure, command, organization, and application will be a safe and respectable basis for NATO's future intentions in this region. Finally, that is also a stipulation for the (future) formation of the united armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which will initially comprise two armies—the federal army and the army of the Serb entity—under the civilian command of the Presidency, and perhaps a joint army will be formed afterwards: The Bosnia-Herzegovina armed forces under one command, one organization, one staff based on the system of subordination, and—most importantly—with one territory and one state to defend and protect.

One of the most serious flaws in the Dayton agreement is its obviously deliberate failure to define something that is very important for every state and every army: Who controls the external borders of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina? We have thus gotten the formal recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, its continuity, its legal rights, and its territorial and political integrity, but the protector of the external borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina has not been determined. That is not accidental; it is a result of the general U.S. strategy in Bosnia-Herzegovina and its surroundings. NATO's primary strategic interest seems to be expansion to the east (as far as the Black Sea, according to some opinions).

The small state of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been caught up in the whirlpool of global interests, in those great plans and great events. Its geostrategic position makes it the stepping stone for the solution of the problem between East and the West, and it has been saddled with the plans and strategic interests of the world's great forces. It is not clear, however, why NATO does not take action—although it could do so using IFOR [Implementation Force]—and place its shock troops on the line connecting Prevlaka in the south and the Drina and Danube Rivers in the north. Such an action would explain the strategic intentions of the West to the party on the other side of the Drina River, and indirectly show them what they are allowed to do and what they are not. Having postponed the solving of the problem of the control of the eastern border of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the West does not seem to have solved the dilemma called Serbia.

The only thing that can shatter such a concept is the problem of the internal situation in Serbia, especially in Kosovo and Sandzak—that is, the placing of Serbia on either side as a critical factor in the Balkans. If Serbia intends to remain in close contact with Russia and other Orthodox brothers in the military sense—and it is more than clear that it does, according to the agreement on military cooperation signed by the so-called Yugoslavia and Russia—the border is likely to be established on the Drina River very soon. We have to pay attention, however, to the signs of possible changes, perhaps even strategic ones, that could result in Serbia turning toward the West. Secret arrangements in Dayton are mentioned in that context.

The Law Soon?

The creation of a close connection between the Bosnia-Herzegovina federal army and the Croatian Army, or simply between the Muslim and Croat elements, is an important step in the realization of the intentions of the West in these regions. Accordingly, we can conclude that the formation of a federal army is essential to the entire U.S. and NATO policy in the Balkans.

The same reasons make it impossible to oppose the efforts of NATO and the West as a whole, especially the United States. Therefore, the federal law on defense will obviously be passed soon, and the federal army will be formed according to the Dayton agreement, signed on 9 November 1995, and the Rome agreement, which admitted that the absence of the principal defense law created dangerous insecurity.

B-H: Commentary Criticizes Croats on Federal Defense Law

AU1305081196 Sarajevo LJILJAN in Serbo-Croatian 8 May 96 pp 8-9

[Article by Salahudin Bosnjak and Fahrudin Salkic: "The '7th' Muslim and the HVO Croatian?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The talks on the integration of the Bosnian and the Croat armies, like the talks between the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the HVO [Croatian Defense Council], started in the fall of 1994 in Medjugorje. They marked the goodwill of the two sides to prevent conflicts and the just ended

Bosniak-Croat war from happening ever again. The talks were held between the expert groups of the two sides (the Republic/Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina on one side and the so-called Herzeg-Bosnia on the other) with the mediation of appropriate international factors. Such talks have, from time to time, been held until today, when the Bosniaks and Croats, with the mediation of the Americans, are working on a solution for the Defense Law of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Unique Ministry and Army

The final phase, which involves the text of this exceptionally important law, started immediately after the signing of the Dayton peace agreement in December 1995, and is ongoing. The goal of this law, as stated in the basic principles, is "to ensure a comprehensive program for the future safety of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina; to constitute the program of defense of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina; to establish the control of civil authorities over the army of the Federation; to create a unique ministry of defense and a unique structure of military command...and to ensure the civil command of the members of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, elected from the territory of the Federation...." So, at the center of the law there is the question of all questions regarding the federation of Bosniaks and Croats; namely, the question of the federal army. That is, the question of whether the Bosniaks and Croats, after the events in Vares and Stolac, will be able to have a common army in a common state, and in what form? It is almost unrecorded in history that one-time opposing armies would merged into one army, however, these, so to say, "Balkan options" have been created on the theory of political compromise.

Last week, step by step, on the very slippery ground of "national interests," the text of this law was worked on, and one very important thing was agreed on. That is the question of civil command during the transition period, i.e., until the final establishment of state organs after the democratic elections on the entire territory of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as defined in Article 222. The role of civil commander was given to one representative from the Bosniak people and one from the Croat people. In the name of the Bosniak people, that will be the president of the state presidency, and in the name of the Croat people, it will be the representative proposed by the Croat caucus in the Federal Assembly; which will afterwards be ratified by the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. These two representatives will, in fact, represent the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO. The decisions will be made by consensus. In that way, any future military conflicts should be prevented, and the possibility of the integration of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO into one army should be realized.

Civil Command—Decisions Through Consensus

It is interesting that, in the course of the talks, the Croat side proposed that both representatives should be chosen "in a package." In other words, the current president of the Presidency [Alija Izetbegovic] could find himself together with one of the travelers to The Hague from Herzeg-Bosnia. His election could thus be conditional on the election of the other. That would not only open a way for the protection of some big war criminals, but it would also put the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as the highest organ of the legal authorities, on the same level as one of the organs of the parastate Herzeg-Bosnia.

It is also interesting that the U.S. representatives have suggested that the Croat side has the right to propose their representative in the civil command without proposing the procedure for the selection of that representative or the procedure for ratification in the organs of the Federation and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. That must doubtlessly be surprising for anybody who knows that procedure is a very important thing in U.S. political life. And, in the ever more-complicated Bosnian conditions, procedure is an essential issue of democracy.

Further, the Bosniak and the Croat sides agreed that "every political activity—the forming of parties, the organizing of political gatherings and political demonstrations, or any discrimination on the ground of political orientation—is forbidden within the army of the Federation."

Depolitization of Army Guarantees Religious Freedom

It will also be forbidden for officers in active service in the future army to take part in political activities, except voting (Article 41). And while the depolitization of this army can be considered a normal result of the talks of the two sides, just like allowing religious activities according to the specific features of each of the religions (as a matter of individual freedom), the size of the compromise that both sides have agreed to regarding the names of armies and individual units is quite surprising. Namely, the two sides have signed that they "...will not use religion or ethnicity as an exclusive basis for the organization of the military units of the Federation. The organization of forces should be based primarily on objective military considerations." That means that previous religious or ethnical designations will be erased. So that there will no longer be designations like the "Muslim brigade" or the "Croatian council...." (provisions of Article 64). The new name 'Army of the Federation' will be the basic identification of the units that belong to it. The well-informed see this compromise on the Croat side as a very positive step and as the readiness of the politicians of the so-called Herzeg-Bosnia to abolish the HVO in future. Of course, unless they change their minds about this before the adoption of the law.

Typical of the U.S. understanding of human rights and freedom, the clause on the freedom of expression and the religious freedom of every member of the federal army entered the text of the Bosnian defense law without any problems. A provision of Article 64 is more than precise and unambiguous: "The ministry of defense, in cooperation with the religious communities, will regulate, for a period of three months upon the entering in force of this law, the organization and the manner of functioning of religious activities within the army of the federation."

What Has Not Been Agreed to in the Defense Law?

No agreement has been reached regarding three questions. Those are "the right of recruits to the choice of component," the precise deadline for the full integration of the two armies, and the integration of the corps commands. All three questions are very important and make up an inseparable whole.

Namely, there is a generally known practice in the world, from the United States to Croatia, that recruits may express their wish for the branch, specialty, and the place in which to serve, but that the final decision is made by state authorities. Only the Herzeg-Bosnian experts for "inventing the impossible" could come up with this unheard-of idea, which they themselves do not apply in the HVO. Under the "right to the choice of component," they ask that every Croat should have a legal right, secured by the state, to do their military service in the HVO component.

Why is that unacceptable for the Bosniak side? For the same reasons that it would be abnormal in any other state in the world. In the first place, for organizational, legal, and political reasons. For example, how can the Federation reinforce all branches and specialties in the future professional army if it has to respect the individual wishes of its young recruits? How can it ensure defense from the land, the sea, and the air in the so-called unpopular branches if it respects the individual wishes of the young men? If individual wishes are turned into the right of an individual, into a human right (and that is the intention), just like the right to property, to political orientation, or to language, then every future professional engagement in the army of the federation could mean an "assault on human rights," which is an absurdity. The matter can further be interpreted in the following way: If, one day in the assembly, the Croat side proclaims the "right to choice of component" as an issue of vital national interest, it is de facto turned into a permanent right. Then, turned into a permanent right, it also implies the permanent existence of the component. Which means a permanent component: a Croat national army, Croat territory, a Croat state on the territory of the Federation. And if, instead of a Croat component, a Bosniak component is allowed, the thing is equally dangerous. In both cases, it means tearing up the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And that is, at the same time, the annihilation of the Dayton agreement, the annihilation of peace, and the annihilation of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Why Are There No Precise Deadlines?

At present, there is no country in the world with two legitimate armies. It is logical that the defense of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is only possible if all its defense potential is subordinate to one short chain of command—"a single chain of command."

And whereas the Bosniak side has expressed its readiness for the full integration of the army—and straight away—the Croat side has been refusing. It is not interested in deadlines. Simply, it wants no deadlines. It justifies its standpoints with the argument that "here, two peoples fought!"

Precisely because two peoples fought here, it is necessary to integrate their armies within as precise a deadline as possible, in order to prevent them from fighting again, because there can be no common state without that. All the integrations and agreements that have been achieved so far, like those on customs, taxes, federal police, the federal government, and some other federal laws, have a limited meaning as long as there are two separate and independent armies within the Federation.

Misuse of Trust

What happens in the conditions of imprecise deadlines for the full integration, is a "Danaian atmosphere" ["danajska atmosfera"] within the Federation. Namely, the Croat side ensures the financing and supply of "its component" as long as it suits them. At the same time, they leave open the possibility of getting out when they declare it necessary. Or, in other words, it can resort to blackmail whenever that provides results.

The Bosniak side sees the Croat unwillingness to accept precise deadlines for the integration of the armies as a mirror on the Federation itself. Thus, it seems that the deadline for the full integration of the two armies (and according to the Americans, that is a period of three years) is the point of the survival or ruin of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

That is where the essence of the Croats' refined boycott of the Federation lies. No agreements "on the strengthening of the Federation" can change or mend anything in that sense. Neither the Sarajevo agreement (March 1996) nor that Bonn (April 1996) enters the essence of the problems of the army of the Federation, and they naively propose the removal of those who have failed to make any laws.... With these papers, the signatories, not understanding the essence of the Croat side's boycott in the true implementation of the Federation and the Dayton agreement, actually contribute to the destruction of the foundations of this fragile state.

The Croats Are Only Interested in Money

Now, it is probably clear even to the less-informed analysts that these questions are decisive for the future both of the Federation and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is therefore inadmissible that these decisive questions should be given over to the cabinets of the federal ministries, regardless of who may sit in them and which five or six persons will challenge the future of the state and the people with their signatures and "wise decisions." It would not be good for the unrealized goal of the four-year war—that of Bosnia's destruction—to eventually be achieved through legal provisions with dangerous consequences.

At the end of this elaborate analysis of this sensitive and, in a way, unpopular topic by LJILJAN, we cannot avoid mentioning the following facts. The Croat side has agreed to the integration of the ministry of defense and the integration of the logistics and the budget without one word of objection. That means that, without obstructions, they only agreed to the arrangements that involve money and arms. It seems that the Croats were only interested in the $500 million that have by now been collected and in military means from the United States, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, and so on. The Croats no longer even try to hide that they are only interested in the common money and in playing their part in spending it. A somewhat bitter, well-known taste from the neighborhood—the annihilation of Bosnia-Herzegovina—wherever it is possible, but this time, it is in the field of defense. Thus, it seems that the story about the Defense Law of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is a story about the choice between real peace or—war. And what politician will, only to avoid "removal," dare sign such a law, which, God forbid, would destroy the results that have been paid for with 200,000 lives?

B-H: Silajdzic Outlines SBIH Policy

AU1305183296 Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian 10 May 96 pp 9-10

[Interview with Haris Silajdzic, former prime minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina and leader of the SBIH, by Eduard Popovic in Sarajevo; date not given: "A Greater Croatia and a Greater Serbia Are Being Created in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Muslims Are Being Left With a Greater Srebrenica"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Political life in Bosnia-Herzegovina has become more dynamic since the constituent assembly of the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina [SBIH] was held on 13 April in Sarajevo. The appearance of the party has been taken seriously by the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] and the opposition parties, to judge from the way it has been confronted by the media. These confrontations are, in fact, the beginning of the election campaign. SBIH leader Dr. Haris Silajdzic is often the target of harsh comments from the leaders of the SDA and the opposition parties. The opposition is accusing him of being an SDA mole in the left voting group, while the SDA's greatest trouble is that many of its most distinguished members have defected to the SBIH as well as Silajdzic's stubborn insistence for a "Bosnian Bosnia-Herzegovina" within its internationally recognized boundaries. Recently, President Alija Izetbegovic, not hiding the irony, suggested that Silajdzic go to Banja Luka and Capljina [Serb- and Croat-occupied towns] and create Bosnia-Herzegovina there. Silajdzic took this seriously, went to Banja Luka a few days later, and founded an SBIH organizing committee there.

[Popovic] It is not even a month since the SBIH's Constituent Assembly and one gets the feeling that the SDA, the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community], and the opposition parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina are quite disturbed and dissatisfied with the appearance of your party.

[Silajdzic] They are dissatisfied because they are afraid of losing votes. The SBIH is not a kind of ingenious party with great ingenious ideas. We simply want the Bosnia-Herzegovina state, we want a home, a political center. Therefore, this party is what Bosnia-Herzegovina really basically is. Bosnia-Herzegovina will never be too far right nor too far left. The basic task is for Bosnia-Herzegovina to be democratic.

[Popovic] The word democratic is not part of the name of your party.

[Silajdzic] I will tell you honestly: I have had enough of democratic parties opening concentration camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Our party is for a Bosnia-Herzegovina that the majority of the people want. That is why Bosnia-Herzegovina needs elections. The people have a right to them, because there is no human dignity without the possibility of elections, nor is there any stability nor peace.

The Beginning of the Election Campaign

[Popovic] What about the claims that your party is the left wing of the SDA and that your separation from the SDA is a tactical move to guarantee the left-wing vote for the SDA?

[Silajdzic] If this were true, I do not know why we would do this secretly. These are rumors spread by the opposition to hang on to their votes. I totally understand them and I have nothing against them operating in such a way. In the end, as far as the SDA is concerned, it also has done some good things, some good reactions, but also some things with which I do not agree and which it should change. Corrections in the operations are more than necessary. There is no progress without competition in all aspects. The final political product is better if one operates under competitive conditions.

[Popovic] To judge from Bosnia-Herzegovina Television and the majority of the media, the election campaign has already begun. The television followed President Izetbegovic's visits to Gorazde and Bihac and placed special emphasis on his visit to the football match between Zeleznicar and Sarajevo [two principal Sarajevo teams] at Grbavica [formerly Serb-occupied suburb of Sarajevo]. I mention this because it seems to me that you are one step ahead of President Izetbegovic. You were in Gorazde two months ago, you were at a football match in Visoko last week, and in Banja Luka the day before yesterday.

[Silajdzic] The election campaign has started and that is good. I am glad that the ruling party is imitating our moves, or is adapting itself to our opinions. That is the sense of democracy as well as our goal. Improvement for Bosnia-Herzegovina should be the goal of us all. This means that at least a rudimentary democracy does exist and that the opposition is attaining its goal, which is to make changes to the ruling party.

[Popovic] Local elections are being announced in Mostar and are to be held at the end of May.

[Silajdzic] That is a very short period of time to organize elections. The only thing that I can say about this is that I am traveling to Mostar tonight and that we will be present, but we will still see in what way.

[Popovic] You were in Great Britain and the United States recently. What were the reasons for your visits to these countries?

[Silajdzic] I was at the Royal Institute in London, that is, at Chatham House, where I gave a lecture on "The Integrity and Sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a Priority of the Dayton Agreement." It has come to an inversion of priorities. Internal borderlines are being insisted upon, not external ones, and this is absurd, because the external borders also protect the other borderlines. The internal borders are today becoming international borders; the consequence of this is two different situations: one de facto and the other de jure. This is usually solved through war, especially if these two situations become totally divergent.

The Disintegration of the Country

[Popovic] Would you explain this in a little more detail?

[Silajdzic] The situation on the ground seems like a disintegration of the country into three parts. On the other hand, there is the Dayton situation, according to which Bosnia-Herzegovina is a united country, regardless of its internal structure. It will come to a blockade and this will be taken care of, let us say, with some kind of Dayton agreement 2, but then we will have endless Dayton agreements. We will have Melbourne 4 and Ottawa 7.... The prospects are, therefore, for the founding of one constant conference for Bosnia-Herzegovina, which would move from one city to another.

To avoid this, matters need to be solved in the way that we agreed upon in Washington and Dayton. In Washington we agreed upon a federation consisting of cantons and not of two national territories. I am, therefore, against such a federation, since national territories do not exist in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Were we to do this, we would be legalizing genocide. I support the federation made up of cantons, but, unfortunately, I do not yet see any serious movements at this level.

[Popovic] Where do you see a trap with regard to the internal and external borders?

[Silajdzic] If a signal is sent to the Serbs that they can gradually leave together with the Serb entity, circles in Croatia, which have strived to create a national territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina, will take "their part." If it comes to that, there will be no division into two parts. This will be a division into three parts. In that case, the following will happen: The Croatian part will go to Croatia, the Serb to Serbia, and the Bosniak Muslims will be in a sandwich, crammed between these two blocks, in one greater Srebrenica, expecting that what happened in Srebrenica repeats itself sooner or later. This will lead to the Bosniak Muslims turning into the opposite of what they are. Instead of polyvalence, openness, and tolerance, a mentality of closed-mindedness, fear, and paranoia will take over and they will, in order to survive, begin to imitate their environment. Mimicry is natural and the need for personal protection and survival might force the Bosniak Muslims to do just that.

The Bosniaks must not be persuaded that anyone is trying to jam them into a small space in order to destroy them. This will create problems for everyone. The squeezing of the Bosniak element further than Stolac and the sea toward the interior suggests just such a thought. This will destabilize the entire region and then there is no peace, no Dayton agreement.

Lost Opportunities

I do not know who finds any use in this. I do not know whether this is a phase and a perfidious way of destroying the Bosniak Muslims in these areas. I only know one thing: Until now, we Bosniak Muslims have, together with part of the Croats and Serbs, legitimized ourselves as civilizational. This is a fact on the ground, not a declaration. Anyone who doubts it, can, as they say, go and watch the traffic lights.

[Popovic] The issue of the armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina is interesting in this regard. There is talk of a joint army, but it seems that, in reality, the Croatian side is not prepared to give up the HVO [Croatian Defense Council]. The minister of defense of the Republic of Croatia is warning Sarajevo that Croatia is not going to look aside if another Croat-Muslim war begins. How will this be solved?

[Silajdzic] As soon as the sound of saber-rattling is heard, it is not good. This means that the tragedy in Bosnia-Herzegovina is still not enough for some. I think that the fact that Bosnia-Herzegovina is one country needs to be accepted. Interstate relations need to be based on respect for the sovereignty and integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. If we agree that politics being the art of the possible is at least partially correct, then why are so much energy and political credit, money, and people being directed toward the impossible? And the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina is impossible. Relations need not be poisoned, economic development and the joint cooperation need not be slowed down. I worked a great deal on cooperation with Nikica Valentic [former prime minister of Croatia]. If we do not work together, we miss an opportunity and there are not many in this world. We will fall behind, both of us. Merciless competition rules in this world.

Together, we are flexible and polyvalent, and can achieve much. But we have done nothing.

[Popovic] Why?

[Silajdzic] Because Bosnia-Herzegovina is constantly being looked at as something that can be divided, from which a part can be taken.

[Popovic] As an alternative, you have mentioned war.

[Silajdzic] That is the ultimate case. Bosnia-Herzegovina is a united body. Any attempt to change history is a sad thing. There is talk of Croatian kings in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The entire problem is that these kings did not know that they were Croatian. They called themselves the kings of Bosnia. Some were Bogomil, others Catholic, but they were kings of Bosnia. It now seems that they were not well informed as to what they, in fact, were kings of.

There is no greater crime than that of falsifying history. That is all that we have. Whether we want it or not, we now only have the past, because we do not know what the future is. By falsifying history we are falsifying our only reality. We do not have to poison relations with this. We do not have to put them on the wrong foundations. The right foundations, I repeat, are respect for the sovereignty and integrity of both countries. The borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina were not made yesterday and they are even less administrative lines drawn by some great power. Bosnia is a unified body: Historical maps clearly prove this.

Tudjman in Bosnia-Herzegovina

[Popovic] It seems that you are not satisfied with the relations of the Croatian Government toward Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Silajdzic] Alas, I am not. I cannot comprehend the reason for the huge posters of the president of the Republic of Croatia on our territory, along with all the symbols and measures that damage our integrity and sovereignty. This is something without precedence. Such posters today exist in Bosnia-Herzegovina. On them it says: "The right man and the right party at the right time." I do not want to get into the contents of these posters, but they are in the wrong place.

Imagine President Clinton putting up his posters in Mexico. This would be beyond the limit of good taste, not to mention sovereignty and integrity.

I am therefore not satisfied with Zagreb's attitude toward Bosnia-Herzegovina, just as I was not satisfied that the elections for the Croatian parliament were held here. The Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina are Bosnia-Herzegovina citizens, or they are a diaspora. They cannot be, depending upon the need, both. I claim that every Croat here is a citizen of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by his roots, just like myself. And Bosnia-Herzegovina is their homeland. I do not know whom it would suit if they were made a diaspora overnight. Maybe it suits some short-term political goals.

Not to mention that the Croats have also lived through a tragedy. It is not good if the fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina is being decided outside Bosnia-Herzegovina. This always ends tragically like this, with the nation split. That is what happened to the Serbs: Since the SDS [Serb Democratic Party] started worrying about the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, their number has halved.

[Popovic] Do you see a Croat or Serb in Bosnia-Herzegovina with whom you could form a united country?

[Silajdzic] There are many of them, but people do not want to speak; they are afraid and confused. They are afraid of everything and anything, they believe no one, they avoid cameras, journalists, and politicians. That is because what has happened so far warns them that they need to hide until a certain moment, in order to survive. I know these people; I grew up with them and I know what they think.

[Popovic] You were in Banja Luka two days ago, where you founded the organizing committee of the party. What was your experience in the town?

[Silajdzic] Unfortunately, I was in Banja Luka for a very short time. I managed to talk to a Catholic priest, but Bishop Komarica was not there. I was encouraged that this man, talking about the fact that Croats used to live there, is nevertheless an optimist. The Croats are not giving in, they are planning their return, and that is very important. He said they are returning "drop by drop," but they are returning. His position is encouraging. I unfortunately did not meet with the mufti, who is also a hero. We will all work to see to it that, regarding people's return to their homes, the Dayton agreement is respected as much as possible.

Trampling Over Human Rights

[Popovic] The problem is that Serbs who escaped from areas controlled by the HVO and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina now live in the houses of Bosniak Muslims and Croats in Banja Luka. I recently saw a leaflet that called on Croats to settle in Glamoc, Drvar, and Bosansko Grahovo, which is where the Serbs are to return to, according to the agreement. How does one solve this problem?

[Silajdzic] This problem cannot be taken care of while the authorities show such tendencies. Continuously, one thing is being said and another is done. Because of this, there is confusion and suffering. Resettling is trampling over people's rights, it is happening in front of the eyes of the entire world, and it is unbelievable that this is being ignored or that the international community is even cooperating in this and facilitating it. After the right to live, the freedom to choose a place to live is the second basic human right.

[Popovic] The efficiency of the international community and IFOR [Implementation Force] is coming into question after the recent events at Trnovo, Doboj, and Prijedor, with Muslims wanting to visit their homes. The matter ended with the Serbs attacking the buses, resulting in some of those who returned getting killed.

[Silajdzic] It would be easiest to blame it all upon the representatives of the international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We must always keep in mind that they are here to receive criticism like a lightning rod and that is where it ends. If the criticism is well founded, then it must be aimed at those that give the orders, and not those that carry them out. The issue here is that someone is giving IFOR and the other international organizations a mandate. I have spoken to these people and they think that they have finished their task by separating the forces here. However, the entire activity so far has been an investment in the final step toward peace and the return of people to their homes. The international community cannot leave Bosnia-Herzegovina until this step is taken.

B-H: Commentary Hails Debut of Silajdzic's Party in Banja Luka

AU0705120596 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE (European edition) in Serbo-Croatian 7 May 96 p 2

[Commentary by Ada Campara: "Banja Luka Closer to Bosnia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Their flight to Banja Luka in an Implementation Force helicopter could mark the turning point in the political reality of Bosnia-Herzegovina. There are several facts that attract attention when it comes to the visit by Haris Silajdzic, Ivo Komsic, Sejfudin Tokic, and Generals Dudakovic and Hajrulahovic to the Serb entity and particularly Banja Luka, which already has some 20 opposition parties.

First of all, during his visit to this city, Silajdzic founded the first branch of a federation party in the Serb entity. From the Dayton perspective, this is a giant step, and for our daily lives still burdened by war, this is a historic event since it represents the first practical move toward a unified Bosnia. Second, Ivo Komsic, chairman of the Croatian National Council, was also present in Banja Luka, which at least symbolically marked the establishment of the bridge to reconciliation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Apart from these two politicians, present, too, was Sejfudin Tokic, representative of the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats, the party that had already established contacts with colleagues, former reformists, in the Serb entity.

The meeting with the representatives of the opposition parties in Banja Luka and the presence of politicians from the federation in that region should be viewed with cautious optimism since for the terrorist Serbian Democratic Party [SDS], the most influential party, the war is still not over, and keeping tensions high is one of their trump cards in the election campaign into which they are even trying to introduce Karadzic. Hence, an informed observer of Bosnia-Herzegovina political developments might wonder why Mirko Pejanovic, chairman of the Serb Civic Council [SGV], or someone else from his democratically oriented Serb headquarters, was not present at this goodwill meeting, as the talks in this Krajina city could, for now, be called.

Silajdzic promised some time ago that the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina would enter Banja Luka. That promise has been fulfilled and a sort of political Bosnian nucleus has thus been formed in the city from which the Bosniaks have been systematically, even genocidally, expelled from their homes. Pejanovic used to claim that the SGV has its cells in the Serb entity, and the Banja Luka visit could be a sign that this part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, too, can be brought closer to the demands of the times in which peace has become priceless. The meeting with Banja Luka opposition parties, without SGV's presence and the opening of its branch in this city in the Serb entity, cannot result in the strengthening of democratic forces in their opposition to the single-mindedness and violence of the SDS. Still, a giant step has been made. As the next step, this mistake should be corrected.

B-H: Failure To Meet Miners' Demands Prompts Strike

AU1405111696 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 14 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Enver (?Calut), representative of the Kakanj mines and a member of the republican miners trade union, informed journalists this morning that the Kakanj miners had gone on strike. He said that the strike had started spontaneously and that the main reasons were miners' dissatisfaction with low salaries, noncoordination of miners' wages with those of employees in nonindustrial branches, and the government's failure to meet their demands. The Haljevici mine was the first to stop work, after which others followed.

B-H: Miner Representatives Brief Izetbegovic on Problems

AU1405113496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 14 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency President Alija Izetbegovic today received representatives of the Tuzla and Central Bosnian mines and veterans association for that part of the country. The miners' representatives were accompanied by Sulejman Hrle, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Independent Trade Union Association.

The miners informed President Izetbegovic of the problems they face in their work and pointed out the grave material position of 18,000 workers in the Tuzla and Central Bosnia mines. The war has significantly hindered the work process and large investment is needed to relaunch production. In addition to this, a great number of miners were on the front line defending Bosnia-Herzegovina's freedom. Moreover, the miners are sharing the little they have with families of soldiers killed in combat, the war disabled, and the sick.

B-H: SDA Leader Says Muslims To Boycott Mostar Elections

LD1405120096 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1150 GMT 14 May 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, May 14 (TANJUG)—The leader of the Muslim Democratic Action Party (SDA) for the divided city of Mostar, Herzegovina, said Tuesday [14 May] that Muslims would not vote in the local elections on May 31.

Hamdija Janic said on Muslim Radio Sarajevo that the main reason for the election boycott was that not all Mostar residents of a voting age would be able to cast their ballots.

Only voters who who will be in the European-Union-administered city on the day of the elections will be entitled to vote, according to the E.U.

"Nobody can deny the 50 percent of Mostar residents who are currently displaced persons the human right of suffrage," Jahic said.

He gave as another reason for the boycott the short time given for securing conditions and carrying out preparations for the elections.

The E.U. foreign ministers decided in Brussels Monday to have elections in Mostar on May 31, in keeping with the Dayton peace accords for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The ministers took the stand that any postponement of the balloting would be detrimental to the peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

After the Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was created in 1994, but only on paper, Mostar remained divided into the Muslim western section and the Croat eastern.

The agreement on the federation was signed in Washington in March 1994 after a year of fierce Muslim-Croat fighting.

B-H: EU Ministers Urge Keeping Mostar Elections on Schedule

AU1305174396 Paris AFP in English
1732 GMT 13 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brussels, May 13 (AFP)—European Union foreign ministers on Monday vowed to press ahead with elections in the EU-administered city of Mostar on May 31, despite the apparently insurmountable problem of all the Moslem parties refusing to register candidates.

"The EU is of the opinion that the elections should take place on the fixed date," Italian Foreign Minister Susanna Agnelli said. "If not we will risk a serious crisis in the whole region because the Dayton accords would not have been respected."

Speculation that a decision to postpone the elections was imminent had been encouraged by a spokesman for Carl Bildt, who said the Bosnia High Representative was in favour of a delay.

Bildt however refused to confirm this after briefing the foreign ministers. "I want to have a solution acceptable for the EU, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and to the parties," he said.

The reunification of Mostar is seen as a key test of whether Bosnia has any future as a unitary state of Moslems, Serbs and Croats. The city was the scene of some of the fiercest ethnic clashes of the war in former Yugoslavia.

Doubts about the feasibility of elections being held in little over two weeks grew dramatically on Friday when the deadline for the presentation of lists for the vote passed without any party from the eastern, Moslem part of Mostar having put forward candidates.

The Moslems have boycotted election preparations in protest of rules which deny refugees who were forced to flee the city the right to vote.

The Bosnian government has also intervened in the dispute, asking the EU administrator Richardo Perez Casado to change the rules to allow former residents to vote either by post or through embassies abroad.

Diplomatic sources said two options were being considered: either putting the vote off until the fall when Bosnia-wide elections are due to take place, or having a two or three week delay in the hope that the current problems can be resolved.

French Foreign Minister Herve de Charette however summed up a widespread feeling by saying that if the EU did not ensure the elections went ahead on schedule, there was little point continuing with the administration of the town.

A failure to resolve the stand-off in Mostar would also cast doubt on the prospect of a successful Bosnia-wide vote in the fall which would involve all the same problems relating to the position of refugees, diplomats fear.

B-H: EU: Not Up to Bildt To Decide on Mostar Election Delay

AU1305172996 Paris AFP in English
1709 GMT 13 May 96

[Report by Alexandra Haramina]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, May 13 (AFP)—Carl Bildt, Bosnia's top civilian peace official, wants elections delayed in the divided southern city of Mostar, but Washington will have the final say, sources here said Monday.

Municipal elections are due to take place on May 31 in Mostar, the city in southern Bosnia-Herzegovina divided between Moslems and Croats which has been under EU administration since July 1994.

Colum Murphy, spokesman for the Bosnia High Representative, told reporters in Sarajevo that Bildt did not want the elections to be held too soon.

"The High Representative is not happy with the situation," he said. "He prefers a late election to a premature one."

Bosnian Moslem parties have refused to register lists for the vote, arguing that it would be impossible for all the refugees and displaced people who left the city during the war to take part.

The Croats, who are in the majority since the war, want the elections to take place as scheduled.

In Mostar, EU spokesman Dragan Gasic told AFP that it was not up to Bildt to decide if the elections were to be delayed. He said that the city was under the administration of the European Union, which was responsible for organising the elections.

Gasic said that everything concerning the elections in Mostar was laid down in the Dayton peace accords and only the United States could exercise any real influence on what actually happened. [passage omitted]

Murphy's statement was welcomed by a Bosnian Moslem party in Mostar.

"We support Bildt's proposal to push back the date of the elections. If they take place on May 31, at least three quarters of the citizens of this city will not be able to cast their votes," Hamdija Jahic, head of the Bosnian government party, the SDA, told AFP. [passage omitted]

"A catastrophe in the elections in Mostar, for example a boycott, could create a precedent which could give all those who want it the right to boycott other elections in Bosnia," EU spokesman Gasic said.

B-H: National Bank Decides on Intervention in Market

AU1305162096 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 13 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The National Bank of Bosnia-Herzegovina will intervene in the market and, in order to maintain the stability of the dinar, sell 15 million German marks to banks, it was decided at the collegium of the governors of the National Bank of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Claims submitted to the National Bank will be solved in direct bids [words indistinct] that submitted claims to purchase foreign means of payment. Claims of banks that still have not submitted them, if they do, will be solved in the same way. Banks may use the purchased foreign exchange exclusively for payment to foreign countries; for importing raw materials, intermediate goods, and consumer goods. Banks that pay for the imports are obligated to agree with their clients on selling the said goods to ultimate consumers, that is, purchasers, exclusively for dinars, it is said in today's announcement issued by the office of the Governor of the National Bank of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

B-H: Monetary Policy, Plans for New Currency Viewed

AU0905150396 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 3 May 96 p 2

[Article by Ibrahim Polimac: "The Bank and Dinar"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Although important, the Law on the Goals and Tasks of Credit and Monetary Policy in 1996 passed by the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina at their April session went almost unnoticed. The media provided only brief information about the law being accepted at the suggestion of the National Bank. There was little discussion of the details of the document, even in the Assembly.

The basic goals, as defined by the law, are the formation of the central bank of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the introduction of a single currency, and the determination of its parity of exchange with German mark. Those actions are demanded by the Dayton agreement and arrangements with international monetary organizations.

Second, but not less important, is that the National Bank of Bosnia-Herzegovina will be the only body in charge of the direction of the monetary policy, its main task being to "keep the country's currency stable." Moreover, "the dinar will be subject to further promotion as the means of payment, with the support of the required foreign currency reserves," and, accordingly, "it will be ensured that the increased issue of the dinar does not exceed the equivalent of the foreign currency reserves in the supplies of the National Bank." As it is planned, the increase of the foreign currency funds by $150 million would provide the means for the issue of a smaller or equal sum of Bosnian dinars, and those would have proper coverage, just as those already in circulation.

Despite all that, the Bosnian dinar will not last very long. The law on the central bank is to be passed by October this year at the latest, and the bank should start to function soon after that. That new institution will then take over the responsibility for the issue of money and for the monetary policy in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The law on credit and monetary policy therefore plans to have "the currency that will be our means of payment in all transactions in Bosnia-Herzegovina determined, its rate of exchange defined according to German mark," even before the law on the central bank is passed.

The circulation of the currency will start after the law on the central bank is passed. That should mean that the Bosnian dinar will gradually be withdrawn from circulation and replaced with the new currency at the determined parity. Simultaneously, the new currency would also be introduced in the regions where the kuna and Yugoslavian dinar are presently used as means of payment. That requires the monetary rule of the central bank on the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which will not be easy to accomplish in the Federation, let alone in the Serb entity. Obviously, that is another challenge for those who are implementing the civilian part of the Dayton agreement, requiring the integration of the monetary system of the entire country.

Until the central bank is founded, the National Bank will use the strictly controlled primary issue for the purchase of foreign currency in order to form the foreign currency reserves, and the banks that perform exchange services will also help. Simultaneously, credits will no longer be granted from the primary issue, and commercial banks will not grant credits to finance public expenditure. With the policy of general discount rate and interest rate on credits granted earlier, compulsory reserves, and limited deposit, the National Bank will stimulate the commercial banks to direct their potential toward the revival of economic activity.

Finally, fiscal arrangements are planned to be adjusted to the monetary policy. They should both be aimed at the establishing of the market elements of the economy. That really means that the budget will have to rely on the real sources exclusively, and the financing of expenditure through credits granted by commercial banks will be impossible.

We could say there is nothing new on the Bosnian credit and monetary scene for the time being. The policy introduced in the middle of 1996 has brought good results so far, and its application continues. However, it was adjusted to the state of war. We are yet to see the results that it will bring in peacetime. For the time being, the efficiency of the restrictions does not seem to be diminishing. Its effect on the reconstruction ambitions, especially on the creation of new jobs, is yet to be seen when the remaining set of rules on economic policy for this year is adopted.

As to the state—that is, the budget—things remain the same, too. The meaning of that is perhaps best illustrated by an anecdote from the recent donor conference in Brussels. An informal question was asked about the deficit in the Bosnian budget, and our representative surprised the audience by saying there was none. One of the present foreign representatives, being familiar with the situation, explained that there was no budget.

B-H: Radio Commentary on World Response to 'Serb Terrorism'

LD0505200496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 5 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Frequent attacks on Bosniak civilians by Karadzic's followers have again opened the question of why international representatives are completely ignoring Serb terrorism in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The consequence of terrorist actions by Karadzic's supporters can be far-reaching not only for the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina but also for the future of the Dayton peace agreement. Enes Osmancevic comments on some of these aspects.

[Begin Osmancevic recording] Is the new post-Dayton era in Bosnia-Herzegovina entering a phase of unrest, and will this phase be ushered in and strongly characterized by modified methods of Serb terrorism? If we can judge from the events which took place over the past few weeks, and the key players' behavior, we can conclude with certainty that it will. By repeating the earlier scenarios, featuring spontaneous gatherings of the celestial nation, Serb terrorism is aspiring to enter the halls of political decision making on the fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina with a fanfare.

Let us remember that Serbia and Montenegro—with Karadzic's Serb Democratic Party paramilitary system—launched the aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina with first-class terrorist actions. That kind of terrorism was a constant accompaniment to the genocide against Bosniaks and Croats on the one hand, and to the pressure exerted on the international community on the other. Terrorism has been and still is Karadzic's strongest point of argument in all his vile deeds.

The same type of terrorism is rudely sobering us up now after the sweet intoxication of the world's deceptions of peace. First, there were kidnappings on the Tuzla-Orasje road, and then attacks on Bosniaks near Brcko, Doboj, Trnovo, and Teslic. Finally, there were the murders and wounding of people near Sjenina.

After all this, the logical question is: Who will be the victim and where are the limits to Karadzic's acolytes' terrorism? The answer to the first question could certainly be: Bosniaks. No definite answer—except suppositions—can be given to the second part of the question. However, we can claim with certainty that, if the behavior so far of IFOR [Implementation Force] and international police is anything to go by, the world is still not capable of recognizing the full impact of the danger of Serb terrorism.

IFOR commanders seem to be ignoring the problem and are using awkward excuses such as: they are only here to supervise the military situation and they have so far executed this task more or less successfully. But can anyone tolerate terrorism, especially if they know that terrorism is Karadzic's main weapon, which he will not hesitate to use to shoot at the good fairies of Dayton?

Furthermore, the small international police force, in its capacity as an observer—the kind of which we have already seen in this region—is inadequate for any kind of operation, let alone the antiterrorist ones. It is obvious that after the initial successes in implementing the military part of the Dayton agreement, civilian issues call for greater mobility and more subtle and effective solutions, which, it seems, Bildt's office cannot come up with for the time being.

This seems to be the reason why the Americans have decided to take control of the situation. The mission of Clinton's adviser, George Mitchell, points to the unambiguous conclusion that handing over war crime suspects Karadzic and Mladic to the Hague tribunal can, in addition to its symbolic value, be of practical use as well. Those in the know are aware that these two have been the main instigators and executors of both the genocide and all terrorist actions in Bosnia-Herzegovina over the last four years.

This move by America in the fight against Serb terrorism is seen as a potentially good beginning. Specific actions are yet to be taken. This luxury can be afforded only by those not directly threatened by Karadzic's followers and their terrorism. Our experience so far has taught us that we simply have no right to that luxury. [end recording]

B-H: UN's Ogata: Freedom of Movement Severely Restricted

AU1305130696 Paris AFP in English 1326 GMT 13 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Geneva, May 13 (AFP)—Freedom of movement remains "severely restricted" in Bosnia, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata said Monday.

She was addressing a meeting in Geneva of the humanitarian issues working group after returning from a week-long tour of Bosnia and Croatia.

"Today, freedom of movement for civilians across the inter-entity boundary line and even between the Croat and Bosnian-controlled areas within the federation remains severely restricted," Ogata said.

Under the Dayton peace accords, Bosnia-Herzegovina was split into two entities, the Serb-controlled Republika Srpska and the Muslim-Croat Federation.

Ogata gave the example of the divided southern city of Mostar, where Croats in the western part of the city and Moslems in the east fought some of the fiercest clashes of the war.

"In Mostar, the bridge linking the eastern and western parts in now open but an invisible wall of fear and obstruction still separates the two communities," she said.

Ogata praised the NATO-led peace Implementation Force (IFOR) for their work in separating the warring sides, and said that it was now up to the civil authorities to reunite the inhabitants.

She said that elections would take place and the arrival of democratically-elected authorities would reinforce the peace.

However, she added a warning: "There are also extremists waiting for the right opportunity to provoke a violent separation."

Dozens of representatives of donor countries, humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organisations took part in Monday's meeting, which was being held to discuss humanitarian questions which have arisen in the implementation of the Dayton peace accords.

Before the meeting, the ministers for refugees of the Republika Srpska, Ljubisa Vladusic, of the Croat-Muslim Federation, Ferid Alic, and of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Nudzejm Recica, signed a joint declaration in Ogata's office. The declaration said they would encourage visits by people who wanted to return to villages from which they had been expelled by "ethnic cleansing".

Obstacles to freedom of movement, primarily on the part of the Serbs, have effectively halted the return of refugees and displaced people.

In the light of this, the UNHCR has revised down its estimations of how many refugees will be able to return home this year. Ogata said Thursday in Sarajevo that "at best" 500,000 Bosnian refugees would be able to return. The figure is almost half the agency's previous figure of 900,000.

B-H: Criticism of Muslims' 'Violent Intrusions' on 'Serb Land'

AU1405070396 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian Serb) in Serbo-Croatian 9 May 96 p 4

[Commentary by R.S.: "Invalidation of Dayton"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The peace signed in Dayton is not being observed. The Muslims keep provoking and attacking the Serb Republic. Their extreme leader, Alija Izetbegovic, displayed all his cards in Gorazde recently, when he said: "We are continuing our struggle until the final liberation of Bosnia-Herzegovina!" What Izetbegovic said, in fact, was that he planned to occupy the Serb Republic and violate the Dayton agreement. The Muslim attempts at mass entry in Brcko, Doboj, Teslic, Novi Grad, Prijedor, and some other places are aimed at causing incidents, for which the international community would again accuse the Serbs. The Dayton freedom of movement cannot be a pretext for violent intrusions by Muslims armed with knives, stones, and blunt objects.

Muslim cemeteries in the Serb Republic are frequently used by Muslims as a pretext for manipulations that can be easily seen through. The attitude of the Muslims toward the dead is not unknown. They often left the bodies of their killed fighters on the front, even when they were able to pick them up. Today, the Muslims, on one hand, are showing excessive interest in their cemeteries in the Serb Republic, while, on the other, they are showing an extreme lack of interest in the cemeteries in their own entity. Likewise, they are trying to return en masse to the Serb Republic, while their return to the cities or in the part of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina from which they were expelled by the federal partner is out of the question. All this is happening after the post-Dayton exodus of the Sarajevo Serbs. The Muslims did not offer any protection to the Serbs or guarantees for their stay and survival in Sarajevo, which is what they demand for themselves in the Serb Republic.

By leaving their centuries-old land, the Sarajevo Serbs have contributed considerably to the strengthening of the Serb Republic. Thereby it has been definitely confirmed that, after everything that happened in this region, a multiethnic society is not possible here. This is clear to the Muslims as well, so they are trying, with their attempts at forceful entry into the Serb Republic, to cause conflicts and set the war ablaze again.

The British press reports that the Muslims have started the secret production of antipersonnel mines. Against what or whom is this aimed, if not against the freedom of movement of Serbs? the National Radical Party of Nikola Pasic rightfully wonders in its statement for the press. What would happen to the Serbs if they were to set off en masse toward Zenica, Travnik, Mostar, or Sarajevo?

With their intrusions, the Muslims are trying to destabilize the Serb Republic, to infiltrate into places along the Dayton borders and invalidate them, and, finally, to prevent the Serbs from accomplishing their final goal—adding the Serb Republic to the FRY. In the near future, we can expect more-frequent forceful, organized or random, entries by the Muslims, with the help of the Implementation Force [IFOR]. The Muslim plan is clear—to settle as many of their people in the Serb Republic as possible, and, in the near future, to revise the maps with a new demographic situation.

The Serbs are not against freedom of movement, because Dayton requires them to observe it, and the Serb side observes it by all means. The Muslims and the Croats, who travel through the Serb land every day, know this very well. Even at the time of the greatest grief in Mrkonjic Grad, when mass graves of killed Serbs were discovered, the Muslims and the Croats traveled through that place without problems. Perhaps even those responsible for those crimes did so. But, even at that time, no Serb provocation was ever reported. When buses from central Bosnia began passing through Serb communities on their way toward Bihac, not a single Muslim driver or passenger ever experienced any provocation from the Serbs.... Nobody, I guess, can forbid us to control and protect our land, which was officially recognized as Serb in Dayton. Forceful intrusion onto the territory of any state represents an act liable to legal sanctions. Thereby, public order is disturbed, freedoms are endangered, and bloodshed is encouraged. Muslim entries into the Serb Republic create possibilities for an increase in crime and the infiltration of Islamic terrorism into the Serb Republic. Incidents or conflicts with IFOR are also possible. Of course, the world would again blame the Serbs for that. Therefore, caution and watchfulness in places close to the border are not only a must for the police force, but also for our people. What was paid for with blood must be protected.

B-H: Kasagic Announces Intention To Reshuffle Government

AU1405122396 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 14 May 96 p 3

[BETA report: "Rajko Kasagic Announced Replacement of Ministers"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Banja Luka, Bijeljina (BETA)—In an interview for Voice of America, Serb Republic Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic said that some ministers are not working for the implementation of the peace accord and that he will replace them. He did not specify the ministers in question. [passage omitted]

B-H: Serb Minister: World Community Provoking Local Divisions

LD1205213996 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1850 GMT 12 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Doboj, 12 May (SRNA)—Serb Defense Minister Milan Ninkovic told a news conference in Doboj today that the "international community wants to break the unity of the Serb Republic by provoking local divisions."

"The international players who have not been able to destroy us from outside are now trying to cause regional rifts and divisions in the Serb Republic," said Ninkovic who is also the chairman of the Municipal Committee of the Serb Democratic Party [SDS] in Doboj.

Ninkovic said that the law on territorial organization and local self-government in the Serb Republic did not envisage the division of the Serb Republic into regions and districts.

"The international community is supporting the Serb political opposition parties in order to bring down the SDS, because it believes that by bringing down the SDS it will also destroy the Serb Republic and reintegrate it into a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina," Ninkovic explained. [passage omitted]

B-H: Serb Opposition Calls For National Salvation Government

LD1305113096 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1018 GMT 13 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Bijeljina, 13 May (TANJUG)—The Democratic Party [DS] and the Party of the Democratic Center [SDC] from Trebinje sent an open letter to Serb Republic President Radovan Karadzic from Bijeljina today. They are urging the formation of a government of national salvation of the Serb Republic, saying that "the existing institutions and bodies in municipalities and the whole of the Serb Republic are incapable of coping with the situation which is seriously deteriorating day by day."

"In order not only to preserve the democratic character of the Serb Republic but also to ensure its very survival, it is necessary to form urgently, with the consensus of political forces that the people have confidence in, a competent and responsible government of national salvation which could initiate and intensify the work of institutions and bodies on the territory of the whole of the Serb Republic," the letter says. It points out that "only a government formed in such a manner would ensure the legitimacy of authorities in the transitional period before the democratic multiparty elections in the Serb Republic take place."

The DS and the SDC believe that this government's priorities should be "active contacts with the international community in order to win greater economic and political support for the Serb Republic, the strengthening of the Serb Republic's institutionalized links with Serbia and Montenegro—as opposed to political links which lead to a negative polarization of sections of the people on the two sides of the River Drina—the drawing up of a resettlement plan of the Serb Republic to ensure a strategic distribution of the population in which Brcko, and not 'New Sarajevo' [Novo Sarajevo] would be the focal point of the Serb Republic's survival, and a responsible and just, not hasty, privatization."

The new political reality demands that the government of national salvation and trust should be based in Banja Luka, where the best conditions for it to function already exist, the letter to Karadzic states.

B-H: SDS Official Denies Party Support for Unitary State

AU1305174796 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 10 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Miodrag Zivanovic, president of the Social Liberal Party [SDS] of the Serb Republic, stated in Banja Luka today that all political parties in the Serb Republic must take a clear stand and reach a consensus on the upcoming arbitration in the Brcko area.

Regarding the accusations that the SDS supports a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina, Zivanovic stated that this is incorrect and added that the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat Federation are a reality acknowledged by the Dayton accord.

According to Zivanovic, the Declaration on a Unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina, signed by Muslim leaders Haris Silajdzic and Alija Izetbegovic, represents a conscious violation of the Dayton accord provisions.

B-H: Arrested Muslims Reportedly Admit Killing 4 Civilians

LD1105094596 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 0758 GMT 11 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Zvornik, 11 May (SRNA)—Seven Muslim terrorists, who were arrested yesterday in the village of Planinka in the municipality of Zvornik, have admitted to Zvornik police investigators that they killed four civilians from Milici on 2 May. [passage omitted]

According to their statements, the Serb civilians were killed in the village of Stublic, 40 km from Milici, and then taken by car to Krusev Do, where they were buried in an old Muslim cemetery.

Zvornik police and judicial investigators are on the scene and examining the statements of the arrested terrorists and are awaiting the arrival of Dr. Zoran Stankovic, a pathologist from the military hospital in Belgrade who is to carry out forensic tests on the bodies.

B-H: Serb Republic Forms 'Elite' Commando Unit

LD1005225796 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 10 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] After the Dayton agreement was signed, the [Bosnian] Serb Republic demobilized a certain number of the Serb Republic Army soldiers. In line with its reorganization, the Serb Republic Army is setting up professional, modern, and elite units of the sort which proved their caliber in the three-and-a-half-year war.

A ceremony held in Bijeljina [eastern Bosnia] today marked the formation of the 33rd reconnaissance-commando detachment in the 3rd Corps of the Serb Republic army.

[Begin recording] [Reporter Darko Milosevic] In line with the planned and systematic reorganization of the units within the Serb Republic army in the Vojvoda Stepa Stepanovic barracks in Bijeljina, a ceremony was held today at which the 33d Reconnaissance-Sabotage Detachment was formally established.

This elite unit of the Bosnian Serb army 3d Corps consists of experienced, war-hardened fighters who have also undergone additional special army training.

[Budimir Gavric, 3d Corps commander] You still have to undergo a process of training and exercise so that the unit is able at any moment to take up its position at our homeland's borders.

We should never forget the statements of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation leaders: They want to conquer the whole territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and chase the Serbs across the Drina [River], although we would like peace to continue in this region, within the present-day borders, an stay for many centuries to come.

[Milosevic] The newly formed reconnaissance-commando detachment will be an exceptionally well-trained mobile unit with sophisticated equipment and all the characteristics of a modern, professional army.

[Milan Jovovic, unit commander] Soldiers from this unit have a rich and [word indistinct] experience. The members of this unit were the factor of security and defense [as heard] of areas around [word indistinct] Podrinje [area along the River Drina], Semberija, and Posavina and there is no area in the Serb Republic where the members of this unit were not engaged.

[Milosevic] Together with the highest officers of the 3d Corps and the representatives of the civil institutions from the region, today's ceremony in Bijeljina was attended by the parents of soldiers from the units forming the new detachment. Among them was Milena Lazarevic, mother of heroes whose three sons were killed in this war. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Croatia: Council of Europe To Delay Croatian Entry

MS1405120096 London THE GUARDIAN in English 14 May 96 p 10

[Article by John Palmer: "Croatia Faces European Snub"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brussels—The Council of Europe may delay Croatia's accession this week because of growing international concern over President Franjo Tudjman's curbs on the independent media and on elected opposition politicians, a source close to the secretary-general said last night.

Foreign ministers of the 15 European Union countries meeting in Brussels, signalled their desire for more time, asking the 39-country council to get a firm timetable from Zagreb for meeting the body's democratic standards. They called for a special meeting of the council's committee of ministers before summer, if possible, to discuss the issue.

A statement by the foreign ministers reiterated their support for the goal of eventual Croatian membership which was approved by the Council of European Parliamentary assembly only last month. "A precise timetable should be established as regards the undertakings entered into by Croatia with a view to its accession," the statement declared.

EU endorsement of Croatia's membership of the council had been thought a formality. But European governments have been angered at President Tudjman's decision to dissolve the opposition-controlled Zagreb city council, elected earlier this year. They are also critical of the legal measures taken by the president against independent newspapers and broadcasting organisations.

The editor of one Croatian satirical weekly paper faces a three-year prison sentence for "bringing the president into disrepute."

The ministerial committee of the Council of Europe will meet in Strasbourg later this week to work out a detailed plan for monitoring Croatia's record on civil liberties. When the Croatian government applied for membership it gave 21 undertakings on human rights, including commitments "to pursue the procedure for electing a mayor of Zagreb, taking account of Council of Europe recommendations" and a "guarantee" of media freedom.

The former Yugoslav republics of Macedonia and Slovenia are already members of the Council of Europe. Bosnia-Herzegovina has "special guest" status and the rump Yugoslavia—Serbia and Montenegro has not been admitted. Russia was accepted as a member in February despite strong misgivings over its human rights record and the army's repression in Chechnnya.

EU foreign ministers also agreed last night to press ahead with elections in the ethnically-divided Bosnian city of Mostar on May 31 despite protests by Muslims that they have been denied the right to register as voters in their home areas. "Any delay might lead to a delay in the elections in the rest of Bosnia and that would be a disaster," the Italian foreign minister and president of the Council of Ministers, Susanna Agnelli, said last night.

The ministers were briefed on the tense situation in Mostar by the EU administrator for the city, Perez Casado. EU governments have repeatedly protested against actions by Croat extremists in Mostar, who are opposed to the unification of the city.

The meeting in Brussels also heard of the problems facing the Bosnia-wide election due to be held by September 14. "The elections will not be perfect in view of the obstacles being placed in the way of refugees wishing to return home, but it is far better that we have imperfect elections than none at all," one EU diplomat said.

The German foreign minister, Klaus Kinkel, flew from Brussels to Belgrade last night to persuade President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia to help turn over to the international court of justice in the Hague Bosnian Serbs accused of war crimes.

Croatia: Official Views SFRY Succession Issues

AU1205140496 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 5 May 96 pp 6-7

[Interview with Bozo Marendic, coordinator of the Croatian Project for the Succession of the Former SFRY, by Ivka Bacic and Gordana Grgas; place and date not given: "Croatia Will Not Give Up Its Share of Foreign Currency and Gold"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Croatian team for the succession of the property of the former SFRY went to Brussels to meet Arthur Watts, chairman of the new group for the succession in the Council for the Implementation of Peace, the "successor" of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia in Geneva. We spoke with Bozo Marendic, the coordinator of the Croatian Project for the Succession of the Former SFRY, about the results of the Brussels meeting and about other current issues regarding the succession. He confirmed that the opinion of the Badinter Commission still formed the basis for further talks about the succession of the former state, although the FRY has opposed it for a long time. The succession has to be accomplished, as Marendic stressed, because it could otherwise cause new confrontations.

[VJESNIK] What arrangements did you make with Arthur Watts at the meeting about the succession in Brussels?

[Marendic] We agreed on a very important point. The work done by the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia in Geneva should be continued, and all the results—of researches and other projects—should be taken into account in the further process of the succession. The talks should begin according to the principles of the Outline of the Contract on the Succession that was prepared a year and a half ago at the Conference.

Mr. Watts has already had similar talks with Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia, and Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], but not with the representatives of the FRY, who postponed the talks because of other obligations. The next session of talks will be similar, and Mr. Watts will also visit the successor states. We expect him in Croatia at the end of May. Should any results be achieved in those two sessions of bilateral talks, all successor states will be summoned to a meeting in Brussels.

[VJESNIK] Croatia considers the existing Outline of the Contract on the Succession to be a good basis for negotiations. Why?

[Marendic] We have estimated that it is satisfactory for Croatia, although that does not mean that it will remain satisfactory to the end of the negotiations. The Outline was created according to the principles of international law, and it provides a number of solutions that observe the fact that Croatia has suffered more damage in the war than some other successor states. Bosnia-Herzegovina is treated in the same way. The succession does not include the war damage, but the international negotiators have nevertheless taken care of that, although the funds in question are not big. However, I am not sure we are going to succeed in "defending" those rights in the contract.

UN Pressure on Belgrade

[VJESNIK] Will the contract, which is not accepted by the FRY, soon come to the UN Security Council as planned?

[Marendic] The project started by the international conference in Geneva is based on the assumption that the process of succession can be ended by the contract on the succession being validated by the UN Security Council, which will also use its pressure to force Serbia and Montenegro to obey the contract. If the FRY has changed its attitude in the meantime—although we have noticed no indications of that—and if Mr. Watts manages to persuade Belgrade to change its present attitude, the decision of the Security Council will not be necessary. I think that Serbia will not change its attitude as long as it has the present regime. As you know, Dragoslav Avramovic, the present governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia, estimated that the results of the Geneva conference were realistic and should therefore be accepted, but they were not accepted.

[VJESNIK] What is your opinion about the Macedonian attitude toward the succession after their mutual recognition with the FRY?

[Marendic] During the recent meeting in Skopje—with the participation of the representatives for succession issues of Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia, and Croatia—Macedonian Foreign Minister Ljubomir Frckovski assured us that the attitude of Skopje toward the succession did not change because of the recognition with the FRY. Besides, the report on the meeting of Macedonian representatives with Arthur Watts in Brussels proved so. Therefore, we expect our cooperation with the Macedonian delegation to be as successful as it has been so far.

Archives of the NBJ and the SIV Inaccessible

[VJESNIK] Is there any news about the distribution of the archives of the former Yugoslavia?

[Marendic] The meetings of the International Archives Council have been held, but there has been no news, because the attitudes of the FRY about the distribution of archival materials are also unacceptable to us.

[VJESNIK] What about the archives of the former NBJ [National Bank of Yugoslavia]?

[Marendic] The archives of the former National Bank of Yugoslavia, of the Federal Executive Council [SIV], and other archives necessary for the succession are still inaccessible to us and to the international mediators, too. Therefore, many things have to be guessed in the process of succession, and it is difficult to estimate, for instance, the value of the actual foreign currency rreserves or the gold reserves.

[VJESNIK] How much of those reserves have been spent in the meantime? Is there any information on whether the FRY has managed to withdraw any of the frozen funds?

[Marendic] We have been in contact with the banks that hold the deposits of the former NBJ, and we have taken a number of legal actions to block those funds because UN Security Council Resolution 1022 created the possibility for Belgrade to attain a part of those funds. We are still working on that, although the greatest part of the funds has been kept. However, it is very difficult to get the information from a bank about the actual amount of money in a certain account—if they have funds of the former Yugoslavia, they tell us so, but they will not tell us the exact value. Therefore, we have to work according to some previous estimates. It happened that we wanted to block the funds in a certain bank, and the bank informed us they did not have those funds any longer...

Our requirements in foreign currency reserves and gold are defined according to the date of the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, that is, the date of succession—for Croatia and Slovenia it is 8 October 1991, and we have determined our demands according to that. Of course, it will not be easy, but demands are demands, and we think we are going to realize them.

Compensation for Military Property, Too

[VJESNIK] What about the military part of the property of the former state, which is 70 percent of the total value of the property in the succession? Will there be compensation?

[Marendic] The system of compensation is valid in the entire succession of the property of the former SFRY. If one of the successor states—for instance Macedonia, whose territory has the smallest number of state institutions—thinks it is damaged by the fact that all objects in Belgrade belong to the FRY, it has the right to compensation. The same is valid for us, for every bit of property.

For the military part of the property, we have to take into account other facts that will affect the succession—the value of the military equipment is different in war and in peace, and many things have been destroyed or taken by force from the FRY during the war. We have to take into account the negotiations on disarmament in Vienna, held within the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. According to the standards defined in those negotiations, some states of the former Yugoslavia will have a surplus of arms and equipment, and we suggest those surpluses be destroyed. All of that will affect the process of succession.

[VJESNIK] What is the situation with the distribution of debt of the former Yugoslavia as well as with the unpaid debt claims, especially from the former Soviet Union and Iraq?

[Marendic] As to the debts of the former state, some of those have been solved, as we can see in the cases of Croatia and Slovenia so far. That will be continued, and the same principles will be applied in the case of every successor state. For the distribution of the common foreign debts, the temporary criteria for the distribution were determined by the International Monetary Fund. The final criteria should be taken from the general contract that has not been signed yet.

Certain debts have not been solved in whole, although some of the successor states have tried to solve those individually. Those are the debts on the basis of guarantees of the former state, and they relate to the foreign currency savings of the citizens. Those funds are very big. In our platform, we are making efforts for the problem of guarantees to be solved the way Croatia solved it—the Croatian state took over the guarantees for the public, for the savers, and transformed it into public debt. The open issues with the Ljubljana Bank and Jugobanka have to be solved by the state.

[VJESNIK] How much claim does the former state—that is, the successor states—hold?

[Marendic] About $5 billion. There have been suggestions that it should be solved individually, the same way we solved the debt. The former Soviet Union is $2 billion in debt to us, Iraq is another $2 billion, and other developing states $1 billion. That is a part of the succession, and it will be solved when possible.

[VJESNIK] The Iraqi debt was said not to be a part of the succession because it was not guaranteed by the former NBJ.

[Marendic] That is true of a part of the Iraqi debt but not of the rest. The part regulated by the contract signed by Janez Zemljaric is a part of the succession, since the former state paid it to the companies by means of credit or otherwise. A part of the debt of Iraq was not regulated by the state contract, and it belongs to the companies that operated individually, outside the contract. However, the Croatian state wants to help our companies, and that is why we hold claims. We must wait and see whether we will succeed.

FRY Has No Right to the Succession

[VJESNIK] The succession also involves purely political problems. How incompatible with the present process of succession is the fact that Croatia was ready, in the unsigned part of the Dayton agreement, to recognize Belgrade as the successor of the SFRY, including the right of membership in international organizations?

[Marendic] You forgot to say that the document said Croatia was ready to do so if the other states did so, too. The outline of that agreement contains the article that says it has no effect on the succession, which is conducted according to international law. That is the difference from the Macedonian agreement with the FRY, which does not contain the clause "should the other states accept it," and which provided consensus as the means of solving the common problems in the succession. Accordingly, even if the agreement on the normalization between Croatia and the FRY was signed—and it was not, because they invented the problem of Prevlaka that had not even been mentioned before—its concept enabled us to remain faultless in the eyes of other successor states.

Finally, we gave it all up. As you know, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina protested recently when the UN secretary general suggested that the FRY keep the place of the SFRY in the UN. That attempt failed, and I think that the intention of the FRY to be recognized as the successor of the SFRY by the international community will fail too. The FRY has made great efforts in that because it would mean a lot to them—an excuse for the war and everything that happened and a chance to place responsibility on other states, primarily Croatia and Slovenia.

[Box, p 6]

Inheritance Is Already Being Sold

One of the most drastic examples of the theft and waste of movables and immovables and other capital (gold, foreign bank accounts) that remained after the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia is the case of the motor vessel Seagull, better known as the "sailing residence" of the lifelong President of the SFRY, Josip Broz Tito. Seagull, used by Tito for cruises around the world, was sold for 3 million German marks to an unnamed American businessman residing in France. We do not know who was the sales representative, we only know that the Montenegro Government will use the money paid for the vessel (!?). As we can see, the inheritance is being sold little by little before the probate of will, and the millions are slowly melting down and disappearing.

Estimated Value in the Succession (in Billions of $U.S)

Financial assets and liabilities	20.737
Military property	69.907
Infrastructure	1.783
State-owned real estate	1.220
Other values	0.284
TOTAL	93.960

Croatia: FRY Envoy Views Recognition, SFRY Succession

AU1405085196 Belgrade INTERVJU in Serbo-Croatian 3 May 96 pp 22-23

[Interview with Veljko Knezevic, head of the FRY Bureau in Croatia, by "M.K." in Zagreb; date not given: "The Serbs Have the Right To Return"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Yugoslav Bureau is located in the Zagreb Salata at the elite address of Mesic Street No. 19. The freshly painted villa with its FRY plaque attracts the attention of passers-by. Cameras are set up at the entrance. They are only a part of the security measures for Veljko Knezevic, the only Yugoslav representative in Croatia. He is, therefore, often asked by Zagreb journalists about Yugoslav-Croatian relations. Knezevic comes from Knin, which means that he is personally interested in the destiny of the Serbs in Croatia.

[M.K.] How would you comment on the developments on the territory of the former Yugoslavia since the Dayton Agreement was adopted?

[Knezevic] We have entered the stage of a major standstill in implementing the Dayton Agreement. The issue of Mostar is contested and, generally speaking, the functioning of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation is contested. The standstill is obviously due to different interpretations of the Dayton Agreement.

Apocalyptical Fear

[M.K.] Have you had any opportunity to visit the former Republic of Serbian Krajina? Do you have any information about how many Serb refugees from Knin want to return home?

[Knezevic] Most Serb refugees from Krajina want to return home, to their land and their apartments. This is only natural, and I think that the refugee-expellee problem is so urgent that both the Croatian and Serbian sides are facing a historic test. I believe that we will be able to muster the strength to pass that test.

[M.K.] What is, in your opinion, the real reason that the Serbs left? Were they manipulated by their leadership or afraid of life in Croatia?

[Knezevic] Had it not been for the apocalyptical fear among the Serb population, they would not have fled in a literally headless fashion.

[M.K.] Has the FRY left the Serbs from Croatia alone or simply "sold" them due to its own vested interests?

[Knezevic] The immaturity of the Krajina leaders and the impatience of the Croatian side have led to the great

Serb tragedy in Krajina. The mention of "selling" is a cabinet politicking thesis that nobody believes.

Serbs Respect Agreement

[M.K.] The Vukovar leadership in Zagreb explicitly demands that, immediately after disarming paramilitary formations, the Croatian authorities should be established there, that the kuna should be established as the legal tender, that Croats should be brought in as school teachers, and that all Serbs who lived there until 1991 may remain on condition that they have not perpetrated any war crimes, while all those who settled later must leave.

[Knezevic] Your question touches upon the topics that imply compliance to the agreement. Its signatories are the Croatian side and the Serb side, which represents the Serbs from this Slavonia Region. Article 1 clearly envisages the transitional period deadline to be 12 months, "which can be prolonged by one period of the same length at the most and at the demand of one of the sides." Therefore, there is enough time for a full and honest implementation of the Erdut Agreement. [passage omitted]

[M.K.] The possibility of opening some kind of war crimes tribunal in Belgrade that would send the indicted people to The Hague has been mentioned recently. Can you tell us something more specific about that?

[Knezevic] Every war crime must be punished. It is what every state and its judiciary owe to the international public and, above all, to its own public. In this respect, the FRY will be on of the historic task within is own constitution. [sentence as published] The Hague Tribunal and the FRY obligations to it were also discussed in Dayton. What the FRY has obligated itself to do to will be done, however, The Hague Tribunal also must not be an instrument of political pressures and manipulations. It would simply not be a tribunal then.

[M.K.] Can you comment on the fact that the United States has engaged 22 officials and agents to collect documents and evidence for drafting The Hague indictment against Slobodan Milosevic?

[Knezevic] Regardless of whether that fact is correct, we consider such ideas to be speculative and serving a possible pressure on the president of Serbia. I think that pressure in such a form is unnecessary. After all, as is known, the United States has verified Serbian president's role in the peace process on the territory of former Yugoslavia. The president of Serbia is an active participant and a respected and incontestable partner in the process of reaching final peace. What is involved here is a mere attempt by irresponsible groups and individuals, which is absolutely contradictory to Slobodan Milosevic's contribution to peace. [passage omitted]

Return to the Homeland

[M.K.] In your opinion, how much closer are we to the normalization of relations between the FRY and Croatia in the wake of the Zagreb and Belgrade talks?

[Knezevic] I view this process with optimism and think that we are much closer to the normalization of Yugoslav-Croatian relations than we were last year. I believe, that the FRY and the Republic of Croatia will establish normal relations soon.

[M.K.] Can one already speak about a date?

[Knezevic] Of course, it is difficult to speak about a specific date. [passage omitted]

[M.K.] Why is the FRY still delaying the recognition of Croatia?

[Knezevic] One cannot speak about any one side delaying recognition. What is involved here is a process that should lead to normalization and mutual recognition. What is involved here is not whether one side wants to recognize the other or not. Mutual recognition is the final act of normalizing relations. It should take place when both sides realize that all the most important problems have been solved and that no room has been left for some potential burdens and misunderstandings that may shortly break out and perhaps push everything back to the beginning. We must prevent such possibilities. We shall achieve that only if we demonstrate maximum rationality, wisdom, and patience to bring everything that was started to an end.

[M.K.] What does the FRY set as the main condition for mutual recognition?

[Knezevic] The FRY sincerely wishes to have the best possible relations with the Republic of Croatia. Such a Yugoslav attitude and orientation have clearly been demonstrated in all contacts the two country's representatives have had at different levels so far. I shall remind you that it was what Federal Foreign Minister Milutinovic particularly stressed in his statement after the talks with Croatian Foreign Minister Granic.

Therefore, one could not claim that there are major or lesser conditions that the FRY sets or that it conditions the recognition of Croatia upon their acceptance. I do not want to say here that there are no open issues, that is, those that deserve most careful examination and preparation.

One of them is the question of Prevlaka. We are all aware of the fact that it is of great importance for both the Republic of Croatia and the FRY. It would be damaging for our overall future relations if that problem were now solved hurriedly and through pressing measures, so that, as a consequence, it may grow into a new burden in the not-so-distant future. Let us leave this question to be solved calmly and without unnecessary tensions and haste, and let it be done so completely that both Croatia and Yugoslavia will both be satisfied with the solution. All open questions in our relations should be approached in that way. This means much fewer conditions and unilateral demands and much more tact, mutual understanding, and respect.

Three Memoranda

[M.K.] During Milutinovic's visit, three memorandums were signed involving seven important questions. How do you evaluate their significance and what is it that they should mean when they are seen from the legal point of view, as they are not interstate agreements?

[Knezevic] During the last meeting and talks between the two ministers, three memorandums were signed that regulated a number of questions for which it was established that they reached a stage at which they can be solved. What are involved here are primarily traffic questions, but also extending the consular services of the Yugoslav Government Bureau in Zagreb and the Croatian Government Office in Belgrade. Regarding the legal point of view, as you put it, I think that what was found and applied was the only possible formula to do something without all the formal and legal conditions being met. Under the conditions in which, for known reasons, the usual interstate agreements could not be reached, a way was found to nevertheless solve some questions and thus move from the standstill.

[M.K.] The question of succession has also reached a certain stage.

[Knezevic] That issue is extremely complex and cannot be solved in a relatively short term. Basically speaking, that question cannot be solved independently from the question of the continuity of the FRY in relation to the SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]. The Yugoslav stance in this respect has been clear from the very beginning—there is a continuity, the FRY is not a new state, but a predecessor state [drzava prethodnica—as published] and, therefore, the state that is continuing the legal entity of the SFRY.

There are already some authoritative confirmations of that stand. The most recent confirmation has come from the United Nations. A recently published document of the Service for International Law of the UN Secretariat provides convincing proof about the legal grounds for the assertion that the FRY represents the successor state. Therefore, the SFRY did not break up, but the FRY represents its continuity. Nevertheless, I think that this issue deserves to be first submitted to analyses and legal explanations, and, as far as is possible, should be freed from any political aspects. If this is not done, I cannot see how the issue can be concluded.

Croatia: Contracts on Neum Transit, Ploce Port Detailed

AU1405121896 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 14 May 96 p 3

[Article by D. Knezevic: "Through Neum Without Customs Control"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Croatian citizens and foreign tourists visiting the Croatian Adriatic coast will have the right to pass through Neum Municipality without hindrance. The port of Ploce will be opened for the needs of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This, in short, is the essence of the two legal documents that were signed in Zagreb on Saturday by the Croatian and Bosnia-Herzegovina prime ministers. These documents are in fact the contract on the implementation of the agreement between Croatia and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by which the passage of Croatian citizens through the territory of the Federation is secured, and the contract on the implementation of the agreement by which the Federation is granted access to the Adriatic. Clearly, the signing of these documents has a certain political weight. They are a proof of compliance with the Washington and Dayton accords, and they will have positive economic implications for both states.

Strengthening the Road Infrastructure

The guarantee of unobstructed passage through Neum and the opening of the port of Ploce for the needs of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina will at the same time provide access for the two states to favorable World Bank credits for strengthening the road infrastructure. In accordance with current needs, both contracts envisage joint appearance before international financial institutions. According to information from sources familiar with the background of the signing of the documents, this refers primarily to the bypass route round Neum, and to the construction of the Ploce-Metkovic-Sarajevo road.

The contract says, among other things, that the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina will permit unobstructed passage from Croatia along the road through Neum to trucks and other vehicles for the transit of goods and passengers. Customs control will not apply to vehicles with Croatian license plates. Those vehicles will not be checked, or approached by representatives of the official authorities of the Federation, unless drivers commit a traffic, customs or other offense. Free passage applies to passengers, luggage, commodities and vehicles, but without loading or unloading, and only if a trip begins and ends on the territory of Croatia. Loading, unloading or reloading are allowed only in the case of a breakdown or a road accident. Ljerka Mintas-Hodak, Croatian deputy prime minister, assesses, however, that much more has been achieved by the contract than by the agreements reached in the United States. That is because the Croatian side has accomplished the freedom of transit for vehicles from third states, that is, for vehicles with foreign license plates belonging to tourists coming to the Croatian Adriatic coast and that want to pass through Neum.

By the other contract Croatia guarantees the unobstructed and safe flow of commodities into the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina through the customs zone in the port of Ploce. No customs or other duties are to be paid for the goods passing the port on their way into or out of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and no customs reports need to be submitted. The port of Ploce will be open for traffic with all goods for the Federation's needs, except for goods that are prohibited in international trade. At the same time the Bosnia-Herzegovina users of Ploce port are guaranteed that cost of services in the port will not be higher than those in other Croatian ports, that is, in comparable foreign ports.

Measures Against Smuggling

With this contract Croatia pledges to maintain land connections (road and railway routes) from the port to the border of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It also pledges that it will not discriminate against ships operating for the needs of the Federation, regardless of their national origin.

As this legal regulation of the freedom of transit through Neum and Ploce may possibly give rise to the danger of smuggling, a clause has been added to the contract on Ploce according to which the transit along roads into and out of the Federation will be supervised or escorted by the Croatian police. This will be so until a separate roadway is constructed from the free customs zone to the Bosnia-Herzegovina border. It is also assumed that one will only be able to prevent smuggling in Neum when such a bypass is constructed as will make possible full control over transit.

The contracts signed last Saturday in Zagreb come into effect immediately, but they are still considered temporary. Passage through the Federation is supposed to be permanently regulated by other documents that will regulate not only road transit, but also rail transit. Likewise, by a new document the Federation's access to the Adriatic is supposed to be permanently regulated in the future. The existing contract does not apply to goods from and destinations in the remaining part of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Box, p 3]

Even as the text of the contract on the Federation's free access to the Adriatic was being prepared, severe reactions erupted in Ploce, from fear that the contract would result in an even more disadvantageous economic situation for the local population. Mintas-Hodak replies that the final version of the contract does not give any reason for such fears. Not only will the port provide services to ships operating for the needs of Bosnia-Herzegovina, there is also no danger that workers from Bosnia-Herzegovina will take over jobs from local citizens. The Ploce port authorities are responsible for employment, and it can also be regulated by state laws. Mintas-Hodak also told us that the final text of the contract had been approved by the Executive Board of the port at a meeting attended also by the mayor of Ploce.

Croatia: Human Rights Committee Chairman on E. Slavonia

LD1305144096 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 13 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The amnesty law was the main topic of today's news conference held in the government's office for the transitional administration [of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem] by Drazen Matijevic, the chairman of the executive committee for human rights, and Branko Culo, a member of the government's office.

In order for the peaceful integration not to be risky or painful for those who return and those who stay, it is necessary to reestablish a certain level of respect for human rights, Matijevic said, adding that this had to become a habit because without it no coexistence was possible.

Croatia has introduced the highest standards of respect for human rights in its Constitution and it will abide by them. People living in the occupied territories are becoming more aware of this fact.

So far a joint committee of the Croatian and Serb sides has met four times and on each occasion good cooperation was achieved and the subjects of future meetings were defined: abolition, amnesty, property, and human rights.

Both sides submitted to the Croatian Government their written proposals for an amnesty, in which the Serb side asked, among other things, for the annulment of sentences passed against Croatian citizens of Serb nationality for criminal offences committed in the armed conflict in the period from 17 August 1990 to 8 May 1996. The Croatian side offered an identical view on the matter in order to help build trust in the Croatian authorities. [passage omitted]

FYROM: Gligorov 'Pleased' With Visit to France

AU1305202796 Skopje MIC in English 13 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] "I am very pleased with the visit, reception, and attention we received, and especially with the contents of the talks which were quite essential for Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]," President Kiro Gligorov told the press at the end of his working visit to France. Among those essential questions, Gligorov firstly named the misunderstanding over the agreement with the European Union and the so-called regional approach. He emphasized the stance of the French President Jacques Chirac that "one country cannot be forced to join some kind of international association if it does not see its interests in it itself." The French President said that "regardless of whether it is insisted on some kind of regional association or not, that will not be a condition or obstacle to a country which meets the requirements to join the union."

As to bilateral matters, President Gligorov informed that his French counterpart Chirac had suggested that other European countries, as well as the European Investment Bank, also join the project "Vardar Valley," on which French experts have prepared a Study.

President Gligorov and Chirac agreed to realize a joint project at the beginning of next year, to organize a representative exhibition of the Macedonian Culture in Paris.

FYROM: Ethnic Albanians View Situation in Kosovo

AU1405105096 Skopje VECER in Macedonian 11-12 May 96 pp 4-5

[Article by Predrag Dimitrovski: "May the Evil Stay Away From Us"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The present situation in Kosovo, the consequences of an escalation of the situation, and the possible reaction of Albanians in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]—those were questions we asked representatives of the ethnic Albanian parties. Our impression is that the views and thoughts of all the speakers are nearly identical, and this is what was announced at the Assembly session on ratification of the agreement regulating relations between the Republic of Macedonia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Referring to the referendum of Kosovo Albanians and the outcome—to make Kosovo a republic, that is an independent and neutral state—Mr. Ismet Ramadani, a member of the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] Presidency and coordinator of the party's parliamentary deputies, emphasized the election of the Kosovo Albanians' leader Ibrahim Rugova and his party, and he stressed that the best way to solve the problem between the Serbian and the Kosovo leadership is peacefully, by dialogue, and by political means. However, Mr. Ramadani pointed out, he and the Kosovo Albanians had expected more help from the international community. "Nevertheless, following Dayton, I believe that they are quite disappointed, although they still hope that the Dayton conference will be reflected in Kosovo, because it was indirectly said and decided in Dayton that the Balkans must be settled as a region and as a part of Europe."

Nothing Concrete

I think that discussions are being held in the most authoritative European institutions on how to find a way to start a dialogue on the problem in Kosovo. Nothing concrete has been achieved, however, and everything remains in the domain of declarations and reports by those who visit Kosovo.

According to Ramadani, it is good that they are still looking for ways to establish a dialogue between the legitimate leadership in Kosovo and the leadership of Serbia with the mediation of a third side. However, those who are more radically oriented and who believe that dialogue cannot bring about what has been declared in the referendum are becoming more nervous. "This is the reason that we should not give Mr. Rugova merely declarative or moral political support, but must do something concrete for the dialogue to begin. Our party is not considering the possible epilogue of these discussions because we adhere to what was declared by the referendum of the Kosovo Albanians."

"If a conflict or war erupts in Kosovo, there is not even a theoretical chance that it can be contained within Kosovo. Most probably, it would be a war in the region at large. Under such circumstances, the Albanians from Macedonia would also be involved.

"I know," Ramadani says, "that the usual question is that we are another state, that there are borders and so on, but a war in the neighborhood makes the borders only an imaginary line. The problem is that many Albanians here in the Republic of Macedonia and Kosovo are related, not only as Albanians but also as families. There would probably be many refugees. These are assumptions that nobody would like to come true; I do not even wish to forecast anything like this. The best is if this does not happen at all and I still believe that it will not."

Growing Opposition

Arber Xhaferri, the leader of the PDPA [Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians, PPDSh in Albania], points out that "in Kosovo and in Macedonia the Albanians are equally dissatisfied" and their policy is based on this. "The policy that now prevails in Kosovo," says Xhaferri, "is the policy of the Democratic League of Kosovo, and they want their goals to be achieved peacefully. All the signs are that this policy will not get you far, and there is a growing opposition there that is, as they say, against the inactive peaceful policy and calling for a more active peaceful policy. There are certainly other unidentified groups, however, that believe that without other instruments that policy cannot fulfill this goal." According to Mr. Xhaferri, the main problem is the enormous, general, and deep dissatisfaction, which is then followed by policies and alternative policies.

"The recent events in Kosovo were serious and they must be understood as such; these events were not at all naive, regardless of who the organizer is. I believe," Xhaferri adds, "that there are calculations on the Serbian side with the aim of hiding some solutions that have to be reached, but there may also be other unidentified groups that have not yet been discovered, which will probably continue their activities. Whether we like it or not, this instability will directly affect Macedonia because from the political and other points of view it is one organism, these vessels are connected, and they have been acting as such for the last 40 years and more. The possible escalation of the relations in Kosovo would have a direct impact on the Albanians in Macedonia, who will want to help in either a humanitarian or political way, or let us say in an organized way. There will be a great number of refugees who will come here, and this is how the problem of Kosovo will be associated with the problem in Macedonia in general. Although we are speaking hypothetically, I still believe that there is no preventive policy in place, either inside or outside Macedonia. I think that some preventive measures must be taken, diplomatic and others, in order to prevent possible incidents in Kosovo, such as highlighting the need for political dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade in the presence of a third side."

Experiences Speak

According to Mr. Etem Aziri, deputy president of the NDP [People's Democratic Party, PDP in Albanian], there are signs that the very difficult situation in Kosovo will further deteriorate in the coming period. "Normally," he adds, "it is clear to all of us and to the international community that the Kosovo problem must be solved as soon as possible. If, and this is what we as citizens of the Republic of Macedonia and as Albanians do not wish at all, there is an escalation, and some believe that an armed conflict is also possible, then the consequences would normally be felt in Macedonia as well. There is a general conclusion that in such a case the whole of the Balkans would be affected."

"Whether Macedonia remains protected from possible unrest is a big question," Aziri emphasizes. "It is logical for the Albanian population living in Macedonia not to remain indifferent to such a situation because we have experience with the events in Bosnia. A part of the population in Kosovo, Albanians, particularly the elderly, the women, and the children, will look for shelter, they will have to go somewhere, to be protected. They will first of all ask for help from the Albanians in Macedonia, that is certain, and it is also certain that a number of Albanians in Macedonia will be dragged into the possible conflict."

According to Aziri, there was such a situation in Bosnia, where volunteers from Serbia fought the war for months and years. "This is possible and logical, although we must admit that the Albanian population, not only here in Macedonia but also in Kosovo, is peaceful. The inclination of the Albanians is to solve all their problems by dialogue. If they had wished to solve their problems in a different way, they would probably have done this before now in Kosovo. President Rugova's policy is known, he wants the Kosovo problem, which in this case relates not only to Kosovo but to the Balkans at large, let me not say to Europe, to be solved by dialogue and with tolerance. However, you know what happens when there is a conflict, people lose their heads," Mr.Aziri concludes.

FYROM: PDPA Leader on 'Dismissal' From Assembly

AU1405120296 Skopje DNEVNIK in Macedonian 11 May 96 p 5

[Interview with Arber Xhaferri, president of the Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians, by Ilir Ajdini; place and date not given: "I Forced the Assembly To Take My Mandate Away"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Ajdini] The Assembly commission proposed your dismissal from the Republican Assembly. Was this your own political decision, considering that you announced your withdrawal from the Assembly?

[Xhaferri] The decision is politically forced because I have announced it a number of times before—the last time I did so was in a letter to Stojan Andov, the then assembly chairman. In a way, I forced the commission to take away my mandate on a legal basis. I wanted to warn of the great dissatisfaction of the Albanians, not only in the Assembly, but in all of society. The aspects of dissatisfaction are evident—in local communities, in communes, in the Assembly, in institutions... I just presnted a warning about the dissatisfaction.

[Ajdini] As the president of a party, you are leaving the Assembly, but the other members of your party remain.

[Xhaferri] This is a projected tactics, and it has nothing to do with somebody's personal will, neither mine nor anybody else's. This is simply a part of a party strategy. We are anticipating developments. In the future, there will certainly be similar activities by our parliamentary group, and, depending on the circumstances, perhaps also of other parliamentary groups, because this assembly has totally ignored all the requests of the Albanians.

[Ajdini] You once said that the "Tetovo University" is necessary for the Albanians, also as a barrier against the spread of damaging Islamic influences. On the other hand, you presented a Muslim cleric as a candidate for the recent elections in Skopje constituency 102.

[Xhaferri] I have never said that the Tetovo university should serve as a barrier against Islam, but against the oriental system of values, which is a completely different matter. As Albanians, I would say we have a sacred duty to fight against different systems of values, whether oriental, Slavic, or any other. As Albanians, we have to cultivate our own system of values, and it is impossible to do so without institutions. The university is an institution in which real values are being cultivated.

As far as the "Muslim cleric" is concerned, it a diminution to say that Mr. Sabahudin Mahmuti is a "cleric." He is not a "kojha" [Muslim cleric] (in Arabic and Turkish this word means professor), but he is an expert in comparative law, and he is an expert that is useful to our parliamentarian group.

[Ajdini] President Gligorov said that the "university" is an invention of a group of separatists, to which the three largest parties of Albanians in Macedonia reacted. It seems that, for the head of the state, the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity], which is participating in the government, is also a separatist party.

[Xhaferri] These are nothing but our dreams, and not Gligorov's. He—that is his team—always think that the Albanians are genetically separatist or that they are political personalities who are against his concept of the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] state, as a state of the Macedonians, and that some of them are better and softer while others are worse. The fact is that they are all separatist, but some are less, others more. The problems should be viewed from the aspect of our dreams. As you know, somebody was sitting with him at an intimate dinner, they had consultations, and then he promised something. From a legal aspect, however, he did not promise anything. From the legal aspect, he installed the Macedonian state and all the laws that have been installed in the Constitution. So, all our future political activity must rely on the legal norms that he installed on 17 November 1991. The subsequent disappointments only reveal our naivete and not his.

[Ajdini] Your party supported the action for the collection of 150,000 signatures. What are your expectations regarding this?

[Xhaferri] The same as regarding our complaints. This government will not give up this concept easily, and the reason is the bad organization of the opposition. In Macedonia, there is no conflict of visions, for instance between the European and the neocommunists, or the humane against Machiavellian visions. The tactical coalitions between the Albanian and the Macedonian oppositions cannot function in Macedonia because both are totally misgoverned, and they do not have the strength to change the political development.

We made a step forward, but we will not continue hundreds more steps. This is something that the Macedonian opposition lacks in promoting and enriching the results of the action.

[Ajdini] Speaking about the initiative [the collection of signatures]—can this be seen as the start of cooperation between the PDPA, the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity], and the DP [Democratic Party]?

[Xhaferri] That would be a positive achievement. Unless we reach a consensus on the national questions, however, we cannot have political cooperation. Normally, there has to be a consensus on some rights that cannot be alienated, and this is condition for a cooperation. Our party is pledged to promote the status of the Albanians in the system. We are not fighting for power, but for a national and, I would say, a human idea. As long as this is not regulated, at least through a consensus between the Macedonian and the Albanian oppositions, we cannot expect a fruitful political cooperation.

[Ajdini] The situation in Kosovo. Recently, there have been a number of events that have imposed this problem as the most pressing in the region. How do you expect the situation to be developed?

[Xhaferri] In Macedonia, the signals are always more sophisticated, while in Kosovo they are always sharper. There are signs here that matters are not good, that they are absurd, but there are also some signs in Kosovo that there will be a stronger processes of confrontation. The latest murders and terrorist acts are an aspect of this unrest, regardless of who the executioners are. In any event, there are signs of some new forms of confrontation that could be extremely dangerous for the peace in Kosovo and the Balkans in general. It is known that these terrorist acts are beyond the organized political organizations and so the international factor will not have anybody to put pressure on. The political influence will be eliminated because it will not be able to influence the small groups and, thus, the situation will become even more tense.

[Ajdini] What, in your opinion, is the right solution for Kosovo?

[Xhaferri] The best thing would be to find a solution for the Albanian question in the Balkans in general. However, there are some basic premises that must be observed. Yugoslavia, as we all know, was based on an agreement, and Kosovo comprised a part of this agreement. After the agreement was annulled, the way in which Macedonia got the right to secession [via a referendum]—let me use a term that is so dear to President Gligorov, to separatism—Kosovo, as a constitutive element of the federation, has to be fully respected, taking into account the referendum that took place there. The best solution for all, particularly for Macedonia, is to have an independent Kosovo that will be open to both Serbia and Albania.

[Ajdini] How do you view the outcome of this situation regarding the Albanians in Macedonia and the region in general?

[Xhaferri] Why is Mr. Gligorov upset about the Kosovo crisis? Is it because he knows that the internal situation is unstable because of a very big problem of the loyalty—that is, disloyalty—of the Albanians? However, neither he nor we, let alone the Americans, can influence these small groups that are slipping away from the Kosovo policy. In order to avoid the danger of possible "bullets," it is necessary to reach a good and organized agreement between the Albanians and the Macedonians, with concrete solutions.

This is the only way in which the process of the identification of the Albanians in Macedonia can begin, as President Gligorov demands in such a romantic way; for the Albanians to start thinking of Macedonia as of their own homeland. This is not a result of any questioning that Gligorov may have done, it is purely his own impression. I have a responsibility for the Macedonians and the Albanians, and I wish to warn them that these visions are romantic and untrue, that they are illusions that can be very dangerous, because calculations are being made based on something that is insecure. We certainly have to reach an agreement and make all necessary changes to the Constitution and the laws, so as to enjoy the fundamental rights to which we are entitled, and thus to stabilize the situation. In such a way, no single "bullet" or assassination attempt could destabilize Macedonia.

[Ajdini] In the efforts of the international community, particularly of the United States, to find a solution to the Kosovo question through dialogue, there has been talk of engaging President Gligorov as mediator.

[Xhaferri] I think that this is an illusion because the Albanians in Macedonia are seen as a danger, particularly for Mr. Gligorov. So, in his mediation, he would certainly try to get rid of the Albanian threat that is arriving from Kosovo.

FYROM: Opposition Protests Signature Verification Method

AU1305202596 Skopje MIC in English 13 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Coordinative committee for the holding of the civil initiative "150,000 signatures" has lodged a public protest over the fashion in which the party state bodies are checking the validity of the collected signatures. The Committee is calling on those in charge of counting the signatures to submit relevant evidence, if they intent to dispute even one signature, after the second checking. For 45 days already, the party state bodies are not in a situation or do not want to announce the number of submitted signatures and thus fulfill the constitutional obligation to issue a notice of referendum for early elections. They are conducting the second checking of the signatures without the presence of representatives of the initiators, the same way that they counted the votes in October, 1994, the Coordinative committee of the initiative, signed by the presidents of VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] Ljupco Georgievski, and of DP [Democratic Party] Petar Gosev says in its press release yesterday.

FYROM: Socialist Party To Elect New Leader at Congress

AU1305210596 Skopje MIC in English 13 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] At its session this Saturday, the Republic committee of Socialist Party of Macedonia [SPM] made amendments to the party's statute, as well as a decision to hold irregular Congress and the number of delegates that will be attending it. The Committee decided to schedule its Congress for 26 May this year.

The Republic Committee of the SPM elected Blagoja Filipovski and Ljubisav Ivanov as likely candidates for party president by secret ballot.

Poland: Commander on Performance of Polish IFOR Battalion

WS1305141196 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 13 May 96 p 1

[Interview with Colonel Wlodzimierz Sasiadek, deputy commander of the Nordic-Polish Implementation Force Brigade in Bosnia, by Andrzej Medykowski; place and date not given: "Nothing Will Take Us by Surprise"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Medykowski] The Implementation Force's mission seemed to be difficult from the beginning. However, it was on the spot, in Bosnia, that the numerous threats, particularly mines, came to light. How are the units prepared to provide medical help?

[Sasiadek] Every soldier has been prepared for hardships and dangers connected with the mission. All units have been appropriately prepared to react to threats and their possible consequences.

[Medykowski] What about the Polish battalion?

[Sasiadek] Practical actions of units, including cooperation among them, indicate that the Polish battalion and Polish soldiers are performing their tasks very well.

The equipment of the Polish battalion is not different from the equipment of similar Western units. This applies also to the medical equipment.

[Medykowski] The issue of evacuation has proved to be very significant. When three Polish soldier were wounded as a result of a mine explosion, help arrived immediately....

[Sasiadek] It has been necessary to send transports on many occasions. One thing can be said about their efficiency: They have never failed.

In case of accident, help is sent immediately. If there is a need to provide professional medical help, it is provided by the personnel of a Norwegian hospital that is constantly on full alert.

[Medykowski] Already during the mission, needs and even problems connected with the so-called interoperativeness appeared. What is the point?

[Sasiadek] It is true that we had certain problems while preparing for teamwork. Some of them were the result of the fact that our radio sets are somewhat differently tuned than Western ones.

[Medykowski] How was this overcome?

[Sasiadek] Because the problem emerged during the organizational work, we immediately detected it and reacted. It was quickly resolved appropriately.

[Medykowski] Was it possible to predict this?

[Sasiadek] It was a new experience for us. We previously did not encounter this problem because we could not.

Owing to early detection and quick reaction, we did not have such problems later.

[Medykowski] What about emergencies and accidents? How does the practical cooperation look during this difficult mission?

[Sasiadek] Accidents are the worst moments in our service. I would like to say, however, that the entire system of our cooperation is fully prepared for sudden, unexpected, and unforeseeable actions. Because it would be a truism to say that it is organized very well, I will only note that we work from 16 to 18 hours daily. Every possible situation is anticipated and discussed, and use of forces and means is planned. All of this is done so that nothing takes us by surprise.

Poland: Kwasniewski Meets With German Defense Minister

LD1305175296 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1642 GMT 13 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 13 May—President Aleksander Kwasniewski today received German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe. Ruehe told correspondents after the meeting that negotiations on the question of NATO expansion would begin in the first half of next year. In the minister's opinion, Poland will certainly take part in them.

Ruehe reported that his conversation with the president primarily concerned Polish issues. They talked about Poland's improving relations with Russia and about our country's entry into European defense structures. Ruehe stressed that, as defense minister, he is particularly pleased with the very good relations between Polish and German soldiers.

Poland: Germany's Ruehe Discusses Poland's NATO Membership

LD1305213296 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1815 GMT 13 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] According to German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe, whose two-day visit to Warsaw began today, Poland is NATO's most important partner in the process of new members joining the alliance. The minister gave assurances that NATO will undergo reforms and that Poland will be among the first new members of the alliance.

[Correspondent] Following his conversation with President Aleksander Kwasniewski, Minister Ruehe said that decisions on NATO's reforms, which will improve cooperation and make it possible for the alliance to expand by allowing Central and East European countries to join the alliance, will be made this year.

[Begin recording] [Ruehe, in German, with superimposed Polish translation] I think a decision to start negotiations with certain states concerning their membership in the alliance will be made in the first half of next year. I am certain that Poland will be among these states. [end recording]

[Correspondent] In a lecture read out to Polish politicians, Minister Ruehe said that the creation of a free Europe depends on the European Union and NATO being open to others to join and on the development of new relations with Russia and Ukraine. Europe must conduct its external policies better to encourage the United States to play a greater part in European security.

Minister Volker Ruehe will have talks with Defense Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski. The setting up of a joint Polish-German-Danish military unit will be discussed, among other things.

Poland: PM on Remarks on Farming Industry by Germany's Ruehe

LD1405085396 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 0800 GMT 14 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe, who is on a two-day visit to Poland, has stressed that preparations are under way in NATO to open the pact to new members, including Poland, which, he gave assurances, is the most important partner. And, on the 50th anniversary of the pact—that is, in 1999—Poland would certainly be in its new structures.

The German minister was received today by Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, who made the following admission, referring to Ruehe's statement yesterday that Polish agriculture was at present supremely unadapted to West European standards of food production and economic effectiveness:

[Begin Cimoszewicz recording] The fact that the process of adaptation of our agriculture will certainly be a long one does not mean that it has to take place before Poland's acceptance into the EU. It will take place to a great extent before that moment, but it will also be continued later. It is a problem, of course, and should not be taken lightly, but the completion or the full reform of our agriculture, its adaptation to the standards of the highly developed West European states, is not a condition of our membership. [end recording]

Poland: Integration With EU Discussed at European Meetings

WS1405114096 Warsaw NOWA EUROPA in Polish 13 May 96 pp 1-2

[Article by "SAN": "European Meetings: Polish Models of Integration With the EU"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Iberian formula for joining the Union is most suitable for us, said Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, governmental plenipotentiary for issues of integration, during the Polish European Meetings. We would like to become a full member of the EU in the year 2000, though with prolongation of the adjustment period.

The Bavarian agricultural model, according to which farms have from 15 to 25 hectares on average, is very suitable for us, said Roman Jagielinski, deputy prime minister and agriculture minister.

Actions aimed at adjustment will be assessed during the negotiations. Prospects for membership will be shorter for some countries and longer for others, summed up EU Ambassador Rolf Timans.

The participants in the Polish European Meetings tried to find answers to the question of how we will join the EU and when.

Our previous actions aimed at adjusting laws and the economy, said Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, government plenipotentiary for issues of European integration and foreign aid, are deemed exemplary. We hope the negotiations will begin early next year, at the latest.

EU Ambassador to Poland Rolf Timans recalled, however, that the Union has not yet coped with its internal problems, particularly with agriculture and social and regional policy, and that it has not assessed the financial implications of the expansion. He added that, before the negotiations, all countries are treated equally, and there are and will be no preferences for Poland.

However, differentiation will appear during the negotiations within the next two years. Poland's progress is tremendous, but much will depend on its determination to implement reforms and make difficult political decisions. The more of them, the quicker Poland will join the Union, he said.

Roman Jagielinski, deputy prime minister and agriculture minister, dissipated concern over the state of agriculture. In terms of laws, it is 30-percent adjusted. I also believe that 30 percent of our products meet the European standards. I am convinced that we will prepare ourselves well by the year 2000, he stated.

Poland: President Kwasniewski Leaves for Romania

*LD1405082896 Warsaw PAP in Polish
0555 GMT 14 May 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 14 May—President Aleksander Kwasniewski left on an official visit to Romania today. This is the first visit by a Polish head of state to that country since World War II and, at the same time, a return visit—President Ion Iliescu visited Poland last year at Lech Walesa's invitation.

During his stay in Romania, the president will have private talks with Iliescu, address a joint assembly of the House of Deputies and the Senate, and give a lecture on the economic transformations in Poland at the Academy of Economics.

Four agreements are to be signed in the presence of the two presidents, including agreements between the Ministries of Agriculture and Food Economy and on both countries' cooperation in the field of science and technology.

On the second day of his visit, the president will meet the Polish community living in Romania.

Poland: Polish, South Korean PM's Favor Dynamic Cooperation

LD1305185196 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1800 GMT 13 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz and Su-song Yi, the prime ministers of Poland and South Korea, have come out in favor of the dynamic development of economic cooperation between both countries and of Polish-Korean cooperation in third markets. They announced that their governments will seek mutually beneficial ways of linking Polish science and technology to Korean capital.

After the talks in Warsaw with the South Korean prime minister, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz reported that the Polish side had presented to the Koreans possibilities for further investment in Poland.

[Correspondent Krystyna Koziol] Prime Minister Cimoszewicz said that much of the talks had been given over to our economic cooperation. He said that both governments were in favor of enlivening our economic relations. The Polish side presented possibilities for further investment in Poland to the Koreans. We proposed the construction here of a television tube and camera factory and cooperation in the aircraft industry. We received assurances, Prime Minister Cimoszewicz said, that the Koreans will take part in the Poland-Asia Minor forum to be held in Poland in September. There will also be meetings of the Polish and Korean Republic's interior and justice ministers, devoted to combatting organized crime.

South Korean Prime Minister Su-Song Yi thanked Poland for our participation in the Neutral Nations' Supervisory Commission, which monitors the cease-fire on the Korean Peninsula.

Krystyna Koziol for the First Program, from the Office of the Council of Ministers.

Poland: U.S. Polonia Congress's Letter Stirs Controversy

*WS1305144496 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish
13 May 96 p 1*

[Article by Waldemar Piasecki: "Whose Name Was Moskal Writing In?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] New York—Confusion is rising in connection with a letter on Polish-Jewish relations that Edward Moskal, chairman of the U.S. Polonia Congress [KPA], recently wrote to President Aleksander Kwasniewski.

Without waiting for the reply that was due at the end of last week, the KPA sent off a copy of the letter to Polonia papers and Polish press correspondents.

After the publication of the letter, which, as Moskal assures us, was written on behalf of the 10-million-strong Polonia, several members of the KPA Board of Directors stated that the chairman had not consulted with them on its contents. Jan Nowak-Jezioranski, asked about the letter, said he knew nothing about it.

One KPA activist told SZTANDAR off the record that this is "supposedly Moskal's individual initiative, perhaps made in agreement with some political groups in the country." He also added that the letter is sure to provoke a fierce reaction from Jewish communities because it is "stupidly inimical and anti-Semitic." Our interlocutor said that, on the eve of Lech Walesa's visit to the United States and his meeting with President Clinton, Moskal's letter is a "disservice," and he would not be surprised if the U.S. President did not "find time" for Walesa as the KPA's guest.

Poland: More on U.S. Polonia's Criticism Regarding Jews

WS1305141096 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 11-12 May 96 p 6

[Report by Sylwester Walczak from New York: "Letter by Edward Moskal to President Kwasniewski: Polish Authorities Too Submissive to Jews?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *"As a result of a lack of firmness in the actions of the Polish Government, as well as* *evident mistakes made by state officials, Jews have the gall to do more and more and they are also getting increasingly more. Despite that, they accuse Poland of anti-Semitism and present it as a country that is pursuing an anti-Jewish policy; they also present Poles as people who have sucked anti-Semitism with the milk of their mothers," American Polonia Congress Chairman Edward Moskal wrote in a letter to Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski. The Presidential Chancellery reported a few days ago that it had received the letter; however, the content of the letter, which was very critical and firm, has been kept secret.*

"As a consequence of submissiveness on the part of the Polish authorities, a number of facts and developments that have occurred recently have enabled Jews to create an unfavorable image of Poland in the world," Moskal's letter reads. Moskal first quotes the "action taken by Rabbi Weiss," whom he describes as an "aggressive individual, almost unknown in America," who "is able to cause incommensurately great interest in Poland." Edward Moskal points out that all countries have their own regulations regarding the staging of public demonstrations; if Rabbi Weiss failed to get permission to stage a demonstration, then "it was the duty of the police to prevent it from happening and (...) to tell this gentlemen politely to leave Poland. This is how he would have wound up in any country, including Israel, but, as could be seen, not in Poland."

"We believe that Foreign Affairs Minister Dariusz Rosati need not have apologized to Jews for the pogrom in Kielce; it was also an unfortunate action," the chairman of the Polonia Congress writes. "After all, Poles' guilt has not been unequivocally proved; moreover, you, Mr. President, said that a special commission would be set up to look into this issue. Thus, it was necessary to wait for its report (...)."

Edward Moskal also accuses the Polish authorities of treating Jews in a special way where restitution of their property in Poland is concerned since "the parliament rapidly passes special laws that regulate restitution of property only and exclusively to Jewish communities." According to him, this is unjust because "this law does not apply" to, for example, "Ukrainian or Belarusian communities." Besides, many Poles who have lost the property they owned before World War II are still waiting for a reprivatization law.

Moskal is also taken aback by the fact that, at the time there is talk of restitution of property to Jewish communities, the authorities are "considering a proposal to set up a parliamentary commission that is to look into the legality of restituting the Catholic Church's property in Poland." The chairman of the American Polonia also discredits Jewish protests against building a shopping center in the vicinity of the Auschwitz concentration camp; he argues that those who visit the camp "must have the possibility of buying something for the body" and that "this is not forbidden even within the area of the Holocaust Museum in Washington."

"Mr. President, there cannot be two truths at the same time," Edward Moskal writes to conclude his letter. "It is true that Nazi Germany committed premeditated murders of Jews with a view to liquidating the entire nation (...). However, it is also true that the Israeli state killed innocent women and children who hid themselves in UN camps in Lebanon. Jews explain that these murders were committed by 'mistake.' They do not say anything else; they do not admit their guilt or apologize, which is so firmly required from others."

Poland: President Denies Jews Being Given Special Treatment

LD1305162196 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1400 GMT 13 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] President Aleksander Kwasniewski has sent the chairman of the U.S. Polonia Congress an answer to his letter of a dozen or so days ago, which contained allegations that the Polish authorities are giving Jews privileged treatment. Minister Marek Siwiec presented the president's position on the matter at a news conference. Magdalena Winiarczyk was present:

[Begin Winiarczyk recording] Commenting on the letter, Marek Siwiec said that Aleksander Kwasniewski does not agree with the accusation that special procedures are applied concerning the return of assets to Jewish communities. The law that is to regulate these questions has gotten only as far as the Sejm. However, the decision to build a supermarket near the Auschwitz camp has been suspended as being against the law.

At the same time, one cannot remain deaf to the moral arguments. Auschwitz is where millions of people died a martyr's death, particularly those of Jewish nationality.

In addition, the Gdansk shipyard has been mentioned. Presidential Spokesman Antopni Styrczula reports that, at today's routine meeting with the prime minister, the president acknowledged that the situation at the Gdansk shipyard is very difficult. He expressed sympathy for the shipyard employees and the hope that specific solutions for the shipyard will be drawn up. The president did not say what kind of specific solutions because he thinks that is the job of the government, the company's directors, and the management of the bank that refuses to finance the shipyard. [end recording]

Poland: Primate Glemp on Failure To Ratify Concordat

WS1305134096 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 13 May 96 p 2

[Article by Andrzej Stawiarski, "ML": "The Primate at the Skalka Church; the Shadow of the Concordat"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] "The issue of the Concordat is casting a shadow over all of us," said Primate Jozef Glemp in a sermon delivered at the Church on the Skalka [Krakow] yesterday. [passage omitted]

"Over three years we were unable to produce structures and muster enough organized will to implement such a good intention for further steps toward the future so that we are not ashamed or confined, so that we do not accuse, dislike, or distrust each other."

As an illustration of incomprehensible criticism to the signed but not ratified Concordat, he gave the provisions on kindergartens and cemeteries. They guarantee that religion is taught in kindergartens and schools if parents so require, and cemeteries are inviolable. The primate does not understand what could be wrong with that. "What we need is goodwill," he said.

Poland: SLD Spokesman Reiterates Stance on Concordat

WS1305124496 Warsaw Radio RMF FM Network in Polish 0605 GMT 13 May 96

[Interview with Deputy Andrzej Urbanczyk, spokesman for the Polish Democratic Left Alliance parliamentary club, by Bogdan Romanowski at the Radio RMF FM studio in Warsaw on the "Guest of Radio RMF FM" program—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Romanowski] Our guest today is Deputy Andrzej Urbanczyk, spokesman for the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] club in parliament. Good morning.

[Urbanczyk] Good morning.

[Romanowski] Mr. Deputy, Primate Glemp yesterday said that the issue of the Concordat casts a shadow on all of us. Is a change in the SLD stance on this issue possible?

[Urbanczyk] The SLD stance is clear and, in general, invariable. We say that the Concordat may be ratified after adopting a constitution. However, we do not doctrinally oppose the institution of the Concordat itself. We are interested in substantial discussions and negotiations with the Vatican. The point is to dissipate all doubts the current version of the Concordat is generating.

[Romanowski] As for doubts, the primate yesterday said that the intentions of the authors of the Concordat are good, and what is needed is only goodwill to see them. Are there no people with goodwill in the SLD?

[Urbanczyk] There are many of them. There are even believers, and one could think about their emotional ties to the contents of the Concordat. However, we live in a democratic state. This government bears the responsibility for this state, and so does the [ruling] coalition. To refer to the Concordat as an already signed document and deprive those who received a mandate in democratic election of the right to correct their predecessors means questioning the rules of democracy. The purpose of elections is to make it possible for governments to correct the actions of their predecessors.

[Romanowski] Mr. Deputy, you said that there are both believers and nonbelievers in the SLD Club. What would you say, however, if I asked you whether there are more rationalists or irrationalists in it?

[Urbanczyk] Of course, there are more rationalists.

[Romanowski] Waldemar Pawlak [leader of the Polish Peasant Party—PSL] yesterday said that conditioning the ratification of the Concordat on the adoption of a constitution is, I quote, an irrational argument, which means that Poland should halt all of its foreign policy activities until a new constitution appears.

[Urbanczyk] This is absurd. Mr. Waldemar Pawlak represents a part of the PSL that advocates quick ratification of the Concordat. As everyone knows, its parliamentary club is divided. Otherwise, there would be no problem at all because the parliamentary majority could ratify the Concordat. The situation is different. There are division lines in many clubs—those of the Union of Freedom, the Union of Labor, the SLD, and the PSL.

Returning to the issue of the Concordat, I understand that the Catholic Church hierarchs are accustomed to the rule: Roma locuta est; causa finita est—Rome has spoken; the case is closed. However, the Vatican is not an example of a democratic state, just as the church hierarchy is not an example of democracy. The essence of democracy is to establish such laws and international rules so that nobody has fears or doubts in Poland. There is nothing wrong or dramatic in the fact that we are yet to hold a long debate on the Concordat to dissipate social fears and doubts. Please remember that such a debate in Italy lasted several years. This is reality; it is not a conceived thing.

[Romanowski] However, does the SLD condition the ratification of other international agreements on the adoption of a constitution?

[Urbanczyk] There are many international conventions and agreements that have not been ratified. For example, Poland has not ratified a protocol to the European Human Rights Convention.

[Romanowski] However, there are agreements that have been ratified.

[Urbanczyk] Of course, but they do not cause so many doubts. [passage omitted]

Poland: SLD Launches Action Against Church Tax Privileges

WS1005144196 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 10 May 96 p 2

[Article by F.F.: "The SLD Against Church Import Privileges"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] wants all of the tariff exemptions on gifts for all of the churches in Poland to be revoked. The churches would be deprived of tariff exemptions on passenger cars and on products on which excise has to be paid (electronic products, alcohol, cigarettes).

"The fact that some representatives of the clergy import considerable numbers of automobiles draws a lot of criticism from the public," SLD Deputy Malgorzata Winiarczyk-Kossakowska, who initiated the draft, writes in the official justification. She also points out that the regulations in force now were passed in 1989, in the reality of a central economy, when many goods were in short supply. Aside from that, these regulations are taken advantage of by institutions that are not involved in religious activities, such as the Church of United Christians, the Church of the Merciful God, or the Christian Church of Gospel Preachers.

"The church is engaged in a lot of charity activities; it employs nurses, who have to drive long distances to get to the sick or to mothers with children. Cars and computers are the basic tools that priests are using in their work today," we were told by Father Marian Subocz, deputy secretary of the Episcopate. "We do not receive either alcohol or cigarettes from abroad; the only exception may be wine used in religious services. The exemptions should be maintained." [passage omitted]

Poland: Cimoszewicz: No Possibility of Changing Budget Law

LD1405101296 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 0800 GMT 14 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz said before the Cabinet meeting today that he saw no possibility at present of changing the budget law in favor of budget sector employees. In the prime minister's opinion, only after the first half-year will it be possible to analyze the state of public finances and ascertain if there are possibilities of earmarking additional sums for pay increases.

The prime minister stressed that it was very easy to talk of changing the budget law, but nobody wanted to say clearly that this meant that somebody had to get less.

When asked for his opinion about Polish Peasant Party Chairman Waldemar Pawlak's offer to mediate between the government and the Gdansk shipyard, the prime minister said; where there is no dispute, there is no place for mediators.

Cimoszewicz said that the clarification procedures in the State Protection Office [UOP] should be completed within two weeks, and then, the prime minister added, if the possibility of the existence of Russian intelligence service collaborators in state structures is confirmed, the clarification of the matter will continue.

Interior Minister Zbigniew Siemiatkowski said that UOP was checking the information contained in the statement by Prosecutor Miroslaw Gorzkiewicz, who said he could guess who was hiding behind the pseudonym "O." In the so-called Oleksy affair, this pseudonym was attributed to the former prime minister.

Poland: Oleksy Urges New Image for SdRP

WS1405110196 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 13 May 96 p 3

[Aerticle by Marek Szyperski and "WN": "SdRP's New Face: Justice, Patriotism, Europeanism. A Party of Values"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *A change in the image of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP] was announced by party chief Jozef Oleksy at a voivodship convention in Ciechanow last Saturday [11 May]. To the delegates gathered at the convention, Oleksy presented six primary programmatic provisions thath will form the SdRP's basic "package of values."*

Work on composing the package will begin this week.

"We are an entity whose presence in the Polish political arena must be very significant," Oleksy began his speech. "Our party is facing challenges that concern its structure, identity, nature, and transformations that may be mandated by the changing times."

"We have broken through the clouds of history of the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] and the former system, as well as through the entire burden of historical inheritance, accusations, and origin," he continued. "We became a pragmatic party. It is currently justifiable to criticize this, though this does not mean that we could have acted differently in 1989. We could not, and, thus, after dissolving the PZPR, we deliberately became a nonideological, pragmatic, and electoral party."

In the opinion of Oleksy, this has resulted in the "firm position of the Social Democracy in the Polish democracy." "However, the time in which the party could only be an electoral party acting only during election campaigns has ended. We must rebuild and realistically outline a package of values that will form the image of a social democratic party in the eyes of our supporters," he argued. "Instead of ideology, we will offer a package of universal values that are characteristic of a social democratic party and on which a party's ability to convince citizens is based."

Oleksy stated that a special seminar devoted to the package will be held this week. "An over-100-strong vanguard of the party will leave Warsaw for two and a half days," he announced. The chairman listed elements of the SdRP's previous pragmatic actions that had not been clear enough:

"Justice as the highest guideline for our activities; second, the factor of social democratic humanism; third, a party program that will show common people why it is good that the left wing rules. If we achieve this, we will be a victorious party in the coming elections as well," Jozef Oleksy said. He announced presenting "honest results of the party's rule to society, so that the Union of Freedom does not say that the government governs inertia."

The fourth component of the SdRP's new face is Europeanism: "If we are a party that says it supports all of the strategic goals of Polish foreign policy, it is a slogan. This is not enough. We must help society understand the balance of our gains and losses resulting from joining [European] structures."

"We cannot be a party that is maliciously tagged with a post-PZPR label of official atheism or antireligiousness," Oleksy explained. "This is not honest."

He added that the party will not quit advocating a division between the public and religious lives, fighting with clericalism and for women's right to abortion, and so forth.

"However, we must act in such a manner so that millions of believers vote for us."

In his opinion, the right wing cannot have a monopoly on patriotism. "Meanwhile, we are neglecting the sensitivity of the patriotic viewpoint on Poland and the world. The left wing has an equal right to patriotism."

During a brief news conference, the SdRP chief ruled out the possibility of adopting the Concordat before passing a constitution.

Poland: Government Wants To Declare Shipyard Insolvent

LD1305173796 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1600 GMT 13 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the Polish Government, there is only one way to resolve the problem of the Gdansk Shipyard and that is to declare it insolvent. Government Spokeswoman Aleksandra Jakubowska said the government was not taking sides in the dispute between the workers and the company's management.

Jakubowska emphasized that the government could not be held responsible for the shipyard's difficulties. She said the government could not agree to the demands of the work force to subsidize the enterprise because the cost to the taxpayer will be $130 million.

Jakubowska thinks that shipyard workers should benefit from bankruptcy proceedings, with the prospect of continuing employment and earnings. Bankruptcy proceedings also made it possible for claims to be met from the guaranteed employee benefits fund.

The shipyard's trade unions committee earlier decided to suspend the protest action. Ryszard Goluch, chairman of the Board of Management of Gdansk Shipyard, assured the shipbuilders that they will receive 200-zloty advances on their April wages tomorrow, with the wages still outstanding to be paid between 17 and 20 May from the Guaranteed Employee Benefits Fund.

Poland: Cimoszewicz: Gdansk Shipyard Subject of Political Game

LD1405102396 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 0600 GMT 14 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] The government thinks the only rational way of solving the problem of the Gdansk shipyard is to declare it bankrupt. Government spokesperson Aleksandra Jakubowska stressed yesterday that the government was not a party in the dispute between the employees and the company's management. Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz told Polish Radio this morning that the government could not implement the shipyard workers' demands and subsidize the enterprise.

[Begin Cimoszewicz recording] The demands that wages be paid out of budget resources, which are terribly limited—that is, the general reserve of the Council of Ministers—were and remain unacceptable. We are trying to help the shipyard by looking for investors, among other things, who would be prepared to buy it or buy a part of its assets [word indistinct], particularly if the enterprise were to be declared bankrupt. [end recording]

[Unidentified correspondent] In the prime minister's opinion, the Gdansk shipyard is again the subject of a political game.

[Begin Cimoszewicz recording] I cannot really see that there is a dispute between the government and the shipyard employees, and, where there is no dispute, there is no place for mediation. How the employees or some employees, some trade union activists, perceive the situation is totally falsified. I have the sad certainty that the Gdansk shipyard is indeed yet again the subject of a political game, a propaganda game, but [word indistinct] the government is not the initiator here. [end recording]

[Announcer] Ryszard Goluch, the chairman of the shipyard's management, has given the assurance that the employees will get part of their April pay today, amounting to 200 zlotys. The Gdansk Shipyard protest committee has demanded that the rest of the wages be paid by Friday [17 May]. If the money is not paid, the shipyard workers threaten further protest action.

Romania: Iliescu Holds Talks With Polish President

LD1405105296 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1005 GMT 14 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] President Aleksander Kwasniewski began an official two-day visit to Romania with private talks with President Ion Iliescu. They talked mainly about Romania's strivings to join European structures, economic cooperation, and Romania's debts to Poland:

[Polish Radio Bucharest correspondent] After the welcome ceremony in the gardens of Cotroceni Palace, President Ion Iliescu and Aleksander Kwasniewski talked for half an hour, after which both delegations, chaired by the presidents, started plenary talks. The talks cover mutual, mainly economic, cooperation and cooperation in the international arena. Romania expects Poland to support her in her strivings for membership in the Central European initiative and CEFTA [Central European Free Trade Agreement]. Poland, for her part, is counting on Romania's support for our candidate for the post of OSCE secretary general. [passage omitted]

Romania: Defense Official Views Chances of NATO Entry

AU1305171396 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 8 May 96 p 8

[Interview with Ioan Mircea Pascu, secretary of state at the Ministry of National Defense, by Radu Tudor; place and date not given: "The Fact That We Have No Relations With the East Backfires Against Us"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Tudor] You were part of the Romanian delegation that recently participated in the first meeting of the intensified and individual dialogue with NATO. What can you tell us about this meeting?

[Pascu] It was a working meeting that lasted for some three and a half hours, with each side asking questions and getting answers on a number of concrete issues. When the we felt the need for details, like in the case of the documentation required, the sides agreed to supply it.

[Tudor] In concrete terms, what is going to happen from now on?

[Pascu] A second round of this dialogue will probably take place after the NATO meeting in Berlin, at the beginning of next June. Meanwhile, the dialogue will continue "from afar," so to speak, as the sides agreed to contact each other whenever they feel the need to do so.

[Tudor] The number of individual stands of the NATO members—that is, of different positions from the official ones upheld by the organization as a whole—has increased of late. As a reaction to that, certain different positions have begun to emerge in our country, too. How do you assess this situation?

[Pascu] One should mention from the start that there has always been some discrepancy between the overall NATO statements and those of its individual members. If you remember, even when the Partnership for Peace [PFP] initiative was launched in Brussels—an initiative designed to give equal chances to all candidate countries—an important Western leader said that, in the end, only the Visegrad countries will be admitted(?!). The same leader recently said in a "Visegrad" capital—that is, more than two years after the start of the whole process—that those who will be admitted are his hosts and their immediate neighbors?! Therefore, it is only natural that such statements should cause justified bewilderment and fears, and even lead to the appearance of other stands in response. However, one should not confuse the opinion of certain political leaders, or even of a country, with the decisions of NATO, which observes well defined rules and clear-cut guidelines. Nevertheless, there is this problem of the appearance of a parallel flux of statements and counterstatements, which can have a negative influence on the proper process of NATO's expansion, thus distorting its meaning.

[Tudor] Did you raise this problem with your dialogue partners within NATO?

[Pascu] Yes, I did it even in the latest meeting. The answer we received was both disarming and instructive at the same time. I say disarming because we were told that NATO cannot prevent such statements being issued by its individual members, statements that reflect the private interests of the respective members, not the goals of the organization as a whole. Therefore, we can expect other similar statements, which we should judge in relation to the official positions of the Alliance, by also taking into consideration the weight of the respective members in the NATO decisionmaking process. The instructive nature of the answer resides in the fact that we realized, maybe better than before, that the NATO expansion process is to a high degree a political one, where even the military dimension is subordinated to political considerations. Consequently, this process should not be judged in the classical terms or outside the terms defined by the undertones of the international balance of power, which is in a stage of accelerated and often constraining change.

[Tudor] Would you be so kind as to be more explicit on that?

[Pascu] Of course. You see, the process of NATO expansion—although it has been already drawn out in its main lines and has a relatively well-defined goal, namely to ensure stability and security in Central and Eastern Europe—is advancing by virtue of ensuring a political compromise between the interests of the Alliance members. Therefore, if this compromise requires that only certain states should be received in the first stage, while others should wait to be considered in a second stage, then this is what is going to happen, even if the political logic and common sense may require that all countries should be treated on an equal footing.

[Tudor] What about the criteria which the candidate members must fulfill in order to be admitted to NATO?

[Pascu] First of all, I would like to say that, at least the study on NATO's expansion does not refer to "criteria" as such, but rather to "requirements" or "expectations" and so forth. The reason for that, we were expressly told, lies in the desire of the NATO members to judge matters from a political viewpoint, therefore from the angle of their interests, without the obligation—in case of the usage of the concept of "criteria"—of automatically admitting to the Alliance anyone fulfilling those criteria?! Nevertheless, as far as the candidates are concerned, the fulfillment of the criteria is indispensable: first, in order to consolidate the candidate's own option for democracy, market economy, and the observation of human rights, and second to ensure that the country is considered for an eventual admission. In other words, from the exclusive and narrow viewpoint of NATO's expansion, the respective "requirements" or "expectations" are more important—through their consequences—if they are not fulfilled, than if they are fulfilled. Because, if you fulfill them, you have the chance of being taken into consideration and may end up either further ahead or at the back of the cue, depending on the political compromise between the individual interests of the current NATO members; but, if you do not fulfill them, you will surely be left outside the respective process, something which is inconceivable for us!

[Tudor] Should one understand that, if Romania and any other country, fulfill the respective "expectations" or "requirements" equally well, there is no guarantee that they will be received at the same time in the Alliance?

[Pascu] I am afraid that this might be the case. For instance, let us take into consideration the criterion of the strategic interest of one large NATO country situated in the center of Europe: To the extent that its neighbors fulfill the NATO "expectations" or "requirements" equally as well as we do, their chances of being received ahead of us are higher because of their increased strategic relevance for the respective large NATO state, whose neighbors they are. One can assume that this NATO state will strive to ensure their admission first and foremost, and will pay less attention to the others, which are not so relevant to its strategic interests.

[Tudor] But this leads to the following two conclusions: First, it may seem more important to engage in a direct dialogue with the member countries, rather than with the organization as a whole; and second, leaving aside other factors, the decisive factor for the admission of one or the other candidate is the compromise that can be reached within the organization between its members, particularly between its more important ones. Is this the case? Then, what about the Western unity extant until now? Does it still exist?

[Pascu] Let us take your question one point at a time. Apropos the dialogue, one should not consider the talks with the capitals of the NATO member countries as being more important than the dialogue with Brussels, but rather that both have their own importance and should be intensified. Regarding the way in which the final decision will be taken, here we must be realistic and lay emphasis not so much on the need for a logical unfolding of this process, but rather on the relevance of our country's integration for the interests of the member countries, particularly of the great NATO powers. Finally, regarding the Western unity, one thing seems to become increasingly more certain: In the wake of the disappearance of the common threat, this unity tends to get increasingly eroded. In my opinion, this erosion is responsible to a large extent for the concrete implementation and finalization of the NATO expansion process.

[Tudor] What about the Russian factor? Is there a link between the failure to initial the treaty with Russia and our application for NATO integration?

[Pascu] For the integration process, the Russian factor is also a key factor; but, as I said before, the decisive element is still the political compromise between the interests of the allies vis-a-vis those candidates that manage to give an appropriate answer to the NATO "expectations" or "requirements" on questions of democracy, market economy, the civilian control of the army, and the relations with one's neighbors. Regarding the second part of your question, I would say that, in order to answer it, one should also examine the similar experience of other candidates. Paradoxically, we will notice that the countries mentioned as having the greatest chances of being admitted to NATO are those which have settled their relations with Russia through such agreements and other international legal acts. Some of them have even reached undrstandings on carrying out joint military exercises and purchasing Russian military technology?! On the other hand, in our country, the simplistic opinion that if you want to be on good terms with the West, you should be on bad terms with the East still prevails?! I would even go further and say that such an optic—regardless of whether those sharing it do it consciously or not—rather represents, as is proven by reality, an obstacle to Romania's integration in the Western structures and may even be interpreted as a proof of Romania's inability to settle its ties with the neighbors and with the countries from its immediate vicinity?! As a matter of fact, the technique of the ricochet in the billiard game is today one of the most "savored" techniques in the political game. The tragic thing is that all these "experts" mange to appeal to the patriotic nerve of the readers, which often influences their clear thinking.

[Tudor] A final question: How do you see, in view of what you have just said, the chances of the Romanian effort to integrate in NATO?

[Pascu] Personally, I believe that, through everything it managed to do in the six and a half years since 1989, Romania has proved that it is capable to maintain its territorial integrity, even under such circumstances when most of the country's institutions collapsed, and to commit itself to the most profound process of internal democratic change since World War II, at a time of continuous and substantial deterioration of its immediate geostrategic environment, thus proving itself a factor of stability in this part of the continent. Therefore, Romania has shown, despite the hardships it had to face, that it is a democratic and responsible European country, with an economy in full sing of change, which has managed, as shown by the statistics, to overcome its initial "fall" and engage itself on an upward course. In this respect, since it fully shares the values of democracy, market economy, and human rights, Romania is more than entitled to seek integration within NATO, whose main mission is to defend exactly such values. Moreover, in the military plane, one should mention the fact that the reform currently underway in the Army—whose main target is to modernize our military structures and make them compatible to those of the NATO countries—has started before the inauguration of the NATO expansion process and is fully financed from our own resources! Right now—that is more than two years since the launching of the PFP, where Romania has behaved in an outstanding manner—I would say that the question is not whether we are going to be included or not in the process of the Alliance's expansion, but rather to establish when and how the integration in NATO will take place!

[Tudor] Of course, such a rich range of subjects cannot be dealt with in a single interview. I know that you will be participating in an important international conference in London soon on NATO expansion, after which you will tour the United States, which will also include the famous Rand Corporation. Are you prepared to resume this dialogue with our newspaper after you return home, thus supplementing it with further impressions from these visits?

[Pascu] With pleasure.

[Tudor] Thank you and see you soon!

[Pascu] Till next time ,and thanks.

Romania: Integration Seen as 'Only Viable Alternative'

AU1005201096 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1900 GMT 10 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Integration into the euro-atlantic structures is the only viable alternative for Romania. It is not a problem that concerns only the government or the political class in Romania, but the whole of Romanian society, said Mr. Teodor Melescanu, minister of foreign affairs, in a program broadcast by Radio Bucharest at 1910 under the title "Romania—The Imperative of Euro-Atlantic Integration." This integration, said the Romanian dignitary in his interview, does not mean simply the signing of official documents and the adoption of legislative decisions and measures, but a change in mentality and an adjustment of Romanian society to European standards. Romania saw this happen in the period between the two world wars, thus proving its capability along these lines, which we should be aware of now that we need to engage the endeavors of the whole of society. Our country, said the Romanian minister in the program entitled "Romania—The Imperative of Euro-Atlantic Integration," opted after December 1989 for a new system of values, for a society based on the values of democracy, pluralism, and the market economy.

Romania: UDMR Chairman Comments on EU Accession

LD1205200696 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 12 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Leading Transylvanian Hungarian politicians think that the EU is deliberately delaying the admission of East European countries. Peter Marvanyi reports from Nagyvarad [Oradea].

[Begin Marvanyi recording] The current Hungarian Government is not observing its three foreign policy priorities [EU integration, good relations with its neighbors, support for the Hungarian communities in its neighboring countries]: Efforts toward European integration have overshadowed the interests of the Hungarians beyond the borders, Laszlo Tokes, honorary chairman of the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania

[UDMR], said in Nagyvarad. Addressing a political forum closing the town's one-week Varadinum festivities, Laszlo Tokes warned that leaving Romania behind will hit the Hungarian community of Romania twice as hard. He, however, added: We do not want to have an integration that will negatively affect minorities.

Tokes sharply criticized Tom Lantos [U.S. congressman of Hungarian descent] for proposing to grant the most-favored-nation status to Romania on a permanent basis. [end recording]

Romania: Iliescu Wants 'Reciprocity' With BBC

AU1405100396 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 11-12 May 96 p 2

[Article by Constantin Coroiu: "Regarding the BBC, President Ion Iliescu Asked and Wondered in Iasi: 'Are We a Colony or Something? Do We Really Lack National Dignity?'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Late Thursday night in the lobby of the national theater in Iasi, at a news conference following the play that opened the Ion Luca Caragiale theater festival, President Ion Iliescu replied to a question regarding the BBC radio programs broadcast in Romania. The issue was raised due to the recent statements by Adrian Nastase, executive president of the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania], as well as the complaint [accusing the BBC of biased reporting] that he addressed on this issue to the CNA [National Audiovisual Council].

Here is what Iliescu said: "The BBC enjoys positive discrimination. It is the sole foreign radio station bestowed with the opportunity of having its programs taken over by a very large number of domestic radios. No other foreign radio station has such an opportunity. That is why I believe that the BBC, too, should pay more attention to the objectivity and equidistance with which it makes use of that privilege. Reciprocity is, perhaps, also needed here. Why should our public radio stations not be able to penetrate there by means of the BBC network, especially considering that the information we send abroad is next to nothing? The complaint sent by Mr. Nastase to the CNA is a point of view that ought to be taken into consideration both by the BBC and the CNA, and I believe that the CNA itself could also raise the issue of reciprocity. I mean, are we a colony or something? Do we really lack national dignity? Why should we not seize this opportunity to obtain reciprocity, to make our country and, generally, our life in this land better known? In our relations with foreign countries, let us not behave like poor relatives who are given nothing but lectures from some professors in matters of democracy. What is at stake here is our history, identity, dignity, patrimony, and intellectual strength, and we should be the first to show respect for these things.

Slovenia: Liberals Hope To Prevent Thaler's Fall

AU1305153596 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 13 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek has today called a meeting of representatives of both coalition parties to reexamine positions on the interpellation of the foreign minister. It is thought that this motion will feature on the parliamentary agenda as early as this week.

The representatives of both parties also backed the measures aimed at unburdening of the economy. Sandi Frelih reports:

[Begin recording] [Frelih] The Christian Democrats, they said, waited outside the government building for quite some time, while the other side was allegedly looking for a place to hold the talks. The two parties are still not agreed on the interpellation. [passage omitted]

[Frelih] And how will Liberal Democracy, which has announced that it would break the coalition agreement in such a case, react? Secretary General Gregor Golobic said:

[Golobic] Over the next few days until the interpellation, we will be striving to convince the Christian Democrats, other deputies' groups, and individual deputies that this interpellation is not about a particular person or a particular post in the government but about the interests of Slovenia and the credibility of Slovene national policy toward the world at a very sensitive moment, when Slovenia is just about to sign the EU association agreement. In this sense, we expect to succeed in preventing the foreign minister's fall and all the ensuing consequences. In any case, we will—and we have openly told the Christian Democrats this today—the party president, the prime minister will propose that the incumbent party body, that is, the party council, examine the consequences, also regarding the coalition.

[Frelih] Both parties supported the planned government measures [words indistinct] debated by the government economic collegium that among other things [words indistinct] and selective taxation of salaries. The Christian Democrats also warned their partners that the United List state secretaries were still active in the government and raised some personnel problems that were concerning them. [end recording]

Slovenia: Kacin on Transformation of Army, Exercises

AU1305132696 Ljubljana DNEVNIK in Slovene 10 May 96 p 5

[STA report: "New Commands Soon"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ljubljana, 10 May—The training of the first generation of Slovene soldiers started in Pekre five years ago. With this, the Territorial Defense organized its peacetime corps for the first time and started evolving into the national army, the Slovene Army, Defense Minister Jelko Kacin said at a news conference yesterday, when he spoke about the Slovene Army Day (15 May) and the central celebration that will take place in the Moste Polje barracks on 11 May.

Over five years the Slovene Army has undergone numerous transformations, and all the basic branches of the Slovene Army have been set up by now, Minister Kacin said and emphasized that the development of the individual branches will remain a reorganization priority even in the future. In the time to come, they expect to pay special attention to the development of the air defense and military aviation, which are supposed to get their commands soon. With this, the Slovene Army will meet all the standards of the NATO members.

Regarding the security integration processes and international cooperation, Minister Kacin drew attention to two important events with international participation that that will be organized in Slovenia in the future. The first is the Potres [earthquake] exercise, which will take place in October and in which the medical corps of the National Guard of Colorado will participate. The exercise, according to Kacin, represents a new chapter in international relations and is a part of preparations for an even more important military exercise named Cooperative Aid in which the medical corps of the Partnership for Peace members will take part.

To be able to cooperate with Partnership for Peace and NATO member states on an equal footing, the Slovene Army must form a special professional Slovene Army unit in which the officers would be trained to undertake the most responsible tasks at the joint maneuvers, Minister Kacin said.

State Secretary Gorazd Vidrih spoke in more detail about the special unit. He explained that its formation was a part of the realization of the program of interoperational capability, which the Slovene Army started in January 1995 and which binds it to the harmonization of procedures and standards for the realization of joint drills. The preparation and formation of the special unit will take place in three stages and is supposed to be completed by the end of 1998, Vidrih said, and emphasized that this will be a major financial expenditure. Slovene Army General Staff Commander Albin Gutman, among other things, said that the Slovene Army is capable of performing all its duties, within the boundaries of its capabilities.

Some new military hardware was also shown for the first time at the central Slovene Army Day celebration. The items in question were a Puch jeep, a Unimog tow truck for the requirements of artillery units, and communication equipment purchased earlier this year.

Slovenia: TAM Negotiates With Iran Despite Bankruptcy

AU1405120796 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1100 GMT 14 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The members of the TAM managerial board met in Ljubljana this morning. Reportedly they discussed the hire contracts for the newly formed companies and studied the offers that arrived in response to an invitation to bid for the sale of TAM's real estate assets. They allegedly also discussed the sale of the TAM enterprise to Zagreb.

Judge Janez Zeithofer, president of the receivership administration for the TAM enterprise, concluded that the application for realizing the bankruptcy procedure was incomplete because it did not contain the consensus of the TAM stockholders' assembly on starting the bankruptcy procedure. He demanded that the application be supplemented with this consensus.

Upon his return from Iran, where he negotiated the safeguarding of markets for the newly formed TAM companies with the Iranian business partners, Joze Lukaric, the president of TAM management, said that new direct sale options without any provisions were opening in the trade between the countries. He also signed a letter of intent for a deal worth $5 million with the Iranian partner. The deal involves the purchase of classical TAM products, namely sets [garniture], trucks, and buses.

Federal

FRY: Government Assails 'Sheer Falsehood' of UN Resolution

LD1405113696 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0949 GMT 14 May 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, May 14 (TANJUG)—The following is the second part of the comments of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the draft resolution on the 'Situation of Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia' adopted by the U.N. Human Rights Commission at its 52nd session.

The comments were circulated as an official document at Le Palais des Nations in Geneva on April 22, 1996.

'To single out the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, particularly 'Kosovo' in the resolution, implies inviting separatist forces in that autonomous province of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to forceful secession (the objective publicly proclaimed by separatist leaders). It is a fact that concern for the human rights situation in other parts of the former Yugoslavia is explicitly mentioned in the reports of the special rapporteur. Hence, the resolution should either make reference to all these parts, or voice its concern for the territory of the former Yugoslavia on a broader scale. At present, violation of human rights, as well as conflicts between Moslems and Croats (e.g. Mostar), the extremely difficult plight of the remaining Serbs and the violation of their human rights are of special concern of the international community.

'The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is resolutely rejecting the charges on its alleged violation of the rights of minorities. In the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which is a state of all the citizens, as stipulated by its Constitution, there is every historical, legal and other precondition for coexistence of all its inhabitants, regardless of their national, ethnic or religious origin.

'The status of all the minorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is determined under respective federal and republican constitutions, and relevant laws, in compliance with the United Nations, the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe or the Council of Europe documents in the minority rights field.

'The allegation that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's 'legislation is discriminatory towards minorities' is sheer falsehood, and the demand for its cancellation, contained in the resolution is nothing but the dangerous political game.

'We recall that it is incumbent upon the authors of the draft resolution to give evidence for their allegations by explicitly indicating the titles of specific laws, thus making it possible for the govermnent involved to take measures for their cancellation or improvement. However, since these allegations are pure falsehoods aimed at engineering proof for accusations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the commission's regular practice and procedure are, once again, being violated.

'As regards Kosovo and Metohija—which is the name of this region of the Republic of Serbia—and the objective problems persisting there, the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has so far submitted large volumes containing explanatory facts on the situation in that region to all relevant international governmental and non-governmental organizations. This time, again, we should like to emphasize the irrefutable fact that no violation of human rights of the Albanian minority has been practised by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Kosovo and Metohija. The bare truth is that the political leaders of this minority are trying to secede from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and to bring about annexation of a part of its territory to Albania, while ignoring the legitimately elected bodies of government and its institutions and refusing coooperation and dialogue.

'If the aim is to reach practical results, there must be a moderation in language and description of facts, for example: why the Albanians do not participate in the political life, why the Albanian minority children do not go to school. Because they do not recognize the state educational system, not even the state itself (Elisabeth Rehn, Report E/Cn.4/1996/63).

'The authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are completely open and willing to have a dialogue, in contrast to the ethnic Albanian minority's representatives, who are openly advocating confrontation and secession.' (More to follow on Wednesday [15 May])

FRY: TANJUG Reports EU Ready To Continue Normalizing Ties

LD1405104096 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0958 GMT 14 May 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brussels, May 14 (TANJUG)—The European Union ministers said on Monday that the EU was ready to continue normalizing relations with Yugoslavia, in keeping with an Apr. 9 decision adopted in Rome.

The one-day session focused mainly on developments in the former Yugoslavia, said a EU statement.

The statement said the EU would examine with international high representative on Bosnia Carl Bildt improving relations with Yugoslavia.

The conclusions said the EU desired to improve contact with the leaders of Republika Srpska who have shown a readiness to implement the Dayton peace process, to which the opening of Bildt's office in Banja Luka will provide fresh impetus.

The ministers agreed that the consolidation of the Muslim-Croat Federation was a key element of the Bosnian peace process and appealed to both sides to overcome difficulties.

The problem-plagued federation was formed in March 1994 at Washington's initiative.

Elections in Bosnia, scheduled tentatively for late September, under the terms of the Dayton peace agreement, and the return of refugees, are the biggest trials for the peace process in Yugoslavia, said the ministers.

They said a planned visit of senior EU officials to states created in the former Yugoslavia had been postponed for technical reasons, due to the coming government changes in Italy, which presides over the EU until July 1.

The visit is, however, expected to take place in the nearest future, possibly by the end of May or early June.

Hastening the visit is a EU conference due in Florence on June 13-14 to discuss semi-annual efforts to establish peace in the former Yugoslavia.

Serbia

Serbia: Motor Workers Again Rally Over Unpaid Wages

AU1405110596 Paris AFP in English 1034 GMT 14 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, May 14 (AFP)—About 1,000 angry motor-construction workers rallied in front of the federal parliament building on Tuesday in protest over months of unpaid wages and to show support for the governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia.

It was the second demonstration on the streets of Belgrade in as many days after the collapse of talks on Monday between workers from the state vehicle manufacturer IMT and the Serbian government.

"We are here because we are hungry, because we haven't been paid for four months and we want to work and live decently," said one of the demonstrators.

A large police presence was evident around the parliament building and the park opposite as more workers arrived to join the protest.

Vuk Draskovic, leader of the Serbian Renewal Movement, the main opposition party, said he supported "those who want reforms against the state mafia which wants to retain the status quo."

On Monday between 2,000 and 3,000 IMT workers demonstrated outside Serbian government headquarters but rejected a government offer to pay wages owed for January and then to start talks over the rest of the unpaid salaries.

Tuesday's demonstration was also a show of support for central bank governor Dragoslav Avromovic, who has repeatedly clashed with the government and urged workers to protest for reforms.

Avromovic has accused the government of deliberately torpedoeing negotiations in March for the readmission of rump Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to the International Monetary Fund, saying the Yugoslav economy can only be saved by foreign aid.

Serbia: New Protests Demand Immediate IMF Negotiations

LD1405110096 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0932 GMT 14 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 14 May (TANJUG)—The United Independence Trade Union [as received] organized a protest rally that began today in front of the Federal Assembly building with several hundred workers from the Belgrade Machine and Tractor Industry (IMT) plant, 21 May [engineering] plant [name of plant as received], and members of the Foreign Currency Account Holders' Association taking part.

The participants in the rally are demanding the immediate opening of negotiations with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank on the basis of Yugoslav National Bank Governor Avramovic's blueprint. They want him to head the Yugoslav delegation for the talks.

The rally participants are also demanding that the federal government and parliament adopt the law on privatization tabled by Governor Avramovic's task group. They are demanding live TV coverage of the debate.

The demonstrators are demanding that the central bank governor address the rally. The traffic in front of the Federal Assembly has come to a halt.

Serbia: Nis Workers Interrupt Strike, Set 31 May Deadline

LD1405103596 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1024 GMT 14 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Nis, May 14 (TANJUG)—Workers of the Machine Industry Nis (MIN) interrupted their general strike on Tuesday [14 May] giving the municipal authorities until May 31 to meet their demands, the strikers' committee said.

The workers are demanding revival of production, increase of employment and repayment of the public firms' outstanding debt to MIN.

Serbian Trade and Tourism Minister Srdjan Nikolic told the local radio in relation to the strike that the workers must seek the solution to their problems in better competititvness of the firms.

The President of the Serbian Autonomous Trade Union Tomislav Banovic on Monday accused the independent trade unions of organising strikes 'whenever the autonomous union reaches an agreement on launching production in a firm' and added they were being helped by certain international trade union associations.

The strikers' commttee warned, however, that they would resume the strike on June 3 if the workers' demands were not met.

Serbia: Talks Collapse With Workers Over Unpaid Wages

AU1305184396 Paris AFP in English 1812 GMT 13 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Belgrade, May 13 (AFP)—Talks between the government and workers demanding months of unpaid wages collapsed Monday despite a demonstration backed by rump Yugoslavia's central bank governor, trade union sources said.

A delegation from the some 3,000 tractor workers who took to the streets met Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Slobodan Babic for three hours to discuss demands to be paid wages owed since January.

But the meeting broke up after Babic suggested paying only January's wages, and proposed instead that discussions start about paying money owed since then in phases.

The workers promptly announced another demonstration on Tuesday followed by a march to the federal parliament building in support of central bank governor Dragoslav Avramovic. [passage omitted]

Meanwhile some 10,000 electrical factory workers took to the streets of the southern city of Nis calling for social reforms, despite concessions by local authorities who allowed 30,000 people total or partial rent relief.

Serbia: Striking Workers, Government Reach Agreement

LD1305184496 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1657 GMT 13 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 13 May (TANJUG)—During this afternoon, Serbian Government representatives reached an agreement with the delegation of striking workers from the "machine and tractor industry" (IMT) plant of Novi Beograd. The workers have been assembled in front of the Serbian Government building since this morning demanding back payment of four months' pay and the relaunch of production.

According to Ljiljana Jovanovic, the assistant republic minister of information, it has been agreed that the unpaid part of the January wages will be paid within the next two days, and that the cutting of electricity supplies to families who have not paid their electricity bills because wages had not been paid will stop.

"The government and the workers are against printing money and insist on an urgent investigation to analyze what steps have been taken to relaunch production in the metal complex, bearing in mind the March agreement in which, along with the representatives of the government, the representatives of the Chamber of Commerce and the union took part," Jovanovic said.

During the long and fair talks in which Slobodan Babic, the republican deputy prime minister, Finance Minister Dusan Vlatkovic, and the 12-member IMT delegation took part, it was agreed that in the next three to four months "a continuity in the payment of the reached level of salaries will be secured, which will be a result of the realized production."

"At the same time, IMT will remain in the Fund for Guaranteed Wages," Jovanovic added.

The realization of all elements of the agreement reached will be reviewed at the next meeting between the government and the workers scheduled for 17 May.

Serbia: Nis Strikers Suspend Strike, Negotiations Continue

AU1305174096 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 13 May 96 p 1

[Article by Z. Kosanovic: "Director Removed—Strike Suspended"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Nis—At yesterday's meeting, the Executive Board of the EI [Electronic Industry] holding company accepted the resignation of Director

General Borivoje Mitrovic, who stated that it is "impossible to manage EI because of the new situation."

Radisav Paunovic, director the EI Television Factory stock company and former chairman of the Executive Board, was designated acting director general and Bratislav Milovanovic, dean of the Faculty for Electric Engineering in Nis, was designated the new chairman of the Executive Board.

The Executive Board assessed that there is no reason for the employees to protest any further because "it will only result in the company losing credibility and the confidence of its business partners, which would be an invaluable damage to the company."

"The reasons stated show how necessary it is for the workers to stop their protests and resume work at their companies on the basis of agreements reached with the board of strikers. The Executive Board believes that the workers should return to work today," it is said in the statement issued by the Executive Board.

Sinisa Jovancic, chairman of the board of strikers, said yesterday that the strike would be suspended but that the board of strikers would continue with its work until the workers' demands were fully met. He called on all the workers to return to work today where trade union officials will inform them of the results of the negotiations.

Serbia: Avramovic Addresses Antigovernment Protest Rally

AU1305145396 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 13 May 96

[Report by Matej Surc from Belgrade—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is the greatest of honors for me that you invited me to attend the protest meeting outside the Serbian Government building and that you wish to hear my proposals for a way out of the crisis. It was with these words that Dragoslav Avramovic [FRY National Bank Governor] started his address to the metal workers from Rakovica, who greeted him with tumultuous ovations and chanting "We are not giving up Avram."

The governor pointed out the need to establish contacts with the international financial institutions, as any delay would increase the Yugoslav debt drastically. He also publicly unveiled the speculations of the financial oligarchy, which is refusing to cut budget spending.

Avramovic also told the demonstrators about the contents of the latest IMF letter, in which the Fund rejects all the Belgrade government's proposals. Afterward, the governor explained his concept of privatization, which envisages the distribution of vouchers to employees in enterprises and the formation of a pension fund, while, according to the government concept, the director himself would decide whether or not to privatize the enterprise.

Avramovic also stressed the need to regulate relations with all the republics of the former Yugoslavia. I give you my word that I will try to do everything in the interest of the workers and farmers. However, there will be no changes as long as the workers refuse them, the governor concluded. He also called on the police guarding the republican government building to side with the protesters.

We are, therefore, witnessing a radical change in Serbia. The metalworkers from Rakovica used to be the striking fist of the policy that relied on public meetings. With his antinflation program, Avramovic merely extended the authorities' agony. Today, the governor and the heavy industry workers both stood up against the regime, although it is questionable how far they will go and what obstacles they will encounter.

The Federal Assembly is to decide on Avramovic's fate and the concept of privatization tomorrow. A crowd of demonstrators, humiliated and deceived Serbian citizens, is expected to gather to support their informal leader, the National Bank Governor.

Serbia: Bank Governor Urges Protesters To Demand Reforms

AU1305154896 Paris AFP in English 1527 GMT 13 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, May 13 (AFP)—Central bank governor Dragoslav Avramovic on Monday urged thousands of angry workers demonstrating on the streets of Belgrade to back his campaign for financial rigour as the best way to secure unpaid wages.

The 76-year-old governor, who has clashed with the government over his attempts to fight hyper-inflation, urged some 3,000 workers to press for reforms which would save the rump Yugoslavia's crisis-bound economy.

"If the workers don't show that they want change, they won't get it," he said to loud cheers from tractor workers protesting in front of the federal government building over salaries that have gone unpaid for four months.

The demonstrators chanted "Deda Avram"—Grandfather Avram—the nickname of the governor, who is regarded by many of Serbia and Montenegro's 10 million inhabitants as a miracle-worker who has juggled hyper-infation of more than 300 million percent in 1994.

Demonstrators also carried placards telling government leaders "No to your games, where's the bread?" and "We want reforms."

Saying that he had no personal ambition, Avramovic gave a stern warning about Belgrade's economic policies.

"They are demanding that I print banknotes. If I agree, prices will rocket within two weeks," he said.

The governor, who has been asked to appear before the federal parliament on Tuesday to explain his row with the government, criticised the government's privatisation drive.

He also repeated his accusation that the government last March torpedoed negotiations on the readmission of the rump Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) into the International Monetary Fund when they were on the brink of success.

Avramovic said that without foreign credit, the Yugoslav economy could quickly collapse.

Demonstrators vowed to protest in front of the Yugoslav Parliament on Tuesday to show their support for the governor. The main Serb opposition party, the Serb Renewal Movement, has also urged its supporters to join the protest.

Meanwhile, calm returned to the southern Serbian city of Nis, where there have been repeated rallies by metalworkers in which protestors have clashed with police.

Last month some 1,200 metal industry workers demonstrated to demand lower income taxes and charges, aid for export and the payment of debts totalling 120 million dollars by state-owned firms and the Yugoslav Armed Forces.

Serbia: Parties Appeal for Support for Bank Governor

LD1305171396 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1613 GMT 13 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 13 May (SRNA)—The Democratic Party, Serbian Renewal Movement, and Civic Alliance of Serbia have addressed an appeal to the citizens of Belgrade to rally in front of the Federal Assembly at 1000 tomorrow morning in order to support National Bank Governor Dragoslav Avramovic in his intention to address deputies.

"We are inviting you to come together with trade unions and opposition party deputies to defend Governor Avramovic from the tyranny of the Socialist regime," the appeal says, adding: "The Socialist regime is intending to replace Governor Avramovic and thrust the country back into hyperinflation. Come to fight for Avramovic's right to be heard by the citizens."

Serbia: National Bank Rejects Avramovic 'Ultimatum'

LD1405135096 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1241 GMT 14 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 14 May (TANJUG)—At a session last night, the board of the National Bank of Yugoslavia [NBJ] did not accept the ultimatum-like demand put forward by NBJ Governor Dragoslav Avramovic to be the sole person to conduct negotiations with international financial institutions, and it established a series of other irregularities in his work, the board said in a statement issued today and dispatched to TANJUG.

The statement says that the board did not accept the ultimatum that a solution should be sought through the governor's personal contact with international financial institutions, and decided that, considering the importance of the issue, the federal government, the NBJ, and other banks and economic players must be involved in the negotiations as much as possible.

The board believes that the governor's ultimatum-like demand for this issue to be his own monopoly "has already caused huge damage to the process of creating the conditions for pursuing adequate loan and monetary policies and speeding up the pace of production and exports."

The board also discussed the announced personnel and organizational changes and their illegal implementation. The board established that the governor's actions were illegal.

The governor also made impossible the adoption of a statute and other documents regulating the work of the NBJ as an institution of great importance for implementation of the country's monetary and foreign currency policies.

"The board wishes to point out in this statement that the governor did not chair the board's session in line with the rules of procedure and that he left the session before it was over," the statement by the NBJ board said in conclusion.

Serbia: Vojvodina Party Leaders Sign Autonomy Manifesto

AU1405081196 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 13 May 96 p 5

[Article by M. Kalinic: "We Are Not Separatists"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Indjija—Seventeen parties, associations, and organizations signed a document that the general public knows as the manifesto for Vojvodina autonomy, the goal of which is "a better organization of the region in which we live." "The manifesto itself is not only about what Vojvodina will be like in the future, but also about what the country we are currently living in will be like." This was stated at the promotion of the manifesto for Vojvodina autonomy held in Indjija. The gathering was addressed by Nenad Canak, president of the League of Vojvodina Social Democrats, Stanimir Lazic, president of the Vojvodina Club, Miodrag Isakov, president of the independent deputy caucus in the Vojvodina Assembly, Marjan Risticevic, member of the People's Peasant Party, and Danilo Beukovic, federal deputy from the Serbian Renewal Movement.

"Vojvodina provided 42 percent of the funds for Serbia's 1995 budget, yet it only received a fraction for its needs. Seventy percent of the soldiers mobilized for the war came from Vojvodina, that is, by 1 March 1992, 106,824 people had been drafted. We have now reached the point where 73 percent of refugees in the country are in Vojvodina. I can understand that; Vojvodina is attractive because it is populated by tolerant people and is, economically, the most developed part of the country," Canak said. [passage omitted]

Stanimir Lazic, president of the Vojvodina Club, explained the demands of the manifesto's signatories, and said that the they want to initiate a procedure to change Serbia's and the FRY's Constitution so as to enable Vojvodina to become an autonomous province and a modern European region in which all citizens will be equal irrespective of ethnicity, ancestry, or religion. Lazic said that the province will guarantee collective rights for all ethnic minorities, including their right to political organization, except for the right to territorial organization on an ethnic basis. The participants in the rally demanded a clear division of the province's authorities from those of the state to which Vojvodina belongs, that is, they demanded full legislative, judicial, and executive power.

"We are not demanding any rights in usual state domains such as the army, foreign affairs, the monetary system, and state security. We are not demanding secession from Serbia. We have submitted our requests to all legitimate authorities in Serbia and the FRY. We have also contacted international organizations such as the United Nations, the Security Council, the EU, and the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], and informed them of our demands that they should keep in mind when solving open issue in the former Yugoslavia," Stanimir Lazic said. [passage omitted]

Of the 19 parties active in Vojvodina, four parties have not stated their stance on the manifesto (the Socialist Party of Serbia, the Yugoslav Left, the Democratic Community of Vojvodinians and Croats, Hungarians' Civic Movement,), two parties are against it (the League of Communists—Movement for Yugoslavia and the Serbian Radical Party), while the Democratic party of Serbia and the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians have a different idea of Vojvodina's organization.

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